Quinn v. U.S. Bank NA

• Decision Date: 21 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. B226143.,B226143.
• Citation: 2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8227,129 Cal.Rptr.3d 166,11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6858,24 A.D. Cases 1321,196 Cal.App.4th 168
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Robert QUINN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

196 Cal.App.4th 168

129 Cal.Rptr.3d 166

24 A.D. Cases 1321

11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6858

2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8227

Robert QUINN, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.U.S. BANK NA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B226143.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

June 6, 2011.

Review Denied Sept. 21, 2011.^*

Felahy Law Group, Long Beach, Allen B. Felahy, Oscar Ramirez, Boris Sorsher, and Zack Domb for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Los Angeles, Lori A. Bowman, Linda S. Goldman, and Matthew Effland for Defendants and Respondents.

SUZUKAWA, J.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed the present action alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and state common law against his former employer (a national bank) and his former supervisor. The bank and supervisor moved for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff's causes of action were preempted by section 24 of the National Bank Act, title 12 of the United States Code section 24, paragraph Fifth (section 24), which grants national banks the power to dismiss officers “at pleasure.” The trial court agreed that plaintiff's causes of action were preempted and granted summary judgment.

We reverse in part. We conclude that section 24's “at pleasure” clause was impliedly amended by the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), title 42, United States Code sections 12101–12213. As amended, section 24 preempts FEHA only to the extent that FEHA's disability provisions exceed the requirements of the ADA. Because the bank has not demonstrated that plaintiff's FEHA claims are preempted in their entirety by section 24, we reverse the grant of judgment for the bank as to those claims. Plaintiff concedes that his claim against his former supervisor is preempted, and we affirm the grant of summary judgment in his favor.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Robert Quinn (plaintiff) is a former senior vice president of defendant U.S. Bank NA. He was terminated on May 7, 2008, by his supervisor, defendant Wayne Brander. On April 24, 2009, plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH), alleging that he was denied accommodation, harassed, and terminated because of a physical disability. Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter on April 27, 2009, and he filed the present action on August 21, 2009.

The operative first amended complaint alleges that U.S. Bank and Brander (collectively, the Bank) (1) terminated plaintiff because he suffers from type 2 diabetes, (2) refused to accommodate plaintiff's diabetes, and (3) harassed plaintiff for seeking accommodations necessary to treat his diabetes. It further alleges that the Bank's conduct constituted disability/medical condition discrimination in violation of FEHA (first cause of action), wrongful termination in violation of public policy (second cause of action), harassment and hostile work environment based on disability/medical condition in violation of FEHA (third cause of action), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (fourth cause of action).

The Bank filed a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. It asserted that each of plaintiff's causes of action was completely preempted by section 24, which grants national banks the power “[t]o ... appoint directors, and by its board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and other officers, define their duties, require bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such officers or any of them at pleasure.” (Italics added.) Alternatively, the Bank urged that even if plaintiff's FEHA claims were not completely preempted, they were preempted to the extent that they relied on provisions of FEHA that are inconsistent with the ADA. The Bank identified two such inconsistent provisions. First, while FEHA provides for supervisor liability, the ADA does not. Thus, the Bank contended that plaintiff's claims against Brander were preempted. Second, the ADA provides a shorter statute of limitations than FEHA, requiring a claimant to file an administrative claim within 300 days of the last discriminatory act and to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter. Plaintiff did not file his action within the federal limitations period; thus, the Bank contended that plaintiff's claims were preempted in their entirety.

Plaintiff opposed the motion. He contended that the Bank could not invoke preemption because it could not establish that his termination had been ratified by the Bank's board of directors, as required by section 24. Further, he urged: (1) section 24 does not preempt FEHA claims, including claims for disability discrimination, because section 24 has been amended by subsequent federal civil rights legislation; (2) even if some FEHA claims are preempted by section 24, the present claims are not because the ADA impliedly amended section 24 and FEHA prohibits the same practices that are unlawful under the ADA; (3) the Bank's contention that plaintiff's FEHA claims are barred by the shorter statute of limitations of the ADA is not supported by any case law and is meritless.

