Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 96-CV-71.
| Decision Date | 09 January 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-CV-71.,96-CV-71. |
| Citation | 245 F.Supp.2d 162 |
| Parties | Jacquelyn M. QUINT, Plaintiff v. A.E. STALEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Jeffrey Neil Young, Esq., McTeague, Higbee, Macadam, Case, Watson & Cohen, Topsham, ME, for Plaintiff.
Jacquelyn M. Quint, New Limerick, ME, Pro se.
John W. McCarthy, Esq., Brent A. Singer, Esq., Rudman & Winchell, Bangor, ME, for Defendant.
Arthur J. Greif, Esq., Christopher L. Dalton, Esq., Gilbert & Greif, P.A., Bangor, ME, Stephen A. Roach, Esq., Roach & Wise, Boston, MA, David G. Webbert, Esq., Johnson & Webbert, LLP, Augusta, ME, for Movants.
Before the Court are various motions regarding enforcement of Plaintiffs fee arrangements with former counsel (Docket # 286, 289, 299) and requests for statutory fees pursuant to the fee-shifting provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Docket # 161, 221, 224, 229, 231).1 See 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1995). On November 21, 2002, the Court heard oral arguments on these motions with all relevant parties present. The Court now proceeds to rule on all matters still pending in this action.2
Plaintiff Jacquelyn Scott (f/k/a Jacquelyn Quint) originally brought eleven counts against her former employer, Defendant A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company: Counts I and II sought relief for sexual discrimination and harassment under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; Counts III and IV were retaliation claims pursuant to Title VII and the MHRA; Count V asserted a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); Count VI sought damages under the MHRA for discrimination against Plaintiff on the basis of her disability; Counts VII through X alleged Negligence, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Defamation; and, Count XI sought relief pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The Court granted summary judgment on all counts except V, VI and XI. On the remaining disability and FMLA claims, the jury awarded Plaintiff $720,000 in punitive and compensatory damages. The Court reduced that award to $300,000 pursuant to a statutory damages cap. At a subsequent equitable remedies hearing, Plaintiff was awarded a further $8,019 in back pay, but was denied reinstatement and front pay.
Defendant appealed and Plaintiff crossappealed. The First Circuit increased her back pay award to $45,917 and remanded to the District Court for further consideration on the questions of reinstatement and front pay. While on remand, the Court found that the parties had entered a binding settlement agreement during negotiations on August 9, 1999. On January 21, 2001, the Court enforced settlement in the amount of $485,000. That figure included the original $300,000 award, the back pay award, as well as an additional $100,000 to settle Plaintiffs outstanding reinstatement and front pay claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the imposition of settlement on April 11, 2001. More than one year later, on April 22, 2002, the Supreme Court denied Plaintiff certiorari.
Plaintiff has retained and terminated a number of attorneys over the course of the litigation. Four attorneys are relevant to the current proceeding. Plaintiff first retained David G. Webbert of the law firm Johnson & Webbert (collectively "Webbert"), located in Augusta, Maine, as trial counsel. Plaintiff then terminated Webbert and hired Steven Roach of the Boston firm Roach & Wise (collectively "Roach") for her first appeal. Roach also represented her on the subsequent remand, employing Webbert as local counsel. Plaintiff objected to the imposition of settlement and terminated Roach after the August 9, 1999 negotiations that lead to the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs counsel in opposing settlement was A.J. Greif of the Bangor, Maine, firm Gilbert & Greif (collectively "Greif'). Greif was terminated after failing to prevent the imposition of settlement. Plaintiff has retained current counsel, Jeffrey Neil Young of the Topsham, Maine, firm McTeague, Higbee, Case, Cohen, Whitney & Toker (collectively "Young"), for the limited purpose of effectuating settlement. Plaintiff presently proceeds pro se on all other issues before the Court.
After various partial distributions to Plaintiff, $384,656.14 of the settlement, including $52,656.14 in interest, remains in escrow. Attorneys Webbert, Roach and Greif seek to intervene and enforce liens upon the settlement pursuant to fee agreements with Plaintiff. In response, Plaintiff demands a jury trial regarding the enforceability of the fee arrangements. Plaintiff also asks the Court to release an hourly fee to Attorney Young directly from the settlement proceeds. Additionally, Defendant seeks a statutory fee award from Plaintiff for pursuit of a frivolous appeal. Finally, Webbert, Roach and Young seek attorney fees from Defendant A.E. Staley Manufacturing pursuant to the ADA fee-shifting statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205. The Court first addresses the fee arrangements and then considers the requests for statutory fees.
