Quintanilla v. Astrue

Decision Date27 June 2008
Docket NumberCivil Action No. C-07-277.
Citation619 F.Supp.2d 306
PartiesSammy QUINTANILLA, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

Nancy B. DeLong, Texas Rio Grande Legal Aid Inc., Corpus Christi, TX, for Plaintiff.

Scott Thomas Morris, SSA OGC, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THE LITIGANTS' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JANIS GRAHAM JACK, District Judge.

On June 11, 2008, United States Magistrate Judge Brian L. Owsley signed a Memorandum and Recommendation recommending as follows:

1) that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 20) be granted with respect to his claims that the Administrative Law Judge improperly rejected Dr. Ramirez's medical opinions tending to show disability, that the Administrative Law Judge did not determine plaintiff's credibility pursuant to the applicable law, and that the Administrative Law Judge erroneously failed to make a finding that he was able to maintain employment;

2) that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 20) be denied with respect to his claims that the Administrative Law Judge erred in (a) applying res judicata; (b) not finding him disabled under the grid rules; (c) considering his failure to seek treatment as an adverse credibility factor without finding that his condition responded to treatment; (d) determining he was capable of light exertion; (e) relying on the vocational expert's testimony that the jobs described involved only average stress; (f) failing to incorporate his moderate limitation in social functioning into his question to the vocational expert; and (g) failing to complete the record.

3) that defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment (D.E. 18) be granted with respect to the Administrative Law Judge's application of res judicata, his determination that plaintiff was capable of light exertion, and plaintiff's waiver of objection to the Administrative Law Judge's hypothetical, and denied in all other respects; and

4) this matter be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and recommendation.

Seeing no objection to this recommendation by either party and having now reviewed the recommendation, this Court hereby adopts as its own the Memorandum and Recommendation as the decision of the Court. Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

1) the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 20) is granted with respect to his claims that the Administrative Law Judge improperly rejected Dr. Ramirez's medial opinions tending to show disability, that the Administrative Law Judge did not determine plaintiff's credibility pursuant to the applicable law, and that the Administrative Law Judge erroneously failed to make a finding that he was able to maintain employment;

2) plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 20) is denied with respect to his claims that the Administrative Law Judge erred in (a) applying res judicata; (b) not finding him disabled under the grid rules; (c) considering his failure to seek treatment as an adverse credibility factor without finding that his condition responded to treatment; (d) determining he was capable of light exertion; (e) relying on the vocational expert's testimony that the jobs described involved only average stress; (f) failing to incorporate his moderate limitation in social functioning into his question to the vocational expert; and (g) failing to complete the record.

3) defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment (D.E. 18) is granted with respect to the Administrative Law Judge's application of res judicata, his determination that plaintiff was capable of light exertion, and plaintiff's waiver of objection to the Administrative Law Judge's hypothetical, and denied in all other respects; and

4) this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and recommendation.

SIGNED and ORDERED.

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THE LITIGANTS' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BRIAN L. OWSLEY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Sammy Quintanilla brought this action for review of the Commissioner's decision to deny Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits on June 20, 2007. (D.E. 1). On February 8, 2008, defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. (D.E. 18). On February 15, 2008, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, and a memorandum in support. (D.E. 20, 21). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

I. JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History.

In 1990 or 1991, petitioner learned he had contracted Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"). Administrative Record ("AR") at 595. On June 26, 2003, plaintiff filed an application for Title XVI benefits. Id. at 14. The Commissioner denied his application at the initial and appeals council levels. Id. On May 17, 2005, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") affirmed the determination. Id. On July 1, 2005, the appeals council affirmed the ALJ's determination. Id.

On September 2, 2005, plaintiff applied for SSI benefits with an alleged onset date of June 23, 2003. Id. This application was denied on December 30, 2005. Id. On May 30, 2006, he requested review by an ALJ. Id. On November 17, 2006, an ALJ conducted a hearing regarding plaintiff's application. Id. On December 19, 2006, the ALJ issued an unfavorable determination. Id. at 11. On April 6, 2007, the appeals counsel affirmed his decision. Id. at 3. Plaintiff filed this complaint on June 20, 2007. (D.E. 1).

B. Plaintiff's Medical Records.

Dr. Guillermo Ramirez of the Valley Aids Council is plaintiff's treating physician. AR at 17. He examined plaintiff three times in connection with his applications for state benefits. On July 8, 2004, he concluded that plaintiff was temporarily disabled, and not expected to be able to work for more than six months. Id. at 556. He did not express an opinion on his capacity to sit, keyboard, or perform other work-related functions for sustained activity because his condition varied so much from day to day. Id. He also found him unable to lift ten pounds for an hour each day, and did not think he could work in an office environment. Id. On January 24, 2005, Dr. Ramirez completed an evaluation that indicated no changes. Id. at 554. On June 14, 2005, however, he indicated that plaintiff could lift up to twenty pounds for short periods of time, and perform all work-related physical activities for four hours per day. Id. at 551. He still considered plaintiff unable to work. Id.

On December 14, 2005, Dr. Lynn Fisher-Kittay performed a mental status examination on plaintiff. Id. at 446. She assessed his reliability as good, "based on his ability [to] provide an adequate overview of his emotional, medical, legal, and substance abuse problems." Id. He complained of depression, anxiety, anger, and an inability to focus on his schoolwork. Id. He reportedly got up at 7:00 a.m. each day to go to school. Id. at 447. He had one or two friends, and his girlfriend, but socialized mainly with his family. Id. Although he claimed to take his medication as prescribed, his physical condition was deteriorating. Id. He appeared anxious and depressed, his tone was occasionally histrionic, and his eye contact was only fair. Id. at 447-48. He did not exhibit disorganized thought processes, but could not interpret a simple proverb. Id. at 448. He was preoccupied with his medical, emotional, and legal problems, and his conversation centered around narcissistic and persecutory themes. Id.

Dr. Fisher-Kittay thought plaintiffs intellectual ability was low-average. His concentration and recent memory were poor, but his remote and immediate memory was intact. Id. His judgment and insight were mixed; he attended appointments and was aware that his ability to function was impaired, but did not discuss his emotional problems with his physicians, and lacked insight into their severity. Id. at 449. His hygiene, gait, and posture were normal. Id. at 447. Dr. Fisher-Kittay thought his prognosis was "very poor." Id. at 449. She expected him to continue to require assistance from friends, family, and the medical community. Id.

On December 30, 2005, Dr. Mark Boulos completed a psychiatric review. Id. at 453. He concluded that plaintiff suffered from adjustment disorder and dysthemia, id. at 456, post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), id. at 458, and antisocial personality disorder. Id. at 460. He felt that plaintiffs drug abuse had caused these problems. Id. at 461. Dr. Boulos diagnosed him as mildly limited in activities of daily life, and moderately limited in social function, and in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace. Id. at 463. He also determined that plaintiff had not experienced any episodes of decompensation, and that none of his disorders met the "C" criteria of the listings. Id. at 463-64. He opined that a GAF score of 45 "appears low in light of claimants [sic] functional status." Id. at 465.

Dr. Boulos also completed a mental residual functional capacity ("RFC") assessment. Id. at 467. He determined that plaintiff was moderately limited in his ability to understand and remember detailed instructions, carry out detailed instructions, to maintain attention and concentration, and pace, and to complete a normal workday without interruptions. Id. at 467-68. Plaintiff also displayed moderate limitations in his ability to interact with the general public, and to respond appropriately to instruction and criticism from supervisors. Id. at 468. However, Dr. Boulos concluded that the record did not...

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