Quinn v. Supreme Council Catholic Knights of America

• Decision Date: 15 May 1897
• Citation: 41 S.W. 343,99 Tenn. 80
• Parties: QUINN v. SUPREME COUNCIL, CATHOLIC KNIGHTS OF AMERICA et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

41 S.W. 343

99 Tenn. 80

QUINN v. SUPREME COUNCIL, CATHOLIC KNIGHTS OF AMERICA et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 15, 1897

Appeal from chancery court, Shelby County; Sneed, Chancellor.

Bill by Mary A. Quinn, executrix, against the Supreme Council Catholic Knights of America, and another. There was a decree dismissing the bill, and complainant appeals. Reversed and rendered.

W. W Goodwin, for appellant.

Randolph & Sons, for appellees.

BEARD J.

Thomas Quinn was a member of the order of Catholic Knights of America, and there was issued to him as such a beneficial certificate in which this institution agreed to pay to his wife, Mary Quinn, $2,000 at his death, upon the condition that he continued during life to pay into the order the dues assessments, etc., required under its constitution. Subsequently, finding the payments which were necessary to keep him in full fellowship in the order were becoming too burdensome, he proposed to the defendant Carter, if he would repay to him (Quinn) the sum of $55, already paid in by him and agree to assume and discharge all dues and assessments which might thereafter accrue against him on account of his membership, that (his wife assenting) he would assign or transfer to him (Carter) the beneficial certificate already issued, or else, delivering to the order the old certificate for cancellation, would cause the issuance of a new one, in which Carter should be named as beneficiary. This proposition was taken under advisement by Carter, who had one or more conversations with officers of the order in Memphis as to the legality of such a contract. Finally, becoming satisfied that he could safely do so, he accepted the terms proposed. Thereupon, on the back of the certificate, Quinn gave an order in writing to the supreme secretary of the Catholic Knights to issue a new certificate in lieu of the old, naming Carter as the beneficiary; and to this Mary Quinn gave, underneath, her written consent. For some reason, undisclosed in the record, this plan thus agreed upon was not carried out. Instead, as Quinn was in arrears for one or more of his assessments, it was evidently thought best to enforce against him suspension, as was authorized by a rule of the order, and in this mode work the change which was to substitute Carter as the beneficiary of the certificate in the room and stead of Mary Quinn. This is apparent from the testimony in the case, and especially from the minutes of the meeting of the order at which this suspension was effected. This minute on this subject recites as follows: "Mr. T. Quinn was suspended for nonpayment of assessments, reading at the same time a letter from the supreme secretary on the subject of changing beneficial certificate, it being the only course Mr. Quinn could pursue in the premises." It is to be observed that at the time of this transaction the laws of this order required the consent, in writing, of the beneficiary named in the certificate, to the surrender of the old and the issuance of a new certificate naming another beneficiary. The effect of this suspension, if not the purpose, was to disconnect Mrs. Quinn, without regard to her consent, from the certificate, and thus open up the way, upon Quinn's reinstatement, to a certificate absolutely under his control. When the suspension occurred, Mr. Carter paid the dues and assessments which Quinn had failed to pay, and the latter was reinstated to full membership. A new certificate was then issued, in which Thomas Quinn was named as beneficiary; and this was at once assigned and delivered to Carter, who at the same time paid to Quinn the small amount of money theretofore expended by him in keeping up his connection with the order. From that time Carter paid all the dues and assessments which accrued against Quinn up to the time of his death. The sum total of all these payments, as shown by the record, was less than $600. This assignment of the beneficial certificate to Carter was vested alone on the agreement and consideration above set forth. He was neither of kin to nor a creditor of Quinn. After the death of Quinn, his widow, Mary Quinn, qualified as executrix of his estate, and set up claim to this fund. Over her protest, however, the full sum of $2,000 was paid to the assignee. This bill was filed by the executrix, seeking to recover from Carter this sum, less the amount expended by him in keeping alive the certificate, and the sum paid by him to reimburse her testator. The chancellor dismissed her bill, and she has appealed.

An examination will disclose that there is an irreconcilable conflict among the authorities upon the question whether a person who has taken out a valid policy on his own life may afterwards assign it to a party who has no interest in that life. Among the cases maintaining the right of the holder of a policy on his own life taken out in good faith to assign it to one without an insurable interest in his life are Murphy v. Red, 64 Miss. 614, 1 So. 761; Bloomington v. Blue, 120 Ill. 121, 11 N.E. 331; Insurance Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24; Bursinger v. Bank, 67 Wis. 75, 30 N.W. 290; Clark v Allen, 11 R.I. 439; ...