R.D. v. State (In re Interest of G.D.)

• Decision Date: 10 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20190946-SC,20190946-SC
• Citation: 491 P.3d 867
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: In the INTEREST OF G.D. and M.D., Persons Under Eighteen Years of Age R.D. and C.W., Appellants, v. State of Utah, Appellee.

491 P.3d 867

In the INTEREST OF G.D. and M.D., Persons Under Eighteen Years of Age

R.D. and C.W., Appellants,

v.State of Utah, Appellee.

No. 20190946-SC

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard October 13, 2020

Filed June 10, 2021

Neil Skousen, Orem, Sara Pfrommer, Bountiful, for R.D., appellant

Margaret P. Lindsay, Barbara A. Gonzales, Provo, for C.W., appellant

Sean Reyes, Att'y Gen., Carol L.C. Verdoia, John M. Peterson, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for State of Utah, appellee

Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian ad Litem for G.D. and M.D., appellees

Chief Justice Durrant authored the opinion of the Court, in which Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Himonas, Justice Pearce, and Justice Petersen joined.

Chief Justice Durrant, opinion of the Court:

Introduction

¶1 The juvenile court terminated a mother and father's parental rights based on years of dysfunctionality, substance abuse, and criminal conduct. They challenge this determination on appeal, raising three issues in their individual briefs.¹ First, they argue the juvenile court erred in declining to apply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof. Second, they argue the standard of review for termination cases we used in State ex rel. B.R. is too deferential.² And third, they argue the juvenile court erred by concluding that termination was strictly necessary and in the children's best interests. We address each argument in turn.

¶2 First, we affirm the juvenile court's decision not to apply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has opened the door for states to adopt an evidentiary standard higher than "clear and convincing" for termination proceedings, both this court and the Utah legislature have not, contrary to what Parents argue, adopted the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. And we decline to adopt that standard now.

¶3 Second, we disagree that the standard of review we used in State ex rel. B.R. is too deferential. Contrary to what Father argues, we do not read our decision in State ex rel. B.R. as creating a unique standard of review for juvenile courts. Rather, the standard in State ex rel. B.R. echoes the standard of deference used in other cases: that appellate courts defer to trial courts’ findings of fact. So by treating State ex rel. B.R. ’s standard as unique, Father overlooks the well-established principle that appellate courts are not generally in a position to second-guess the factual determinations of trial courts.

¶4 Finally, we reject Parents’ argument that the juvenile court erred in concluding that termination was strictly necessary and in the best interests of the children. After reviewing the record, we conclude that, in reaching its conclusion, the court gave full and careful consideration to all the evidence presented.

Background

¶5 This case concerns two of Parents’ children: G.D. and M.D. At the time of the juvenile court's decision, G.D. was five years old and M.D. was one year old. Parents have struggled with substance abuse and mental illness for several years. This case is the culmination of that struggle and the State's efforts, through juvenile courts and the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), to protect G.D. and M.D.

¶6 Over the last five years, G.D. has been removed from Parents’ home three times. In each of these instances, DCFS filed petitions for custody of G.D. based on a combination of parental neglect, substance abuse, mental illness, criminal conduct, and parenting deficits. During G.D.’s third removal from the home, M.D. was also removed for the first time.

¶7 Shortly before both children were removed from their home, a woman contacted the police in the middle of the day, alleging that she was caring for the children because Father had overdosed. After finding Father unconscious, the police questioned him about his drug use. Father confessed to using methamphetamine and opiates, and the police found drug paraphernalia in the home. Father also admitted to DCFS that he used methamphetamine on two occasions and used heroin to fall asleep on one occasion. But he claimed that Mother was not aware of his drug use—a claim that was contradicted by the fact that Mother had previously contacted DCFS to report concerns about Father's drug use.

¶8 Because DCFS became concerned about Father's drug use, Father voluntarily assigned temporary custody of G.D. to the children's grandmother. DCFS made a safety plan with Parents, according to which G.D. would not be left alone with Father, Parents would both submit to drug testing, M.D. would remain at home,³ and G.D. would remain with Grandmother. But shortly thereafter, Father again tested positive for morphine

and methamphetamine, and Mother did not submit to drug testing.

