Quintin Vespa Co. v. Construction Service Co.

• Decision Date: 06 February 1962
• Citation: 179 N.E.2d 895,343 Mass. 547
• Parties: QUINTIN VESPA CO., Inc. v. CONSTRUCTION SERVICE COMPANY et al. CONSTRUCTION SERVICE COMPANY v. QUINTIN VESPA CO., Inc.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 895

179 N.E.2d 895

343 Mass. 547

QUINTIN VESPA CO., Inc. v. CONSTRUCTION SERVICE COMPANY et al.

CONSTRUCTION SERVICE COMPANY v. QUINTIN VESPA CO., Inc.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 3, 1962.

Decided Feb. 6, 1962.

Edward J. Barshak, Boston (Samuel Winetsky, Boston, with him), for Quintin Vespa Co., Inc.

Francis T. Leahy, Poston, for Construction Service Co.

Before wilkins, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, CUTTER and KIRK, JJ. CUTTER, Justice.

These are cross-actions (a) by Quintin Vespa Co., Inc. (Vespa) against Construction Service Company (Construction) and Maryland Casualty Company, surety on bonds furnished by Construction in connection with a contract, and (b) by Construction against Vespa. The cases were consolidated and referred to an auditor. After the filing of his report, the parties stipulated 'that the auditor's report will be accepted as an agreed statement of facts, subject to * * * [certain] additions, modifications, and amendments.' They also agreed that if, under the contract, 'Construction was to do the work of sheeting and shoring, then the finding should be in favor of Vespa; if Vespa was to do the sheeting and shoring, then the finding should be in favor of Construction.' The cases were tried by a judge in the Superior Court, without jury, 'upon the agreed facts.' Both parties submitted requests for rulings of law. The judge 'found' for Construction in each case and, in the case brought by Construction, assessed its damages at $1,530.46. The case is here on Vespa's exceptions to the findings and to the granting and denial of various requests for rulings. The facts are stated from the auditor's report as augmented.

In 1956, Vespa was laying sewer pipe under a contract with the town of Framingham. It became necessary to place the pipe and its casing under an aqueduct. Vespa approached Construction to do the work, ¹ and Construction offered to 'take over the entire work that Vespa was to do in this segment [of the whole sewer job]--for * * * $5,000. * * * Vespa refused this offer.' Construction then offered for $2,500 'to furnish the equipment and install the casing * * * [if] Vespa was to furnish the labor and materials and dig the required access trench.' Construction submitted a proposal to this effect which in part is set out in the margin. ² The proposal was on a printed proposal form used by Construction. ³ 'Vespa told Strickland, Construction's foreman, that he would not sign the contract if he were required to install sheeting and shoring. Strickland thereupon telephoned Van Nest, Construction's vice president, * * * and * * * repeated Vespa's objections. * * * Van Nest asked Strickland if Strickland thought sheeting and shoring would be necessary, and Strickland said 'no.' Van Nest then authorized Strickland to strike out the following words in the proposal as originally submitted [the omitted material included the words 'sheeting and shoring if required' and the other italicized words of the proposal, see footnote 2, supra]. * * * [B]oth parties initialed the deletions. Thereupon the contract was executed as per copy * * *' attached to the auditor's report.

'Shortly after the excavation work had started, water came into the trench in large quantities, causing the sloping sides to slough off and filling the trench so that pumps had to be operated continuously. This condition practically put a stop to the excavation work. Only thirty feet in length were completed and even that part was not fully down to grade. Pumps were supplied by Vespa and operated by Construction. At that point, the town engineer * * * ordered Vespa to put in shorting and sheeting at the aqueduct end of the trench, lest the stability of the aqueduct be affected by * * * erosion. * * * Vespa demanded that Strickland do the sheeting, but Strickland refused. Vespa thereupon installed some shoring and sheeting at the aqueduct end of the trench and about thirty feet down the sides, but not enough to box in the whole trench. * * * Vespa demanded that Construction pay for it. Construction refused. * * *

'Over twelve days * * * had elapsed by this time, during which * * * Construction had had its equipment and men continuously on the job. The trench was still unfinished and it seemed unlikely that it could be finished at all unless a well-point system was installed. The sheeting used by Vespa * * * had been improperly placed. It failed to hold back either the water or the bank. It was in a state of collapse. Van Nest * * * inspected the work. * * * [H]e ordered Construction's equipment to be removed, and called off his working force.' Vespa then entered into a contract with another firm to do the work.

