Quinn v. Scott

• Decision Date: 24 March 1876
• Citation: 22 Minn. 456
• Parties: JOHN B. QUINN <I>vs.</I> JAMES G. SCOTT.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 456

22 Minn. 456

JOHN B. QUINN vs. JAMES G. SCOTT.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 24, 1876.

Action for slander. Plaintiff was city justice of the city of Faribault. Two horses had been stolen at that city, and one Quackenbush and others had been arrested, on a warrant issued by plaintiff, as the supposed thieves, and brought before plaintiff for examination, and upon such examination discharged. The complaint, after stating these facts, alleges that, immediately after the discharge of the prisoner, the defendant, with intent, etc., falsely and maliciously spoke and published, of and concerning the plaintiff in the exercise of his said office, in the presence and hearing of several citizens named, the false, defamatory and malicious words following, which are set forth in the complaint, with proper innuendoes: "There is no use bringing any horse thieves to this town, for the justice is in the ring just as bad as any of them. I believe Quinn belongs to the gang of thieves. The justice is in the gang and interested with them," etc.

The answer, after admitting the larceny of the horses, and the arrest and examination before plaintiff, as city justice, proceeds: "And after such examination before such justice, and after having the undisputed testimony of reliable witnesses showing clearly that said Quackenbush had been detected in the theft, * * * said Quackenbush was discharged by said justice, as alleged in the complaint, and allowed to go unpunished. That upon the discharge of said Quackenbush by said justice many of the citizens of Rice county, including defendant — by whose exertions and at whose expense mainly the detection and arrest of said Quackenbush and the recovery of said stolen property had been procured — believing such discharge to be unjust, and that upon the evidence before said justice he ought to have been required to give bail for his appearance to the court, discoursed somewhat, and expressed their opinion as to the propriety of said examination, and of the discharge of said Quackenbush.

"That the defendant is unable to recollect or state the exact words or language used by him on that occasion, further than that defendant did on that occasion give his opinion merely to the effect that said Quackenbush ought not to have been discharged upon the evidence as given at the examination, and that said justice ought to have held him to bail; and that the discharge of Quackenbush, with all the proof which was arrayed against him, might reasonably lead to the belief that said justice was in sympathy with the defendant.

"That nothing was said or uttered by the defendant, on that occasion or any other, with intent to injure him or his reputation in any manner; but whatever was spoken by defendant was without malice or ill-will toward the plaintiff, or any one."

At the trial in the district court for Rice county, before Lord, J., the plaintiff had a verdict, on which judgment was entered, and defendant appealed. The exceptions taken at the trial are stated in the opinion.

Batchelder & Buckham and Gordon E. Cole, for appellant.

Perkins & Mott and George N. Baxter, for respondent.

CORNELL, J.¹

This case comes before us upon exceptions embodied in a settled case, which purports to contain "a correct and full statement of the evidence, rulings and exceptions on the trial." Among the defendant's requests, the refusal to charge which is now claimed as error, is the following: "That if the conduct of the plaintiff in the examination which had transpired in discharging the party accused was such, in view of all the evidence which had been adduced, as to produce in the mind of a reasonable man, hearing the examination and evidence, a belief that the plaintiff was connected in interest with the gang of which the accused was a member, as charged by the defendant, this would be competent to rebut the presumption of malice in the defendant in speaking the words, and you are entitled to consider it in mitigation."

Facts and circumstances, sufficient to induce in a reasonable man a belief in the truth of the alleged defamatory matter, could by no possibility have influenced the defendant in making the charge, unless brought home to his knowledge, and productive of a like belief on his part; and even though he possessed the information, if he did not in fact rely upon it, nor believe the truth of his accusation when made, it would furnish no evidence in mitigation, as tending to explain quo animo the charge was made, and to repel the inference of malice. Gorton v. Keeler, 51 Barb. 475. Inasmuch as the instruction prayed for, even though in other respects proper, omitted both these elements of knowledge and belief on the part of the defendant, it was rightly refused.

Another alleged ground of error insisted upon here is that portion of the charge given by the court to the jury in these words: "No justification has been shown, in this case, of the language used by the defendant, imputing to the plaintiff misconduct and want of integrity in the discharge charge of his office, and no mitigating circumstances, except the excitement under which the defendant was laboring at the time of speaking."

As we understand the defendant, the particular portion of this charge to which objection is now made is that part which instructed the jury that no mitigating circumstances had been shown except the excitement of the defendant. It is contended that under it, and the other instructions which were given, no question was left for the consideration of...