¶9 In light of Parents’ failures to follow DCFS's safety plan, DCFS filed a petition for custody of G.D. and M.D. DCFS took M.D. into its custody and completed a safety assessment, concluding both children were unsafe.⁴ At a shelter hearing pursuant to DCFS's petition, the juvenile court placed G.D. in the temporary custody and guardianship of Grandmother but kept M.D. in the protective custody of DCFS pending a continued shelter hearing.

¶10 At the continued shelter hearing, the court found there was a substantial risk the children would suffer abuse or neglect if it did not remove them from Parents’ custody because Parents had both tested positive for methamphetamine. Accordingly, the court placed both children in DCFS's temporary custody and guardianship.

¶11 With future custody hearings pending, Parents’ troubles with substance abuse and law enforcement continued. In the evening after the continued shelter hearing, police found Father under the influence of opiates and arrested him. Father was also subject to pending charges for driving with a measurable controlled substance and on a suspended license. Meanwhile, Mother submitted to drug testing, testing positive for methamphetamines.

¶12 Over the course of their dealings with DCFS during this time, Parents repeatedly concealed one another's drug use from DCFS, prioritizing hiding their drug use over the children's interests. Between the continued shelter hearing and a disposition hearing held about two months later, Mother was found guilty of driving on a suspended or revoked license, Father was convicted of driving under the influence, and Mother and Father were evicted from their home.

¶13 Because DCFS and Parents failed to resolve the problems identified in DCFS's petition for custody through mediation, the juvenile court scheduled a preliminary hearing on Parents’ fitness. At this hearing, Father admitted to neglecting G.D. The court also heard evidence about Father's criminal history⁵ and evidence suggesting that he was likely to remove the children from Grandmother's guardianship at any time.

¶14 The court also heard evidence regarding Mother's unfitness, evidence that Mother had admitted to neglecting both children, and evidence about Mother's criminal history.⁶ The court noted that, in a previous proceeding regarding G.D., Mother lost the presumption⁷ that custody with her was in G.D.’s best interests.

¶15 The court held the disposition hearing in late April 2019, but Father failed to appear. At that hearing, the court declined to order DCFS to facilitate the children's reunification with Mother and Father. Instead, it identified the children's permanency goal as adoption, with a concurrent goal of permanent custody and guardianship.

¶16 In a later pretrial hearing, the State sought partial summary judgment with respect to Parents’ fitness. Father failed to appear. At the time of that hearing, he was subject to a $5,000 cash warrant for his arrest for a pending felony drug possession and paraphernalia case.

¶17 Parents then filed a joint motion asking the court to apply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof instead of the usual "clear and convincing" standard used in termination proceedings. The court rejected their motion, and the case proceeded to trial.

¶18 At trial, Dr. Jensen, a clinical psychologist, testified that the combined efforts of Parents, Grandmother, and DCFS had allowed the children to form attached relationships to their caretakers. But he explained that Parents’ dysfunctional lifestyle had imperiled this process. And he noted that, without Grandmother and DCFS, custody with Parents would fail. He also testified the children were attached and positively bonded to each other.

¶19 With respect to the children's future, Dr. Jensen testified that, because the children had formed positive relationships in the past, they had a good chance of forming new positive relationships. In light of the children's unstable living situation and M.D.’s age, Dr. Jensen explained that changing M.D.’s custody placement would be less disruptive than leaving her in Parents’ care. But, in his view, G.D. would have more difficulty with a change in custody. He added, however, that any delay in finding a permanent placement would only make change more difficult for G.D. and might even cause irreparable harm.

¶20 The court agreed with Dr. Jensen's assessment that Parents had failed to demonstrate they were capable of providing the children a risk- and disruption-free environment. The court also noted that Parents’ long struggle with addiction indicated a high risk for relapse, and thus more instability.

¶21 Grandmother also testified at trial. She explained that she already cared for one of Mother's other children and was hesitant to take permanent custody of M.D. and G.D. And although she testified that she might be in a better financial situation after a pending divorce case, she said she did not want to care for the children for more than two years. Instead, she hoped Mother could regain custody within that time period. Dr. Jensen corroborated Grandmother's testimony on this point, adding that, in his view, Grandmother imagines herself in a mere supportive role and hopes her grandchildren will...