Quintanilla v. Thaler

• Decision Date: 25 January 2011
• Docket Number: V-09-CV-39
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
• Parties: JOHN MANUEL QUINTANILLA, JR., Petitioner, v. RICK THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.

JOHN MANUEL QUINTANILLA, JR., Petitioner,

v. RICK THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.

V-09-CV-39

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

VICTORIA DIVISION

SIGNED: January 25, 2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on Petitioner John Manuel Quintanilla, Jr.'s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and Respondent Rick Thaler's Motion for Summary Judgment. Having carefully considered the Petition, the Summary Judgment Motion, the evidence, and the arguments and authorities submitted by counsel, the Court is of the opinion that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED, and Quintanilla's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be DENIED.

I. Background¹

Quintanilla was arrested on January 14, 2003, for an aggravated robbery. At that time, no charges had been brought and no warrant issued for capital murder.²

At 2:30 p.m. on January 15, 2003, Quintanilla appeared before a magistrate for the warnings and other proceedings that Article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure required.³ Herequested an attorney.

At approximately 4:00 p.m., Investigator Abel Arriazola of the Victoria County Sheriff's Office and Investigator Mike Kovorek of the Calhoun County Sheriffs Department began interrogating Quintanilla. They videotaped the interview, later labeled State's Exhibit 1a. Prior to questioning, Arriazola gave Quintanilla his Miranda warnings. Quintanilla indicated that he understood his rights and wished to continue with the interview. He made no statements regarding the capital murder, nor did he invoke his right to counsel, during this portion of the interview.

At approximately 7:55 p.m., Quintanilla and the officers took a short break, which marked the end of State's Exhibit 1a. A new videotape, which eventually would be labeled State's Exhibit 1b, was inserted in the videotape recorder. Quintanilla and Kovorek returned to the room at about 8:10 p.m. to continue the interrogation; then Kovorek left the room again. A short time after that, at about 8:35 p.m., Arriazola returned, now with Detectives Alfred Santiago and Tom Copeland of the Victoria Police Department. Arriazola told Quintanilla: "Nothing has changed from the time I've talked to you, " by which he meant, according to his testimony in the pre-trial hearing, that Quintanilla's rights were still in full effect. Santiago and Copeland testified that they were aware that Arriazola already informed Quintanilla of his Miranda rights, and so they began their interrogation, which included questions regarding the capital murder, without re-administering the warnings. About fifteen minutes into the interview, however, the detectives reminded Quintanilla of his Miranda rights and that Arriazola had read him his rights; Quintanilla acknowledged that he remembered and understood those rights. Santiago later acknowledged in his pre-trial testimony that he inadvertently left out the warning that an attorney would be appointed if Quintanilla could not afford to hire one. At no time during the interview did Quintanilla invoke his right to counsel. During the interrogation by Santiago and Copeland, Quintanilla made inculpatory statements regarding the capital murder.

The trial court found that Quintanilla received the Article 15.17 magistrate's warning on, and requested an attorney for, the aggravated-robbery offense. He was not under arrest for capital murder at the time of the interview. State's Exhibits 1a and 1b constituted one continuous interview, and therefore the Miranda warnings Arriazola gave at the beginning of videotape 1a applied to the entire interview. Quintanilla freely, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights regarding the capital murder at the beginning of Exh. 1a, including the right to a court-appointed attorney. His statements regarding the aggravated robbery were taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment, but this did not prohibit the admission of statements as to other offenses.

Portions of State's Exhibits 1a and 1b were consolidated into State's Exhibit 29, a videotape that was admitted into evidence during the guilt phase of Quintanilla's trial. State's Exhibit 29 contains only those portions of the interview that relate to the capital murder charge, including Arriazola's initial warnings to Quintanilla, the introduction of Santiago and Copeland, the reminder of Quintanilla's Miranda warnings, and his statements regarding the capital murder. All references to the aggravated robbery and other extraneous offenses were omitted.

The jury found Quintanilla guilty of capital murder for murdering Billings while in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. SH at 105-07.⁴ Following testimony in the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury found a probability that Quintanilla would commit future acts of criminal violence constituting a continuing threat to society. Id. at 108. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced Quintanilla to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Quintanilla's conviction and sentence, Quintanilla v. State, 2007 WL 1839805 (Tex.Crim.App., 2007), and denied his application for postconviction relief, Ex Parte Quintanilla, No. 67, 177-01 (Tex. Crim. App. June 4, 2008).

II. Discussion

A. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

This federal petition for habeas relief is governed by the applicable provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Under the AEDPA, federal habeas relief based upon claims that were adjudicated on the merits by the state courts cannot be granted unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

For questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact adjudicated on the merits in state court, this Court may grant federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) only if the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established ^{reme Court precedent}." See Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 475 (5^th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 885 (2001). Under the "contrary to" clause, this Court may afford habeas relief only if "'the state courtarrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by... [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than... [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'" Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 740-41 (5^th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 915 (2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000)).

The "unreasonable application" standard permits federal habeas relief only if a state court decision "identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case" or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from ^{reme Court} precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Williams, 529 U.S. at 406. "In applying this standard, we must decide (1) what was the decision of the state courts with regard to the questions before us and (2) whether there is any established federal law, as explicated by the Supreme Court, with which the state court decision conflicts." Hoover v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 366, 368 (5^th Cir. 1999). A federal court's "focus on the 'unreasonable application' test under Section 2254(d) should be on the ultimate legal conclusion that the state court reached and not on whether the state court considered and discussed every angle of the evidence." Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 696 (5^th Cir. 2001), aff'd, 286 F.3d 230 (5^th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Neal v. Epps, 537 U.S. 1104 (2003). The solitary inquiry for a federal court under the 'unreasonable application' prong becomes "whether the state court's determination is 'at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.'" Id. (quoting Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7^th Cir. 1997)); see also Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 560 (5^th Cir. 2001) ("Even though we cannot reverse a decision merely because we would reach a different outcome, we must reverse when we conclude that the state court decision applies the correct legal rule to a given set of facts in a manner that is so patently incorrect as to be 'unreasonable.'").

The AEDPA precludes federal habeas relief on factual issues unless the state court's adjudication of the merits was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2); Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5^th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1039 (2001). The state court's factual determinations are presumed correct unless rebutted by "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Jackson v. Anderson, 112 F.3d 823, 824-25 (5^th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1119 (1998).

B. The Standard for Summary Judgment in Habeas Corpus Cases

In ordinary civil cases, a district court considering a motion for summary judgment is required to construe the facts in the case in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (The "evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor"). However, where a state prisoner's factual allegations have been adversely resolved by express or implicit findings of the state courts, and the prisoner fails to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the presumption of correctness established by 28...