Quintana v. State

• Decision Date: 09 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. A-1-CA-36664,A-1-CA-36664
• Parties: MAX QUINTANA, ESTATE OF RICHARD VALDEZ, RICHARD VALDEZ, JR., his son, and ROBERT GALLEGOS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and LEONARD QUINTANA, GEORGE VIGIL, MURPHY SISNEROS, SAMUEL R. QUINTANA, and FREDDIE LUJAN, ESTATE OF ISAAC ELOY VALENCIA, and ERIC VALENCIA, his son, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO, RISK MANAGEMENT DIVISION, NEW MEXICO CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT, and DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

MAX QUINTANA, ESTATE OF RICHARD VALDEZ, RICHARD VALDEZ, JR.,

his son, and ROBERT GALLEGOS, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

LEONARD QUINTANA, GEORGE VIGIL, MURPHY SISNEROS, SAMUEL R. QUINTANA,and FREDDIE LUJAN, ESTATE OF ISAAC ELOY VALENCIA,and ERIC VALENCIA, his son, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO, RISK MANAGEMENT DIVISION, NEW MEXICO CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT,and DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS, Defendants-Appellees.

No. A-1-CA-36664

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

January 9, 2020

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN MIGUEL COUNTY

Abigail Aragon, District Judge

Domenici Law Firm, P.C.

Pete V. Domenici, Jr.

Reed C. Easterwood

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellants Hatcher Law Group, P.A.

Keitha A. Leonard

Scott P. Hatcher

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellees

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOGARDUS, Judge.

{1} Plaintiffs¹ Max Quintana, Estate of Richard Valdez, and Richard Valdez, Jr. appeal the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants State of New Mexico, Risk Management Division, New Mexico Corrections Department, and Department of Military Affairs on both their workers' compensation claims and their claims made pursuant to Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148. Concluding that the district court did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' workers' compensation claims, we remand to the district court to dismiss those claims for lack of jurisdiction. We otherwise affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} On February 2, 1980, prisoners at the New Mexico State Penitentiary began to riot. On that same day, Governor Bruce King determined that, "in order to protect the life, safety and well-being" of persons and property, "it was necessary to call in emergency service elements of the New Mexico National Guard[.]" Plaintiffs were among those in the New Mexico National Guard who performed military duty at the State Penitentiary during and/or after the riot.

{3} On June 21, 2012, over thirty-two years after their military service at the State Penitentiary, Plaintiffs filed the complaint that began this case. On July 17, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, which alleged that (1) Plaintiffs were employees of the State of New Mexico through the Department of Military Affairs in 1980; (2) as a result of their employment during the 1980 riot, Plaintiffs experienced work-related post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or exacerbation of pre-existing PTSD; (3) their workers' compensation claims are covered by the Workers' Compensation Act in effect when they were deployed to the State Penitentiary (the Old Act) rather than the Workers' Compensation Act in effect when they filed the lawsuit (the New Act); and (4) alternatively, Plaintiffs have causes of action under Delgado.

{4} Defendants moved for summary judgment. Following briefing from the parties and argument on the motion, the district court entered an order granting Defendants' motion. The district court concluded that (1) Plaintiffs had not and could not meet the requirements of the Old Act; (2) even if the court could apply the Old Act, Plaintiffs'claims were time-barred; (3) Plaintiffs had not and could not meet the requirements of the New Act; (4) even if the New Act did apply, the court would not have jurisdiction to hear claims made under it; (5) the 1980 reports from Attorney General Jeff Bingaman to Governor Bruce King and members of the Legislature discussing the causes of the riot at the State Penitentiary and providing recommendations to avoid future riots do not satisfy the "actual knowledge" standard sufficient to meet NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-29(A) (1990); and (6) Delgado does not apply because there was no evidence that Defendants unconscionably or egregiously deployed Plaintiffs to the riot at the State Penitentiary either subjectively or objectively expecting and intending that Plaintiffs would be injured. Plaintiffs appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' Workers' Compensation Claims

{5} The facts and circumstances of this case raise a jurisdictional question that we must address before reaching Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the merits of their workers' compensation claims. See Smith v. City of Santa Fe, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 10, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300 ("[I]t is incumbent upon the appellate court to raise jurisdiction questions sua sponte when the Court notices them."); Maso v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2004-NMCA-025, ¶ 13, 135 N.M. 152, 85 P.3d 276 ("[A]n appeal from a court . . . that lacks subject matter jurisdiction confers no jurisdiction on the appellate court." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). "[W]hether a [district] court has jurisdiction in a particular case is a question of law that we review de novo[.]" Smith, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 10.

