Quinn v. State

• Decision Date: 25 January 1928
• Docket Number: 20717
• Citation: 160 N.E. 453,118 Ohio St. 48
• Parties: Quinn, Aud., Et Al. v. The State, Ex Rel. Leroy.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

160 N.E. 453

118 Ohio St. 48

Quinn, Aud., Et Al. v. The State, Ex Rel. Leroy.

No. 20717

Supreme Court of Ohio

January 25, 1928.

Res adjudicate - Applies to material questions which were or might have been litigated - Parties to action and persons in privity bound by former judgement - Privity of contract exists, when - Parties to public contract bound by adjudication in taxpayer's suit - Defense of invalidity of contract not available in later mandamus proceeding.

1. Material facts or questions which were in issue in a former suit and were there judicially determined by a court of competent jurisdiction are conclusively settled by the judgment therein so far as concerns the parties Lo that action and persons in privity with them and cannot be again litigated in any future action between the same parties or privies, and this rule also applies not only to what was determined but also as to every other question which might properly have been litigated in the case. (Hixon v. Ogg, 53 Ohio St. 361, 42 N. E., 32, and Strangward v. American Brass Bedstead Co., 82 Ohio St. 12l, 91 N. E., 988, followed and approved.)

2. Privity of contract is the relationship that exists between two or more contracting parties, and where the legality of a contract is determined in a suit brought by a taxpayer, the parties to such contract with knowledge of such suit are in privity and bound thereby although only one of them is made party to such suit.

3. Where the legality of a public contract has once been determined in a proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, between a taxpayer and the public officials who were parties to such contract and other officials whose official action is necessary to the process of payment of money due under said contract, all parties and their privies to such record are bound by such judgment; in an action in mandamus to compel payment of the amount due under such contract afterwards brought by one in privity with one of the parties to the prior suit, such officials will not be allowed to avail themselves of the same defenses that were passed upon and determined in such prior suit, such judgment constituting res adjudicate.

The original action in this cause was one in mandamus, begun in the Court of Appeals of Perry county. The petition discloses that the relator, J. A. Leroy, in September, 1926, had a contract with the board of county commissioners of Perry county whereby he was to furnish all the equipment, labor, and material for installing a new heating plant in the courthouse, jail, and sheriff's residence of said county, at an agreed price of $5,450; that said Leroy went forward and completed said work, which was accepted, approved, and confirmed by the board of county commissioners, which drew a warrant on the respondent, J. W Quinn, as county auditor of Perry county, directing him to draw a warrant on the county treasurer of said county in payment of the obligation of said contract; that before the same was paid one George D. Kildow, a taxpayer of Perry county, filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of said county, praying for a restraining order against the issuance of said warrant and the payment of said amount, averring as his grounds for such injunction the failure of the county commissioners to comply with certain statutory requirements in the performance of a public contract of the character and kind entered into between said Leroy and such board of county commissioners.

In that action J. W. Quinn as county auditor, David J. Lewis as county treasurer, and the board of county commissioners of Perry county were all parties defendant.

An answer was filed by the prosecuting attorney, in which, as a first defense, it was averred that the prosecuting attorney had duly certified that the pro- ceedings in the premises were in accordance with the statutes, and, as a second defense, that the taxpayer on whose relation the suit was begun had been an unsuccessful bidder, and that he stood by and allowed the successful bidder, Leroy, to go forward and furnish the...