Quintana v. People, 23556

• Decision Date: 09 June 1969
• Docket Number: No. 23556,23556
• Citation: 169 Colo. 295,455 P.2d 210
• Parties: Leandro C. QUINTANA, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 210

455 P.2d 210

169 Colo. 295

Leandro C. QUINTANA, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error.

No. 23556.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

June 9, 1969.

Rehearing Denied June 30, 1969.

Francis R. Salazar, Robert L. Pitler, Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert L. Hoecker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error.

HODGES, Justice.

Certiorari was granted by this court to review the disposition on an appeal to the Superior Court of the City and County of Denver from an order of the County Court of the City and County of Denver, which order vacated a jury verdict of guilty to a drunk driving charge.

Defendant Quintana was charged in the County Court with drunk driving, and in a separate count, he was charged with a prior conviction of drunk driving within five years. Pleas of not guilty to both counts were entered by the defendant. The issue of defendant's guilt on the substantive charge was first presented to the jury which found the defendant guilty. The County Court then proceeded before the same jury to try the issues presented by the second count. During the course of this proceeding, the County Court declared a mistrial and the jury was discharged. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion requesting the County Court to vacate the verdict of guilty on the first count on the grounds that the same jury must hear both counts. The County Court granted this motion and ordered both counts to be retried. The People, contending that the trial court erred in vacating the guilty verdict on the first count and ordering a retrial of both counts, appealed to the Superior Court. After review and legal argument, the Superior Court reversed the judgment of the County Court ordered that the conviction on the first count be reinstated, and also ordered that a retrial be had only on the second count.

At this juncture in the case, defendant Quintana petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari claiming that the Superior Court's disposition was erroneous in law and prejudicial to him. The crucial issue presented for our determination is whether a drunk driving charge under C.R.S.1963, 13--5--30, which includes a second count alleging a previous conviction for drunk driving within five years, must be tried to the same jury as a matter of law under the facts presented here.

This precise issue has not come before this court previously. Certiorari was therefore granted.

C.R.S.1963, 13--5--30(1) provides as follows:

'It is a misdemeanor for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive any vehicle within this state.'

And, in subsection 5 of this statute, it is provided:

'Every person who is convicted of any violation of this section shall be punished upon a first conviction by imprisonment for not less than one day or more than one year, or by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars or more than one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment, And on a second or subsequent conviction within five years shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ninety days or more than one year and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars or more than one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment as provided upon second or subsequent conviction for a violation of this section shall be mandatory, and the court shall have no discretion to grant probation or to suspend the sentence therefor.' (Emphasis added.)

A complaint charging the defendant with drunk driving under this statute and also with a second or subsequent conviction within five years, requires procedurally that each be the subject of a separate count. The use of the proof of prior convictions cannot be offered until the guilt on the first count has been established. Heinze v. People, 127 Colo. 54, 253 P.2d 596.

C.R.S.1963, 13--5--30(1) and (5) does not create two separate offenses. The obvious purpose of these statutory provisions is to regulate the punishment to be imposed upon the single offense of drunk driving. Righi v. People, 145 Colo. 457, 359 P.2d 656.

The defendant puts great emphasis on the argument that since this two count charge of drunk driving involves only a single offense, it is therefore mandatory that both counts be tried to the same jury. He states as a proposition that our common law tradition provides that when a party is charged with a crime, the same jury will hear and decide all issues involved in that crime. This is a generally accepted truism in our law, but in our view, like any general rule, there are exceptions which must be promulgated in unique situations to afford not only a fair trial to a defendant, but to lay a foundation for the orderly and expeditious administration of justice. The facts here present such a unique situation. To set aside the guilty verdict on the substantive offense of drunk driving and to order another trial on this count had the effect of frustrating and demeaning the judicial process in this case. It was an abuse of the County Court's discretion. To have promptly presented the issue on the second count to another jury would not have prejudiced any of the defendant's rights to a fair trial. It is conceded that the matter of a mistrial after the guilty verdict on the substantive charge in no way infected that verdict.

It is our considered opinion that when confronted with a situation comparable to what transpired here, it is incumbent on a trial court to refuse to set aside a guilty verdict and to promptly proceed to impanel another jury to determine the single issue of whether the defendant is identical with the person previously convicted of drunk driving. This procedure is in the public interest, and where it does not violate any of the defendant's rights to a fair and speedy trial, it shall be followed by a trial court under the comparable circumstances of this case only.

The defendant cites several Colorado cases involving our habitual criminal statute as being persuasive of his contention that the substantive crime of drunk driving and the issue of a prior conviction must be tried to the same jury. In Routa v. People, 117 Colo. 564, 192 P.2d 436, the majority opinion mentioned that it approved the procedure outlined in the dissenting opinion filed in that case, to the effect that upon conviction of the...