State ex rel. E.R. v. State

• Decision Date: 29 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20200163,20200163
• Parties: STATE of Utah, IN the INTEREST OF E.R., a person under eighteen years of age. J.R., Petitioner, v. State of Utah, Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

496 P.3d 58

STATE of Utah, IN the INTEREST OF E.R., a person under eighteen years of age.

J.R., Petitioner,

v.State of Utah, Respondent.

No. 20200163

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard April 8, 2021

Filed July 29, 2021

Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, for petitioner

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Carol L. C. Verdoia, John M. Peterson, Asst. Att'y Gens., Salt Lake City, for respondent

Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian ad Litem for E.R.

Associate Chief Justice Lee authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Himonas, Justice Pearce, and Justice Petersen joined.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Associate Chief Justice Lee, opinion of the Court:

¶1 This case arises from the termination of a mother's parental rights. The juvenile court removed E.R. from his mother's custody in January 2016, after the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) supported a finding of dependency against the mother. The court first set a primary permanency goal of reunification with the mother, with a concurrent goal of permanent custody and guardianship with a relative. After several months of receiving services from DCFS, however, the mother failed to come into substantial compliance with the reunification plan. In November 2016, the juvenile court "terminated reunification services" and "set a primary goal of adoption with a concurrent goal of permanent custody and guardianship."

¶2 A year later the state petitioned for termination of the mother's parental rights. At that point, the court found there were statutory grounds to terminate and determined that it was in E.R.’s best interest to do so. The court concluded that E.R. "has a particular aversion to anything court related" and that he "has a significant need for stability in his placement." And with that in mind, the court determined that it was "strictly necessary to terminate" the mother's parental rights to provide E.R. with "true permanency through adoption and so that all court proceedings come to an end."

¶3 The mother appealed the termination, asserting that the juvenile court had "exceeded its discretion in terminating her parental rights" and that "termination was not in E.R.’s best interest." State ex rel. E.R. , 2019 UT App 208, ¶ 9, 457 P.3d 389 ; see UTAH CODE § 78A-6-507 (setting forth grounds for termination and providing that termination is permitted if it is "strictly necessary" "from the child's point of view").¹ In the mother's view, the juvenile court had failed to give adequate consideration to reasonable alternatives to termination, as required for the "strictly necessary" inquiry. Id. ¶¶ 10–11 ; see also In re B.T.B. , 2020 UT 60, ¶ 76, 472 P.3d 827 (stating that "a court must specifically address whether termination is strictly necessary to promote the child's welfare and best interest"). And the mother sought reversal on that basis.

¶4 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the juvenile court. Applying the standard of review set forth in State ex rel. B.R. , 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435, the court of appeals stated that "the juvenile court's decision should be afforded a high degree of deference" and concluded that the result could be overturned only if it is "against the clear weight of the evidence" or leaves the appellate court "with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made." E.R. , 2019 UT App 208, ¶ 8, 457 P.3d 389 (quoting B.R. , 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 ). The court determined that the mother had failed to "demonstrate that the juvenile court's findings were against the clear weight of the evidence." Id. ¶ 13. It concluded that the juvenile court had "examined the specific circumstances of this case and the individual needs of E.R." when making its decision and that its best interest determination was adequate. Id. And the court of appeals thus concluded that the "finding that termination was strictly necessary was not against the clear weight of the evidence." Id. ¶ 15.

¶5 The mother filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted. Her briefs filed in our court are aimed at challenging the propriety of the standard of review applied by the court of appeals. She first asks us to rule that the deferential standard of review laid out in B.R. applies only to determinations of parental fitness in termination proceedings, not to best interest determinations. If we conclude that B.R. does apply to best interest determinations, she next asserts that the standard is too deferential, and should be replaced with a non-deferential, de novo standard of review.

¶6 We affirm. First, we hold that the court of appeals correctly applied the B.R. standard of review to the juvenile court's best interest determination. Second, we reject the mother's request that we replace the B.R. standard with a de novo standard of review. Third, we acknowledge some points of imprecision and possible confusion in B.R. , and clarify that the governing standard is the same deferential standard that applies to any fact-intensive decision of any lower court—such determinations are upheld unless they are against the "clear weight of the evidence."

