Quintard Associates, Ltd. v. New York State Liquor Authority

• Decision Date: 27 May 1977
• Parties: QUINTARD ASSOCIATES, LTD., Petitioner, v. NEW YORK STATE LIQUOR AUTHORITY, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 960

394 N.Y.S.2d 960

57 A.D.2d 462

QUINTARD ASSOCIATES, LTD., Petitioner, v. NEW YORK STATE LIQUOR AUTHORITY, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

May 27, 1977.

Boyle & Vita, Syracuse, for petitioner (John B. Vita, Syracuse, of counsel).

Warren B. Pesetsky, State Liquor Authority, New York City, for respondent (Joseph S. Ryan, New York City, of counsel).

Before MOULE, J. P., and SIMONS, DILLON, GOLDMAN and WITMER, JJ.

GOLDMAN, Justice.

In this article 78 proceeding, transferred by order of Onondaga Supreme Court, petitioner Quintard Associates, Ltd. (Quintard) seeks to annul the determination of the New York State Liquor Authority (Authority) which suspended Quintard's license for 30 days, 15 days of which were deferred. The reason given for the suspension is "(t)hat the licensed premises and the area adjacent thereto have been a source of noise or disturbance which tends to adversely affect the health, welfare, safety or repose of the inhabitants of the area in which the licensed premises are located; all cause for revocation, cancellation or suspension of such license in accordance with Rule 36, subdivision 1(q) of the Rules of the State Liquor Authority (9 NYCRR 53.1 q)." Quintard urges annulment of the order on the ground that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the charges and secondly, that Rule 36, (1)(q) fails to provide standards which would give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is proscribed and that therefore the Rule is unconstitutional.

The first objection is without merit. The Authority's findings on this entire record are supported by substantial evidence (CPLR 7803, subd. (4)). As we recently stated in Mtr. of Application of Inside Straight, Inc. v. State Liquor Authority, 56 A.D.2d 720, 392 N.Y.S.2d 770, "(t)he substantial evidence rule requires only that the determination of the authority be supported by 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion' " (citations omitted).

The Authority's hearing was attended by approximately 25 citizens, most of whom lived in the vicinity of the licensed premises. Six of these residents testified, as did the Director of the Police Department of the Town. They stated that the noise generated from the Club prevented them and members of their families from sleeping, that the noise came from the music, from vehicles entering and leaving the premises, from boisterous patrons (as many as 75 or 80) assembled in the parking lot and was particularly bothersome in the summer when windows were open. The hearing officer credited all of the testimony and the petitioner concedes that "(t)he facts are not in dispute". Moreover, if the veracity of witnesses is in dispute "it is for the administrative board to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and to base its inferences on what it accepts as the truth" (Mtr. of Avon Bar & Grill, Inc. v. O'Connell, 301 N.Y. 150, 153, 93 N.E.2d 573, 574). The testimony at the hearing clearly supports the Authority's determination that Quintard conducted its operatio in such a manner that property owners in the area were repeatedly and regularly deprived of the quiet enjoyment of their homes.

The petitioner's issue of unconstitutionality of Rule 36(1)(q) ¹ presents an interesting and complex question. Petitioner argues that the provision of the Rule which prohibits "noise or a disturbance which tends to adversely affect the health, welfare, safety or repose of the inhabitants" who reside in the area "provides no guidance to men of common intelligence as to what conduct is proscribed, and therefore is unconstitutionally vague". Moreover, petitioner maintains that the prohibition lacks clarity, is overbroad and thus impermissibly intrudes upon the exercise of First Amendment rights.

The vagueness doctrine is commonly applied to criminal statutes (Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 230-231, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886, reh. den. 341 U.S. 956, 71 S.Ct. 1011, 95 L.Ed. 1377; Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126 70 L.Ed. 322; People v. Lang, 36 N.Y.2d 366, 369, 368 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494, 329 N.E.2d 176, 178; People v. Byron, 17 N.Y.2d 64, 67, 268 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26, 215 N.E.2d 345, 347 and to administrative regulations which carry penal sanctions (United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 80 S.Ct. 459, 4 L.Ed.2d 423; M. Kraus & Bros. Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 621, 66 S.Ct. 705, 90 L.Ed. 894). There is, however, a growing recognition that it is also applicable to statutes or administrative regulations imposing serious civil sanctions, especially where First Amendment rights are implicated (Jordan v. DeGeorge, supra; A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239, 45 S.Ct. 295, 69 L.Ed. 589; Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 3 Cir., 462 F.2d 463, 467; Muller v. Conlisk, 7 Cir., 429 F.2d 901, 903; Soglin v. Kaufman, 7 Cir., 418 F.2d 63, 67).

It is obvious that the Legislature's requirement that the State Liquor Authority furnish each licensee "a statement of the causes for which licenses may be revoked" (Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, § 114) would have little meaning if the Authority could revoke, cancel or suspend in reliance upon causes which are so devoid of specificity that licensees would be trapped without fair warning (see, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222). On the other hand, the requirement of impossible standards of specificity in regulations by the Authority would unduly weaken and inhibit enforcement. The void-for-vagueness doctrine embodies a "rough idea of fairness" (Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584) and the most common standard by which the sufficiency of statute is measured when attacked for vagueness is that it must not be so drawn that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at what conduct is prohibited (Broadrick v. Oklahoma,413 U.S. 601, 607, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830; People v. Lang, 36 N.Y.2d 366, 369, 368 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494, 329 N.E.2d 176, 178, supra; People v. Bryon, 17 N.Y.2d 64, 67, 268 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26-27, 215 N.E.2d 345, 347, supra ).

Petitioner contends that the words "any noise disturbance, misconduct and disorder" which adversely affect the health, welfare, safety or repose are ambiguous and fall short of the required standard. In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79, 69 S.Ct. 448, 449, 93 L.Ed. 513, the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance forbidding the operation on public property within the city limits of sound trucks emitting "loud and raucous" sounds. Noting that "(w)hile these are abstract words, they have through daily use acquired a content that conveys to any interested person a sufficiently accurate concept of what is forbidden". In Grayned v. City of Rockford, (408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, supra ) the Court sustained an anti-noise ordinance which proscribed acts which "shall willfully make or assist in the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order * * * ". Mr. Justice Marshall stated at page 110, 92 S.Ct. at page 2300 that the words of the "ordinance are marked by 'flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than...