Plaintiff contests the reasonableness of fee arrangements with three former counsel. She further maintains that she enjoys a right to a jury trial regarding the reasonableness issue.3 The three attorneys all filed motions to intervene as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) to enforce attorney's liens on Plaintiffs settlement. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). All have filed notices of their respective liens with this Court as well. (Docket # 138, 197, 182.) Because Plaintiff waived all objections to intervention at the hearing, the Court moves on to consider the reasonableness of the three arrangements directly.
District courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over collateral fee disputes that would otherwise represent state law contract claims. Kalyawongsa v. Moffett, 105 F.3d 283, 288 (6th Cir.1997) (). Exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over fee disputes also entails the authority to determine the amount of an attorney's hen brought under state law and incorporate that amount in a fee award. Id. Courts also have broad supervisory power to refuse to enforce unreasonable fee agreements. See Ryan v. Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan, 193 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir.1999); Alderman v. Pan Am World Airways, 169 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir.1999); Boston & Maine Corp. v. Sheehan, Phinney, Bass & Green, P.A, 778 F.2d 890, 896 (1st Cir.1985). This supervisory authority is derived from a court's equity powers. See Krause v. Rhodes, 640 F.2d 214, 218 (6th Cir.1981). Under the Seventh Amendment a party enjoys a limited right to a jury trial in civil matters. This right only attaches to legal actions recognized at common law at the time of the Amendment's adoption in 1791. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987). While contract disputes concerning the terms of a contingency agreement represent a legal dispute triable to a jury at common law, postadjudication reasonableness determinations sound in equity and lie beyond the scope of the Seventh Amendment. See McGuire v. Russell Miller, Inc., 1 F.3d 1306, 1314-15 (2d Cir.1993); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Marshall, 939 F.2d 274, 279 (5th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (); Cont'l Bank N.A. v. Everett, 861 F.Supp. 642, 644 (N.D.IU.1994) (same). Because Plaintiffs reasonableness objections to the fee arrangements in this matter sound primarily in equity, she has no right to a jury trial regarding the enforceability of those arrangements.4 In light of the above discussion, the Court orally denied Plaintiffs motion for a jury trial on the fee dispute (Docket # 266) at the November 21, 2002 hearing.
As Plaintiff objects to the professional conduct of her former counsel, the local rules require the Court to apply the Maine Code of Professional Responsibility and the Maine Bar Rules to the fee arrangements. See D. Me. Local R. 83.3(d); Holbrook v. Andersen Corp., 756 F.Supp. 34, 38 n. 7 (D.Me.1991). Rule 3.3(a) of the Maine Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits fees in excess of a reasonable fee as understood by a "lawyer of ordinary prudence." Me. Bar R. 3.3(a). Whether a fee is excessive is determined by examining a number of factors, including: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment of the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the responsibility assumed, the amount involved, and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; and (9) the informed written consent of the client as to the fee agreement. Id. In light of the above factors, the Court considers the reasonableness of the three arrangements in turn.
Greif seeks to enforce a lien in the amount of $17,736.05 against Plaintiffs settlement. The agreement at issue is a mixed hourly-contingent fee arrangement. Because Greif was unsuccessful in achieving the contingent portion of his fee arrangement, he seeks reimbursement solely for time expended at a rate of $150 an hour and for...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras
...is excessive or unproductive must be determined in light of how aggressively the Defense has argued its case." Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 245 F.Supp.2d 162, 179 (D.Me.2003) (internal citations omitted). It is an important factor to consider whether Defendants employed "Stalingrad defens......
-
Ramirez-Lluveras v. Pagan-Cruz
...the Defense has argued its case.” Guillemard–Ginorio v. Contreras, 603 F.Supp.2d at 319–20 (quoting Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 245 F.Supp.2d 162, 179 (D.Me.2003) ). “It is an important factor to consider whether Defendants employed ‘Stalingrad defense’ tactics, resisting Plaintiffs at e......
-
Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras
...is excessive or unproductive must be determined in light of how aggressively the Defense has argued its case." Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 245 F.Supp.2d 162, 179 (D.Me.2003) (internal citations omitted). It is an important factor to consider whether the Defendants employed "Stalingrad de......
-
Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr.
...counsel cannot receive both fees. Other courts have declined to take this bright-line approach. See, e.g., Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 245 F.Supp.2d 162, 178 (D.Me.), aff'd, 84 Fed.Appx. 101, 102 (1st Cir.2003). Although we believe that a contingent fee contract that allows for offset ca......