Quiroz v. Baldwin
| Decision Date | 11 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | C/A No. 2:15-1891-DCN-BM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Camilo Quiroz, Plaintiff, v. Solicitor Jessica Baldwin, Defendant. |
The Plaintiff, Camilo Quiroz, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is a pretrial detainee at the Charleston County Detention Center. Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated because Defendant, Charleston County Solicitor Jessica Baldwin, failed to dismiss a criminal case against him even though Plaintiff's alleged victim did not appear at Plaintiff's preliminary hearing.
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a pro se complaint to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).
However, even when considered pursuant to this liberal standard, for the reasons set forth herein below this case is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) [].
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights as to a criminal action pending against him. He claims that he was seized by a legal proceeding that was not supported by probable cause because he was not allowed to appear at his preliminary hearing and Defendant did not produce the alleged victim/accuser at a preliminary hearing such that Plaintiff was not able to confront his accuser. Plaintiff claims that his public defender told him that Defendant was willing to allow Plaintiff to plead to a misdemeanor charge with time served. He states that he has already served three months and claims that Defendant was willing to allow him to plead to a "30 day charge." Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has maliciously prosecuted and falsely imprisoned him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, based on Plaintiff's unreasonable seizure on February 19, 2015 (which appears to be the date of his preliminary hearing). Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 2-4. Plaintiff requests release from prison, monetary damages, and other injunctive relief. Id. at 5.
Plaintiff provides few details concerning his pending criminal charge. However, records from Charleston County indicate that Plaintiff has a pending charge for Criminal Domestic Violence - 2nd Offense, for which he was arrested on January 18, 2015, a warrant and affidavit were filed on January 26, 2015, and a preliminary hearing was waived on February 19, 2015. A true bill was filed on April 7, 2015, and a first appearance date is scheduled for May 29, 2015. Charleston County Circuit Court Public Index, http://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=10&CourtAgency=10001&Casenum=2015A1010200303&CaseType=C (last visited May 8, 2015).1
This action should be dismissed because Defendant, as an assistant prosecutor for Charleston County, is entitled to absolute immunity for activities performed as "an officer of the court" where the conduct at issue was closely associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-343 (2009). For example, when a prosecutor "prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding," "appears in court to present evidence in support of a search warrant application," or conducts a criminal trial, bond hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pre-trial "motions" hearings, absolute immunity applies. Id. at 343; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000). In the instant action, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant involve the prosecution of Plaintiff's criminal case. Therefore, Defendant is protected from Plaintiff's claim for damages by prosecutorial immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)[absolute immunity "isan immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability"]; see also Bernard v. County of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 502 (2d Cir. 2004)[immunity extends to "persons working under [a prosecutor's] direction, when they function as advocates for the state" and are clearly associated with the judicial process].
Further, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not authorized to interfere with a State's pending criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989). In Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that federal district courts should abstain from constitutional challenges to state judicial proceedings, no matter how meritorious, if the federal claims have been or could be presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Id. at 52. Moreover, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, expressly prohibits this court from enjoining such proceedings. See Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc)["Congress and the federal judiciary have consistently recognized that federal courts should permit state courts to try state cases, and that, where constitutional issues arise, state court judges are fully competent to handle them subject to Supreme Court review."]; cf. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983)[federal courts cannot review state court proceeding in appellate sense]; Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg Cnty., 411 F.2d 586, 587-88 & nn.2-4 (4th Cir. 1969)[federal courts may not issue writs of mandamus against state courts]. Here, Plaintiff is not foreclosed from raising the issues he raises in his Complaint and having them ruled on in his ongoing state criminal prosecution by a state court Judge. Thus, this Court should not intervene in Plaintiff's pending criminal proceedings.
Additionally, Plaintiff's claims for malicious prosecution are subject to summary dismissal based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477(1994).2 In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under § 1983 where success of the action would implicitly question the validity of the conviction or duration of the sentence, unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been previously invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487. Here, Plaintiff's claims necessarily question the validity of his prosecution, such that any claims for monetary damages are subject to summary dismissal because a right of action has not yet accrued. See Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260-261 (4th Cir. 2000)[claim for malicious prosecution requires a showing that the initiation or maintenance of a proceeding against the plaintiff was without probable cause to support it and a termination thereof occurred in favor of the plaintiff](emphasis added), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130 (2001); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996)[Claim for malicious prosecution does "not accrue until a favorable termination is obtained."].3
As for Plaintiff's request of release from incarceration, Plaintiff's exclusive federal remedy to obtain release from custody is to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 or 2241, after full exhaustion of his state remedies. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 []; see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)[complaint or petition challenging the fact or duration of confinement should be construed and processed as a habeas corpus petition, while a complaint or petition challenging the conditions of confinement should be construed and processed as a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983]. Moreover, this Defendant would not be the proper party in such an action, as a prisoner's custodian is the proper respondent in a habeas corpus action. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004).
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff has alleged claims under state law (he requests monetary damages for, among other things, emotional distress, mental anguish, and slander), federal courts are allowed to hear and decide state-law claims only in conjunction with federal-law claims, through the exercise of "supplemental jurisdiction." See 28 U.S.C. §1367; Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998). Since Plaintiff has asserted no valid federal claim, this Court cannot exercise "supplemental" jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, if any. See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) []. While a civil action...
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