I

¶7 In State ex rel. B.R. , this court stated that a juvenile court's termination decision "should be afforded a high degree of deference." 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435. We noted that the question "[w]hether a parent's rights should be terminated presents a mixed question of law and fact." Id. And we held that an appellate court may thus overturn the juvenile court's decision on termination only where it is "against the clear weight of the evidence or leave[s] the appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. (alteration in original, citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Such a decision may be overturned, in other words, "only if it either failed to consider all of the facts or considered all of the facts and its decision was nonetheless against the clear weight of the evidence." Id.

¶8 The mother contends that only determinations of parental fitness, and not determinations of a child's best interest, are reviewed under the standard set forth in B.R.² She cites language from B.R. stating that "the legal standard of unfitness is the ultimate question." Id . And she accordingly insists that B.R. concerned only a parental fitness determination, not a best interest determination. See id. ¶9 This is a misread of our opinion in B.R. Our opinion addressed the larger question of what level of review to apply to a juvenile court's analysis of "[w]hether a parent's rights should be terminated." Id. And parental termination implicates not just parental fitness but also the child's best interest—a point made clear by subsequent precedent.

¶10 In State ex rel. A.C.M. , we reiterated the B.R. standard and applied it to a juvenile court's decision to terminate a father's rights. We thus applied this standard to two questions—to whether the juvenile court had "sufficient grounds to terminate his rights," and to whether it had failed to consider the child's "best interests." 2009 UT 30, ¶ 8, 221 P.3d 185. In considering these questions, we stated that "[w]e afford great deference to the juvenile court's findings of fact and overturn the result only if the facts are against the clear weight of the evidence." Id.

¶11 Our recent decision in In re G.D. is along the same lines. There we stated that "[w]hen reviewing a fact-intensive mixed question of fact and law, such as whether a particular placement serves a child's best interests, ... [a]n appellate court must not overturn the trial court's decision unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence." In re G.D. , 2021 UT 19, ¶ 72 n.46, 491 P.3d 867.

¶12 These cases foreclose the mother's first argument. The standard of review established in B.R. applies to all aspects of the juvenile court's termination of parental rights determination, and not just to the parental fitness determination. We have routinely applied the standard to both parental fitness and best interest determinations. The court of appeals was thus correct to apply the B.R. standard to the juvenile court's best interest determination.

II

¶13 The mother asserts that the standard we established in B.R. is too deferential for a best interest determination. But the deferential standard established in B.R. is in line with the standard of review we apply to similar fact-intensive decisions. And the mother has not identified a basis for repudiation of this deferential standard in favor of the de novo standard she asks us to apply.

¶14 The appropriate standard of review for a lower court's decision is dependent upon the "nature of the issue." In re Adoption of Baby B. , 2012 UT 35, ¶ 42, 308 P.3d 382. We apply differing standards of review to findings of fact, conclusions of law, and determinations of mixed questions of law and fact.

¶15 Factual determinations are accorded a high degree of deference. This is because "a lower court often has a comparative advantage in its firsthand access to factual evidence." In re United Effort Plan Trust , 2013 UT 5, ¶ 17, 296 P.3d 742 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And as factual issues "are unique to each case," there is "no particular benefit in establishing settled appellate precedent on issues of fact." Id. (citation omitted). With this in mind, we review determinations of fact with a "highly deferential standard," overturning the lower court "only when clearly erroneous." Id. (citation omitted).

¶16 Our review of conclusions of law is at the other end of the spectrum. We afford "[n]o deference ... to the lower court's analysis of abstract legal questions." Id. ¶ 18 (citation omitted). "[S]ettled appellate precedent is of crucial importance in establishing a clear, uniform body of law." Id . (citation omitted). And appellate courts have comparative advantages in establishing such precedent. We apply a non-deferential de novo standard to questions of law for that reason.

¶17 A best...