The trial court granted the motion. As a preliminary matter, it rejected plaintiff's contention that the Bank was required to show that Brander consulted with the Board before deciding to terminate him. Instead, the court said that all the Bank had to show was that the Board ratified the termination; here, it did so. The court also found that section 24 preempted plaintiff's FEHA claims. It relied on Peatros v. Bank of America (2000) 22 Cal.4th 147, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 659, 990 P.2d 539( Peatros ), in which the California Supreme Court considered the extent to which title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, title 42, United States Code section 2000e et seq. (Title VII), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) preempted section 24. The trial court quoted Peatros as follows: “[S]ection 24, Fifth, as impliedly amended by Title VII and the ADEA, preempts FEHA to the extent that, unlike Title VII and the ADEA, FEHA confers on officers of a national bank a right against dismissal on the ground of physical disability, mental disability, medical condition.... [¶] ... [¶] Also, section 24, Fifth, as impliedly amended by Title VII and the ADEA, preempts FEHA to the extent that, unlike Title VII and the ADEA, FEHA creates a remedy for violation of the right of an officer of a national bank against dismissal on the ground of physical disability, mental disability, medical condition ... in the form of any relief whatsoever[.]” The trial court characterized these statements as dicta (presumably because the Peatros plaintiff alleged race and age discrimination, not disability discrimination), but it nonetheless held that they required a finding that plaintiff's physical and medical disability claims were preempted. It explained: “The question that must be resolved here, then, is whether plaintiff's medical and physical disabilities claims against Defendants Bank and Brander are preempted. While technically dicta, Peatros, supra, 22 Cal.4th 147, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 659, 990 P.2d 539 answers this question: physical disability claims under California law do not ‘substantially mirror’ analogous federal law. [¶] Indeed, a cursory review of California disability discrimination law confirms that it provides more substantive protection and is more comprehensive than its federal counterpart.” Thus, the court said, “[s]tate medical and physical disability claims ... are thus re-exempted.”

Further, the court said, plaintiff's FEHA claims were untimely because plaintiff “did not file a claim until April 24, 2009, which is beyond the 300–day limitation period provided under federal law. [Internal record citation omitted.] Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that he received a right to sue letter on April 27, 2009. [Internal record citation omitted.] Plaintiff, however, did not file his Complaint until August [21], 2009, beyond the ninety-day limitations period provided under federal law. [Internal record citation omitted.] Accordingly, Plaintiff neither timely exhausted his administrative remedies under the ADA nor filed a court action within the time limitations set forth under the ADA. The Bank, therefore, is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's first cause of action, and both the Bank and Wayne Brander are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's third cause of action, on the additional ground that the state and federal statute of limitations are different and there is clear conflict under Peatros, Supra.” ¹

The court entered judgment for defendants on July 2, 2010. Plaintiff timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo the trial court's order granting summary judgment. ( Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089.) In particular, questions of statutory construction are questions of law and also subject to de novo review. ( Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 683, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 97, 13 P.3d 704.)” ( Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 344, 350, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 332.) “ ‘The trial judge's stated reason for granting summary judgment is not binding on us because we review its ruling, not its rationale.’ ( Reliance Nat. Indemnity Co. v. General Star Indemnity Co. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1074, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 627.)” ( United Parcel Service Wage & Hour Cases (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1009, 118 Cal.Rptr.3d 834.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's sole contention on appeal is that his state law claims for disability discrimination under FEHA are not preempted by section 24. ² Specifically, he contends that section 24 was impliedly amended by the ADA and, as amended, section 24 does not preempt the disability discrimination provisions of FEHA because they are “ ‘substantively the same’ ” as analogous provisions of the ADA. As relevant here, he...