Quirarte v. United Domestic Workers AFSCME Local 3930

• Decision Date: 10 February 2020
• Docket Number: Case No.: 19-CV-1287-CAB-KSC
• Citation: 438 F.Supp.3d 1108
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: Alicia QUIRARTE et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED DOMESTIC WORKERS AFSCME LOCAL 3930 et al., Defendants.

438 F.Supp.3d 1108

Alicia QUIRARTE et al., Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED DOMESTIC WORKERS AFSCME LOCAL 3930 et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 19-CV-1287-CAB-KSC

United States District Court, S.D. California.

Signed February 10, 2020

Amanda Kae Freeman, Pro Hac Vice, William L. Messenger, Pro Hac Vice, The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Springfield, VA, Karin Moore Sweigart, Olympia, WA, Mariah Gondeiro, Freedom Foundation, Redwood City, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Scott A Kronland, Stacey Monica Leyton, Rebecca Moryl Lee, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, Lara Haddad, California Department of Justice, Los Angeles, CA, Attorney General, State of California Office of the Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

[Doc. Nos. 30, 34]

Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings. [Doc. Nos. 30, 34.] The motions have been fully briefed and the Court finds them suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the motions are granted.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiffs Alicia Quirarte, Nora Maya, Anh Le, Viet Le, and Jose Diaz are In-Home Supportive Service ("IHSS") providers that provide non-medical assistance services to disabled individuals who qualify for California Medicaid ("Medi-Cal"). [Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 17.² ] Plaintiffs filed this putative class action complaint against Defendants Unified Domestic Workers AFSCME Local 3930 (the "Union") and California State Controller Betty Yee (the "State Controller") on July 11, 2019, alleging: (1) a violation of their First Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deducting union dues from Plaintiffs' wages; and (2) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32) ("Section 32") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deducting union dues from Medicaid payments made to IHSS providers. [Id. at 15–19.] On October 10, 2019, pursuant to stipulation between the parties, the Court granted the request of Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity as Attorney General of California, to intervene in this matter as a defendant. [Doc. No. 21.]

Plaintiffs are IHSS providers in various California counties. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 10–14.] Pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code section 12301.6, the Union was designated as the exclusive bargaining representative of certain IHSS providers in twenty-one California counties, including the counties where the named Plaintiffs are employed. [Id. at ¶ 22.] The State Controller deducts union dues from IHSS payments made to IHSS providers who agree to the terms of a dues deduction assignment with the Union. [Id. at ¶ 25.] Plaintiffs allege that the dues deduction assignments usually contain terms that make the deduction of union dues not contingent on maintaining union membership and make the deduction irrevocable except when notice of revocation is provided during a short, annual escape period. [Id. at ¶ 26.] Plaintiffs further allege that the dues deduction assignments do not contain language informing IHSS providers of their First Amendment right not to subsidize the Union and its speech or stating that the provider waives that right by executing the assignment. [Id. at ¶ 27.] While IHSS providers who are Union members can resign at any time, deduction of union dues will continue if notice is provided outside of the designated escape period. [Id. at ¶ 28.] Each of the Plaintiffs allege they were pressured or induced into signing the assignment. [Id. at ¶¶ 30, 35, 41, 45.]

On December 13, 2019, the Union moved for a judgment on the pleadings and on December 27, 2019, Defendants Xavier Becerra and Betty Yee (the "State Defendants") moved for the same. [Doc. Nos. 30, 34.]

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), any party may move for judgment on the pleadings at any time after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be evaluated under the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6). See Enron Oil Trading & Trans. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., Ltd. , 132 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, the standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) applies to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Lowden v. T–Mobile USA, Inc. , 378 Fed. Appx. 693, 694 (9th Cir. 2010) ("To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) motion, a plaintiff must allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 )). When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court assumes the allegations in the complaint are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner , 31 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 1994). A judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc. , 430 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs allege two causes of action: (1) a § 1983 claim for violation of Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights for the deduction of union dues from Plaintiffs' wages and (2) a § 1983 claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32) for deducting union dues from Medicaid payments made to IHSS providers. The Union and State Defendants (collectively "Defendants") move for judgment on the pleadings on similar grounds.

A. Mootness of Prospective Relief Claims

The Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief do not present a live controversy and are therefore moot. [Doc. No. 30-1 at 15–17; Doc. No. 34-1 at 11.] According to the Defendants, Plaintiffs lack any cognizable interest in forward-looking relief because the deduction of union membership dues from each of the Plaintiffs' wages has been terminated and Plaintiffs cannot show that they are likely to suffer any similarly alleged injury in the future. Plaintiffs respond that the Ninth Circuit has already considered, and rejected, an identical mootness argument in Fisk v. Inslee , 759 F. App'x 632 (9th Cir. 2019). In Fisk , the Ninth Circuit held under similar facts that while "no class ha[d] been certified and [the union] and the State ha[d] stopped deducting dues," this did not result in the plaintiffs' non-damages claims becoming moot. 759 F. App'x at 633. Citing to Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 111 n.11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' "non-damages claims are the sort of inherently transitory claims for which continued litigation is permissible." Fisk , 759 F. App'x at 633. Like Fisk , this case involves a putative class action where prospective class members presumably remain subject to the challenged conduct. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief are not moot.

B. State Action

To prove a § 1983 violation, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the Defendants: "(1) deprived them of a right secured by the Constitution, and (2) acted under color of state law." Collins v. Womancare , 878 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1989) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "The state-action element in § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful." Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc. , 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotations and citation omitted). "[C]onstitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains." Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma , 723 F.3d 984, 994 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). However, "[u]nder § 1983, a claim may lie against a private party who ‘is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting ‘under color’ of law for purposes of § 1983 actions.’ " DeGrassi v. City of Glendora , 207 F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks , 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980) ). "[A] bare allegation of such joint action will not overcome a motion to dismiss; the plaintiff must allege ‘facts tending to show that [the private party] acted ‘under color of state law or authority.’ " Id. (quoting Sykes v. State of Cal. , 497 F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1974) ); see also Dietrich v. John Ascuaga's Nugget , 548 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008). Courts use a two-prong framework to analyze "when governmental involvement in private action is itself sufficient in character and impact that the government fairly can be viewed as responsible for the harm of which the plaintiff complains." Ohno , 723 F.3d at 994. First, the court considers "whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible." Id. Second, the court considers "whether the party charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor." Id.

1. Whether Plaintiffs' Alleged Harm Results from the Exercise of a Right or Privilege Created by the State or a Rule Imposed by the State

Plaintiffs allege the constitutional deprivation in this case results from the State Controller's systematic extraction of monies for union speech from state payments made to individuals pursuant to the statutory scheme created by California Welfare & Institutions Code § 12301.6(i)(2). [Doc. No. 35 at 12; Doc. No. 36 at 12.] The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs' attempt to frame the alleged harm as resulting from state action. The crux of Plaintiffs'...