Quintero v. State, 1D03-3726.

Decision Date30 December 2004
Docket NumberNo. 1D03-3726.,1D03-3726.
PartiesJose A. QUINTERO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Jamie Spivey, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

HAWKES, J.

In this child sexual abuse case, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by permitting an expert to testify that child victims do not initially fully disclose in 67% to 70% of child sexual abuse cases. We affirm. It is well settled that, in child sexual abuse cases, "an expert may properly aid a jury in assessing the veracity of a victim of child abuse ... by discussing various patterns of consistency in the stories of child sexual abuse victims and comparing those patterns in [the victim's] story." Tingle v. State, 536 So.2d 202, 205 (Fla.1988). That is precisely what happened here. Appellant's conviction is AFFIRMED.

DAVIS, J., concurs, BROWNING, J., dissents with Opinion.

BROWNING, J., dissents.

I must dissent, as I think the expert testimony — that a certain percentage of children in similar situations to the child victim (S.S.) here during their initial interviews totally deny any sexual abuse according to test data — invades the jury's province and impermissibly bolstered S.S.'s testimony. See Tingle v. State, 536 So.2d 202 (Fla.1988)

.

During the pre-trial proceedings S.S., a child under 12 years of age, made conflicting statements relating to Appellant's guilt (Appellant was charged with and convicted of a lewd and lascivious act on S.S. a child under 12 years of age.) S.S. first stated: to her teacher, that Appellant had done nothing to her and that her brother lied and made up the incident when he stated to the contrary; to Ms. Raines, of the Department of Children and Families, that Appellant had done nothing to her; and to the school nurse, that Appellant had done nothing to her. However, several days later S.S. recanted such statements and gave a written statement to the child protection team that, if believed, supports Appellant's conviction. All of such inconsistent statements were presented at trial, and precipitated the rebuttal testimony asserted by Appellant as grounds for reversal.

On rebuttal, the State, in an attempt to rehabilitate S.S.'s inconsistent testimony, called Ms. Ellis, a forensic interviewer with the child protection team, and qualified her as an expert on child sexual-abuse behavior. She testified that according to tests, a child victim will totally deny any sexual abuse in the initial interview 67 percent of the time according to one test, and 70 percent according to another. Appellant timely objected to such testimony as impermissibly bolstering S.S.'s testimony and as requiring a Frye1 hearing. The trial court overruled both objections. Appellant asserts as error the impermissible bolstering argument but fails, for some unknown reason, to assert the Frye basis and thereby waives that substantial appellate argument.2

Analysis

In my judgment, contrary to the majority opinion, Ms. Ellis' testimony is inadmissible under Tingle. There the following rule was adopted:

without usurping their exclusive functions by generally testifying about a child's ability to separate truth from fantasy, by summarizing the medical evidence and expressing his opinion as to whether it was consistent with [the victim's] story that she was sexually abused, or perhaps by discussing various patterns of consistency in the stories of child sexual abuse victims and comparing those patterns with patterns in [the victim's] story.

536 So.2d at 205.

The majority applies this rule to affirm, stating that "an expert may properly aid a jury in assessing the veracity of a victim of child abuse ... by discussing various patterns of consistency in the stories of child sexual abuse victims and comparing those patterns in [the victim's] story." While this statement encompasses the rule, the rule is misapplied here. The expert, by...

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4 cases
  • Harrison v. State Of Fla.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 25, 2010
    ...testifying about a child's ability to separate truth from fantasy.’ ” Id. (quoting Azure, 801 F.2d at 340). See Quintero v. State, 889 So.2d 1013, 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). At trial, the alleged victim, then eleven years of age, testified that the appellant twice “rubbed” her “private” seve......
  • Daniels v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 4, 2009
    ...address Mr. Daniels' argument and are otherwise inapposite. Tingle v. State, 536 So.2d 202, 205 (Fla.1988), and Quintero v. State, 889 So.2d 1013, 1013-14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), describe the types of opinions that an expert may offer in a child sexual abuse case. However, these cases do not a......
  • Russ v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 1, 2006
    ...of child abuse ... by discussing various patterns of consistency in the stories of child sexual abuse victims"); Quintero v. State, 889 So.2d 1013, 1013 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (finding no error in permitting testimony "that child victims do not initially fully disclose in 67% to 70% of child s......
  • Black v. Rutherford, 1D04-4861.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 30, 2004
    ...889 So.2d 1013Otto BLACK, Petitioner, ... John H. RUTHERFORD, Sheriff, State of Florida, et al., Respondents ... No. 1D04-4861 ... District Court of Appeal of Florida, First ... ...

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