Quinn v. State
| Decision Date | 01 November 1935 |
| Docket Number | 26486 |
| Citation | 198 N.E. 70,209 Ind. 316 |
| Parties | QUINN v. STATE |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Thaddeus Quinn was convicted of robbery and from a judgment denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis, he appeals.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court; Chester G. Vernon, Judge.
Ernest Maholm, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Philip Lutz, Jr., of Boonville, and James D. Sturgis, of Indianapolis, for the State.
On the 29th day of April, 1933, the appellant entered a plea of guilty in the Morgan circuit court to the charge of bank robbery, and was sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for life. On the 5th day of June, 1934, he filed in that court a verified petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Notice was served on the prosecuting attorney who appeared and filed an answer in general denial. The cause was submitted to the court for trial. Both appellant and appellee introduced evidence, documentary and oral. The court denied the petition. Appellant, without filing a motion for a new trial has appealed and assigned as error the court's refusal to grant his petition.
Appellant charged in his petition that at the time he entered the plea of guilty, he was 19 years of age, without funds to employ counsel; that he did not understand court proceedings, the nature of the charge, the severity of the punishment, and that he was entitled to a trial by jury upon the merits. Prayer that the judgment of conviction be set aside and that he be permitted to withdraw the plea of guilty.
The record discloses that at the time appellant was arraigned, the charge was read to him; the court asked him whether or not he had counsel. A negative answer was made to the question and the court then stated that the county attorney would be appointed to represent him. Thereupon the appellant stated that he did not want an attorney; that he was guilty as charged. The court caused the statute defining the crime of bank robbery with the use of arms to be read to appellant, but he stated that he desired to plead guilty and throw himself upon the mercy of the court. The evidence discloses that appellant was almost twenty years of age at the time, married, and had two children; that he had been employed prior thereto as an electrician in the city of Indianapolis, where he had resided since he was five years of age; that he graduated from the Indianapolis common schools; that he was intelligent, fully capable, and sufficiently experienced to comprehend all that took place in court at the time he entered the plea of guilty; that the court fully advised him as to his rights.
No attempt was made to show that, if he had been permitted to withdraw the plea of guilty and substitute therefor a plea of not guilty, he was in possession of any facts tending to establish his innocence. Wheeler v. State (1902) 158 Ind. 687, 696, 63 N.E. 975; Stephenson v. State (1932) 205 Ind. 141, 196, 179 N.E. 633, 186 N.E. 293. There was no charge of fraud or coercion upon the part of the court or any other person, but the plea of guilt was made freely and understandingly. Appellant rested his case solely upon the grounds (1) that the court did not fully advise him as to his rights, and (2) that under the Constitution he was entitled to a trial of the charge by a jury of twelve upon the merits.
The evidence further discloses that appellant and another, armed with automatic revolvers, entered the bank during business hours, commanded those present to lie upon the floor, and escaped with $ 5,000. Upon leaving the bank in a stolen automobile, the bandits engaged in a pistol duel with officers upon the streets of the town.
The proceedings invoked by the appellant in this case, though used to correct a sentence imposed in a criminal case, are considered as civil in their nature and not criminal. State v. Calhoun (1893) 50 Kan. 523, 32 P. 38, 18 L. R. A. 838, 34 Am. St. Rep. 141; State v. Ray (1922) 111 Kan. 350, 207 P. 192.
The function of a writ of error coram nobis is limited to the correction of an error of fact not appearing on the record and lies to the same court, in order that it may correct the error which, it is presumed, would not have been committed had the facts in the first instance been brought to its notice. It differs from a writ of error or a motion for a new trial, each of which is brought for a supposed error at law, apparent in the record, and which takes the case to a higher tribunal, where it may be decided and the judgment of the lower court affirmed or reversed. Fugate v. State (1904) 85 Miss. 94, 37 So. 554, 107 Am. St. Rep. 268, 3 Ann. Cas. 326; Sanders v. State (1882) 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. Rep. 29.
Where a proper remedy is afforded by appeal, a writ of error coram nobis will not lie. Sanders v. State, supra; In re Ernst (1923) 179 Wis. 646, 192 N.W. 65, 30 A. L. R. 681.
A writ is allowed only when it is made to appear to a reasonable certainty that there has been some error of fact. Holford v. Alexander (1847) 12 Ala. 280, 46 Am. Dec. 253, and note.
The writ cannot be claimed as a matter of right, but can be granted only on an affidavit showing error of fact, and is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 2 R. C. L. 306, § 261; Tyler v. Morris (1839) 20 N.C. 625, 34 Am. Dec. 395, and note; Holford v. Alexander, supra.
The application of appellant to withdraw the plea of guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Unless there appears to be an abuse of the discretion, the Supreme Court will not interfere. Lamick v. State (1925) 196 Ind. 71, 147 N.E. 139, 140; Mahoney v. State (1925) 197 Ind. 335, 149 N.E. 444; Blackburn v. State (1924) 195 Ind. 603, 145 N.E. 486, 146 N.E. 398.
'The denial of an application to withdraw a plea of guilty will generally be sustained on appeal, where the record discloses no ground for the application, or where it appears that the ruling was based on conflicting evidence, which the court was compelled to weigh to reach a conclusion.' Lamick v. State, supra; Dobosky v. State (1915) 183 Ind. 488, 109 N.E. 742; Rowe v. State (1921)...
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