R. D. Lamar, Inc. v. Ray

• Decision Date: 09 June 1938
• Parties: R. D. LAMAR, Inc. v. RAY et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

182 So. 292

132 Fla. 704

R. D. LAMAR, Inc. v. RAY et al.

Florida Supreme Court

June 9, 1938

Suit by J. C. Ray, individually and as a taxpayer on behalf of the City of Miami, Fla., and others, against R. D. Lamar Incorporated, to vacate certain assignments of municipal tax certificates, to enjoin the issuance of a tax deed under the certificates, and to require the reassignment of the certificates to the City of Miami. From an order granting a temporary injunction and from an order overruling defendant's motion to dismiss, motion to dissolve the temporary injunction and motion to strike certain portions of the bill of complaint, the defendant appeals.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; Arthur Gomez, Judge.

COUNSEL

Wiseheart & Wiseheart, of Miami, for appellant.

Morrow & Mayes, of Miami, for appellees.

OPINION

BUFORD Justice.

The appeal here brings for review order granting temporary injunction and order overruling defendant's motion to dismiss, motion to dissolve temporary injunction and motion to strike certain portions of the bill of complaint in a suit in Chancery, the purpose of which was to vacate certain assignments of municipal tax certificates, to enjoin the issuance of a tax deed under the certificates and to require the certificates to be reassigned and returned to the municipality, the City of Miami.

The bill of complaint was filed July 6, 1937, by one J. C. Ray individually and as a taxpayer on behalf of the City of Miami, Florida, a municipal corporation, against R. D. LaMar, Inc., M-B Properties, Inc., and E. B. Leatherman as Clerk of the Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida.

The bill of complaint alleges that plaintiff was a taxpayer of the City of Miami, Florida, and was the owner of certain property as set forth in said bill of complaint; that the City of Miami, at its sale of City taxes imposed for the years of 1926, 1927, 1928 and 1931, became the purchaser of a great number of tax certificates on property in the City of Miami, and that among such certificates were included certificates numbers 26032 for the year 1926, 22231 for the year 1927, 22242 for the year 1928, and 31301 for the year 1931, which covered property in the City of Miami known and described as the West half of the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of section 4, Township 54 South, Range 41 East; and that the City Commissioners on August 20, 1934, contrary to public policy, and in utter disregard of public welfare, and in gross abuse of power, and notwithstanding the provisions of law applicable thereto, passed a resolution which, among other things, authorized the Director of Finance of the City of Miami to sell the above certificates, having a face value of $2,032.31, for the sum of $171.81; in accordance with such resolution, the certificates above described were purchased from the Director of Finance of the City of Miami, Florida, for the sum of $171.81, and said certificates were assigned by City of Miami to M-B Properties, Inc., a Florida corporation.

That subsequently thereafter, on November 23, 1934, the City Commissioners of the City of Miami passed and adopted a resolution which, among other things, authorized the Director of Finance of the City of Miami to acquire at face, plus accrued interest, the said certificates above described by exchanging therefor City-owned tax certificates of the face value of $2,032.31 on other lands within the City of Miami for the year 1931 and prior years; pursuant to said resolution, the City of Miami exchanged tax certificates for the years 1929, 1930 and 1931 on other properties in the face amount of $2,032.31, without interest, among which were included certificates numbers:

47171 evidencing sale of lot 41, block 56, of Mary Brickell's Flagler Addition for the year 1931;

47172 evidencing sale of lot 42, block 56, of Mary Brickell's Flagler Addition for unpaid taxes for the year 1931;

47170 evidencing sale of lot 4, block 56, of Mary Brickell's Flagler Addition for unpaid taxes for the year 1931; and

47378 evidencing sale of lot 11, block 7, of Brickell Hammock Unit No. 1 for unpaid taxes for the year 1931;

for the certificates originally assigned to M-B Properties, Inc., as above described, that said exchange of certificates was unconstitutional, irregular, ultra vires, and null and void, and was an abuse of power and in disregard of public welfare, for the reason that the certificates exchanged by the City of Miami, Florida, were of a far greater value than the certificates held by M-B Properties, Inc., and that the consideration for the same was grossly inadequate; that the property covered by the certificates exchanged by the City of Miami was worth a great deal more than the amount of all taxes assessed against it, and for the further reason that said exchange was an ultra vires act on the part of the City Officials of the City of Miami; that the sale of certificates of the face value of $2,032.31 by the said City of Miami to M-B Properties, Inc., for the sum of $171.81 was such a tremendous discount and reduction that upon its face the amount of discount would shock the conscience of any court; that the subsequent exchange of said certificates for the said certificates on complainant's lands was also such a discount and reduction on such certificates exchanged, that the same would also shock the conscience of any court; that the said City of Miami had not attempted to make a sale of said certificates numbers 47170, 47171, 47172 and 47378 at a greater amount, so as to indicate that an experiment had reasonably demonstrated to the officials of the City of Miami that the full face amount thereof, with or without penalties, could not be obtained by the ordinary processes in cash; but that the City Commissioners arbitrarily, and acting beyond the scope of their authority, exchanged said certificates covering plaintiff's property for certificates of inferior value, without any justifiable reason for discounting certificates on complainant's land at such a ridiculously large figure, and in utter disregard of the reasonable market value of said certificates.

That subsequently thereafter, said M-B Properties, Inc., assigned the above mentioned certificates covering plaintiff's property to R. D. LaMar, Inc., appellant herein, and that appellant herein as the holder of said certificates made application to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, for tax deeds based upon said certificates; that the amounts necessary to redeem the aforesaid certificates from said tax deed application are as follows:

$87.21 for Certificate No. 47170

$89.23 for Certificate No. 47378

that as to certificates numbers 47171 and 47172, in the amount of $87.21 each, plaintiff paid said amounts to said Clerk under protest; that in the event tax deed should issue on plaintiff's property, plaintiff as an individual and as a taxpayer would be irreparably injured.

Thereupon the bill prayed that the Court declare invalid the acts of the City Commissioners of the City of Miami, Florida, in adopting said resolutions for the sale and exchange of said tax certificates, and that appellant R. D. LaMar, Inc., be required by the Court to return said certificates to the City of Miami, Florida; that a temporary injunction be granted restraining the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, from paying to appellant, R. D. LaMar, Inc., any moneys paid under protest by appellee, and that the Clerk be further restrained from issuing any tax deeds based upon said tax certificates. The bill of complaint also contained prayer for general relief.

Upon the filing of the bill of complaint, the Court granted the temporary restraining order prayed for and thereafter on August 10, 1937, appellant moved to dissolve the injunction and moved to dismiss the bill of complaint, both of which motions were denied on August 27, 1937.

Appeal was sued out as heretofore stated.

The appellant has stated four questions, the 1st and 4th of which cover the range including the matters which we deem it necessary to discuss. The 2nd and 3rd questions embrace what is stated in the 4th question and, therefore, it is not necessary to discuss those questions separately. The 1st and 4th questions are:

1. 'Where the City of Miami was the owner of delinquent tax sales certificates more than two years old, and sold and assigned such certificates for less than the full amount due thereon to a purchaser who assigned such certificates for value to another person, is the assignment of the City invalid because of the lack of full consideration?'

4. 'Where the City of Miami was the owner of delinquent tax sales certificates more than two years old, and the City being desirous of obtaining other outstanding City of...