The auditor found that, if there was a breach of contract by Construction, Vespa's damages were $3,500 and that, if there was a breach by Vespa, 'Construction should be awarded as * * * [the] sum by it expended * * * $1,530.46 * * * in furnishing equipment and crew.' His conclusions are summarized in the margin. ⁴

1. The agreement as to the facts contained in the augmented auditor's report, which had attached the contract itself, presents a case stated. No evidence was considered by the trial judge. It would have avoided some doubt and confusion if the parties had been explicit in stipulating that they intended to present a case stated. Nevertheless, this is the substance of what they have done. Their agreement was not merely an agreement as to evidence. Cf. King Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Cape Cod Bdcst. Co. Inc., 317 Mass. 652, 653, 59 N.E.2d 481. The interpretation of the written contract is, of course, a matter of law. The requests for rulings need not concern us. They have no standing. It was the duty of the trial judge and it is our duty to order the correct judgment on the agreed facts. Richard D. Kimball Co. v. Medford, 340 Mass. 727, 728-729, 166 N.E.2d 708.

2. The interpretation of the contract ⁵ involves, among other things, the significance, if any, of (a) the deletion of the words 'sheeting and shoring if required' (see footnote 2, supra, at point [O]; (b) the presence in the proposal of such provisions as those with respect to a trench and a possible well point system (see footnote 2, supra, at points [N] and [P]); and (c) par. (14) of the printed standard proposal provisions (see footnote 3, supra). We consider these matters in order.

(a) The deletion of the words 'sheeting and shoring if required' grew out of Vespa's refusal to 'sign the contract if he [Vespa] were required to install sheeting and shoring.' Although it was found that the words were omitted after Construction's foreman expressed the opinion that no sheeting and shoring 'would be necessary,' the precise reasons and motives for the deletion are not clear from the auditor's report. Construction may have agreed to the deletion, in part at least, because it was of opinion (a) that the deleted words were unnecessary or redundant, and that the remaining contract provisions adequately protected it, or (b) that they had at least primary reference to the burden of shoring as a safety precaution for workmen which was unlikely to be necessary, and which, perhaps, might be covered by par. (15). See footnote 3, supra. See Fred C. McClean Heating Supplies, Inc. v. Jefferson Constr. Co., 339 Mass. 356, 363, 159 N.E.2d 95. Even if we assume that the deletion of the omitted words may be used in interpretation as a part of 'the circumstances attending the making of the contract' (see Krinsky v. Leventhal, 323 Mass. 160, 161-162, 80 N.E.2d 477, 4 A.L.R.2d 136; cf. Kennon v. Shepard, 236 Mass. 57, 59, 127 N.E. 426), the deletions in themselves do not point with clarity to any particular interpretation of the remaining provisions. In view of the limited character of the work to be done by Construction (see footnote 1, supra) and of par. (14) of the printed provisions (see footnote 3, supra), imposing upon Vespa the obligation of preparing and maintaining the job site, and of Vespa's obligation (see footnote 2, supra, at point [N]) to provide a trench, we are of opinion that the ambiguous deletion cannot be viewed as creating an affirmative undertaking by Construction to provide sheeting and shoring.

(b) Performance by Construction was prevented because 'water came into the trench in large quantities. * * * This condition practically put a stop to * * * excavation. * * * Pumps were supplied by Vespa and operated by Construction.' Then, to protect the aqueduct, the town engineer 'ordered Vespa to put in shoring and sheeting.' The water condition, as the auditor found, would probably prevent the trench from being 'finished * * * unless a well-point system was installed.' Such an installation was the responsibility of Vespa. See footnote 2, supra, at point [P]. There is no finding by the auditor that 'shoring and sheeting' were required to permit Construction to do its work or for any reason other than to protect the aqueduct. The explicit burden placed upon Vespa to install a well point system supports the conclusion that Vespa (and not Construction) was bound by the agreement to put in whatever facilities might become necessary to permit Construction's work to continue unimpeded, at least by water.

(c) Paragraph (14) ⁶ imposed on Vespa the duty 'to prepare and maintain the job site' so that the work (see footnote 2, supra, at point [L]) could go on continuously. This provision in terms is broad enough to require Vespa to do whatever might become necessary (including any necessary sheeting and shoring) to maintain the job site in such condition that the work at no time would be impeded.

We reach this conclusion without interpreting par. (15) of the printed standard provisions (see footnote 3, supra). Paragraph (15) expressly relieves Construction of the cost of sheeting and shorting to comply with certain New Jersey statutory safety provisions (N.J.Rev.St. Tit. 34, c. 5, § 21), comparable to those found...