{6} In 1986, our Legislature repealed sections of the then-existing Workers' Compensation Act that "required filing of claims in the district court . . . and trial of claims in the district court." Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, 1986-NMSC-075, ¶ 8, 104 N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381. The repeal of those sections became effective on May 21, 1986. Id. At the same time, the Legislature provided that "all claims filed after December 1, 1986, shall be heard and determined by a hearing officer appointed by the director of the newly created [workers'] compensation administration." Id. ¶ 1.

{7} Following those changes, our Supreme Court held "that commencing on December 1, 1986, all claims, regardless of when the injury . . . may have occurred, shall be filed with the [workers'] compensation administration." Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis added). Furthermore, this Court has recognized that "[w]ith its creation of the [workers' compensation administration], the Legislature gave the [workers' compensation administration] exclusive jurisdiction over workers' compensation cases, removing these cases from the district court's jurisdiction." Jones v. Holiday Inn Express, 2014-NMCA-082, ¶ 11, 331 P.3d 992 (citing Wylie Corp., 1986-NMSC-075, ¶¶ 1, 8).

{8} Because Plaintiffs' workers' compensation claims were filed for the first time after December 1, 1986, the district court did not have jurisdiction over those claims. Cf. DiMatteo v. Cty. of Dona Ana ex rel. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 1989-NMCA-108, ¶¶ 12, 18, 109 N.M. 374, 785 P.2d 285 (distinguishing claims filed for the first time after December 1, 1986, from applications to increase, decrease, or terminate benefits and concluding that the district court had continuing jurisdiction over the latter). Accordingly, we remand to the district court to dismiss Plaintiffs' workers' compensation claims for lack of jurisdiction.

II. The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Delgado Claims and Plaintiffs Have Failed to Otherwise Show That the Workers' Compensation Act Does Not Provide Their Exclusive Remedy

{9} In their summary judgment briefing in the district court, Plaintiffs argued that they had valid Delgado claims. Plaintiffs attempt to shed the Delgado label in this appeal, asserting that the characterization of their claims is not dispositive. Rather than challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment on their Delgado claims, Plaintiffs focus on whether Defendants have waived immunity under the Tort Claims Act and whether they have met the notice requirements of that act. Within that argument, Plaintiffs assert that the Workers' Compensation Act does not provide their exclusive remedy under this Court's reasoning in Quintero v. New Mexico Department of Transportation, 2010-NMCA-081, 148 N.M. 903, 242 P.3d 470. In response, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have waived any appeal as to their Delgado claims. In their reply, Plaintiffs briefly argue that they had made a "colorable" Delgado claim while continuing to assert their arguments based on Quintero.

A. Standard of Review

{10} "Summary judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo." Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶ 8, 139 N.M. 12, 127 P.3d 548. "New Mexico courts, unlike federal courts, view summary judgment with disfavor, preferring a trial on the merits." Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 2010-NMSC-035, ¶ 8, 148 N.M. 713, 242 P.3d 280. However, "summary judgment may be proper when the moving party has met its initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment." Id. ¶ 10. "By a prima facie showing is meant such evidence as is sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{11} "Once this prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts which would require trial on the merits." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "A party may not simply argue that such evidentiary facts might exist, nor may it rest upon the allegations of the complaint." Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). "Rather, the party opposing the summary judgment motion must adduce evidence to justify a trial on the issues." Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). "Such evidence adduced must result in reasonable inferences." Id. "An inference is not a supposition or a conjecture, but is a logical deduction from facts proved and guess work is not a substitute therefor." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Plaintiffs' Delgado Claims

{12} We begin with Plaintiffs' arguments concerning the district court's grant of summary judgment on their Delgado claims. We note that, generally, we will not address issues that are raised for the first time in the reply...