R. C. N. v. State, 52802
| Decision Date | 02 March 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 52802,No. 3,52802,3 |
| Citation | 141 Ga.App. 490,233 S.E.2d 866 |
| Parties | R. C. N. v. STATE of Georgia |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Jack L. Sammons, Gainesville, John L. Cromartie, Jr., Atlanta, for appellant.
Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Carol Cosgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, William M. House, Special Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Gainesville, for appellee.
This is an appeal from an order of the Hall County Juvenile Court permanently terminating the appellant's parental rights in her child. The Hall County Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS) brought a petition in the Juvenile Court to have the appellant's parental rights in her newborn baby terminated. After a hearing, the court found the child to be deprived and ordered a subsequent hearing to determine whether the deprivation was likely to continue. At the subsequent hearing four months later the court found the deprivation was likely to continue and would probably cause serious harm to the child and on that basis the appellant's parental rights were terminated. The issue presented on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence for the court to find probable continuous deprivation such that, under Georgia law, the mother's rights in her baby could be terminated. We find an insufficiency of evidence and reverse the order.
At the age of sixteen, the appellant was unmarried, unemployed, and living in a foster home. When she became pregnant her foster parents warned that she could not bring her baby into their home so she arranged for the DFCS to take temporary custody of her child after its birth until she could find employment and establish a home for the baby. After the child's birth, the DFCS took custody and allowed appellant to visit but refused to release the baby to the appellant. After about four months, the DFCS initiated proceedings to terminate the appellant's parental rights. At the first hearing, evidence was introduced to show the appellant had no reliable source of income; she aided and abetted the escape of a prisoner prior to the child's birth; she colored her language with profanity when angered; she had lived at several addresses recently; she, and a trailer in which she lived for awhile, had been observed on occasion to be unclean; and she was seen kissing and hugging her boyfriend in public. The Juvenile Court found under Code § 24A-3201(b) that the appellant's child was deprived, and temporary custody was to remain in the DFCS until the court reviewed the case to determine whether the deprivation was likely to continue. At the review, evidence was introduced to show the appellant had looked for a regular job at several places but was unsuccessful; she had missed several appointments to see her child; she had changed addresses several times but had finally settled in a mobile home with the help of her boyfriend and money earned doing odd jobs and baby-sitting; she had been in no legal trouble since the prior hearing; she had no indications of alcohol or drug usage; and she anticipated a possible marriage to her boyfriend. The court found the deprivation was likely to continue and as a result thereof the child was suffering or would probably suffer serious physical, mental, or emotional harm. Accordingly, under Code § 24A-3201, the appellant's parental rights in the child were terminated.
Seldom does the state wield so awesome a power as when it permanently cuts the family ties between parent and child. While the state may not sit blindly idle...
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