Quintano v. Industrial Commission

• Decision Date: 10 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. C--109,C--109
• Citation: 178 Colo. 131,495 P.2d 1137
• Parties: Richard QUINTANO, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the State of Colorado, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1137

495 P.2d 1137

178 Colo. 131

Richard QUINTANO, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the State of Colorado, et al.,

Respondents.

No. C--109.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

April 10, 1972.

Michael M. Laden, Denver, for petitioner.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondents.

GROVES, Justice.

We granted a petition for writ of certiorari to review the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Quintano v. Industrial Comm., 29 Colo.App. 319, 485 P.2d 733 (1971). We affirm.

The petitioner brought an action for damages against the Industrial Commission and its three commissioners. He alleged that he had been employed as a diesetter in a plant; that the machine he was using had malfunctioned and severely injured him; that this and other machines in the plant had malfunctioned in the past and caused many severe and permanent injuries to employees; and that his injuries resulted from violation by the respondents of C.R.S.1963, 80--2--1. This section reads in part as follows:

'The industrial commission of Colorado shall be charged with the inspection of all factories, mills, workshops . . . or any kind of an establishment wherein laborers are employed or machinery used, for the purpose of protecting said employees or guests against damages arising from imperfect or dangerous machinery . . .'

The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis that the statutory duty was owed to the public and not to an individual, citing Richardson v. Belknap, 73 Colo. 52, 213 P. 335 (1923) and Miller v. Ouray E.L. & P. Co., 18 Colo.App. 131, 70 P. 447 (1902).

In Richardson, supra, it was held that members of a board of county commissioners were not liable for 'carelessly and negligently' failing to erect railings upon a bridge, off which the plaintiff's automobile fell. The statute imposed a duty upon the county commissioners to keep highways in repair. The holding was two-pronged: (1) the statute imposed a public duty, and could not be used as the basis for recovery of damages for an individual injury; and (2) since the county was not liable under the doctrine of governmental immunity '(i)t would be inconsistent to . . . hold the officers liable.' The doctrine expressed in this second prong was overruled Sub silentio in Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 353 P.2d 590 (1960). ¹

Miller, supra, was cited in Richardson. There a minor was left alone, locked in the county jail. A fire occurred in the middle of the night and the minor suffocated. It was alleged that the fire was caused by defective electric wiring. Recovery was sought against the county commissioners for their failure to perform the duty required of them by statute to make an examination of the jail. It was held that the duty imposed was a purely public one and that the breach did not constitute a wrong for which there may be private redress.

People v. Hoag, 54 Colo. 542, 131 P. 400 (1913), was also cited in Richardson. In Hoag it was alleged that the county clerk had failed to comply with the statute which directed him to publish a list of nominations. The action for damages was brought by a newspaper publisher. This court said:

'The statute requiring the clerk to publish the list of nominations was clearly intended for the benefit of the public, and not for the benefit of newspapers. The benefit to the latter was only incidental. Certainly the law was not passed with the idea of benefiting publishers. So that the duty imposed was purely a public one. When the duty imposed upon an officer is one to the public only, its nonperformance must be a public and not an individual injury, and must be redressed in a public prosecution of some kind, if at all.

(Quoting from Strong v. Campbell, 11 Barb. 135, in turn quoted in Colo. P. Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28):

"Wherever an action is brought for a breach of duty imposed by statute, the party bringing it must show that he had an interest in the performance of the duty, and that the duty was imposed for his benefit. But where the duty was created or imposed for the benefit of another, and the advantage to be derived to the party prosecuting, by its performance, is...