A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. New York City Dept. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 10 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-9473.,No. 02-9471.,No. 02-9472.,02-9471.,02-9472.,02-9473. |
| Citation | 407 F.3d 65 |
| Parties | A.R., on behalf of her minor child, R.V., M.S., on behalf of her minor child, I.O., M.L., on behalf of her minor child, J.L., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellant. S.W. and M.M., on behalf of N.W., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, (District 2), Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Kristin M. Helmers, Assistant Corporation Counsel of the City of New York (Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, Leonard Koerner, Martin Bowe, of counsel), New York, NY, for defendant-appellant in both appeals.
Michael D. Hampden, Legal Services for Children, Inc., New York, NY, for plaintiffs-appellees A.R., M.S., and M.L. in Nos. 02-9471, 02-9472, and 02-09473.
Gary S. Mayerson, Mayerson & Associates (Amanda L. Oren, of counsel), New York, NY, for plaintiffs-appellees S.W. and M.M. in No. 03-7258.
Before: McLAUGHLIN, SACK, and SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judges.
Under Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001), "[e]ssentially, in order to be considered a `prevailing party' [to enable a plaintiff to take advantage of a federal fee-shifting statute] ..., a plaintiff must not only achieve some `material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,' but that change must also be judicially sanctioned." Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75, 79-80 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835). Neither Buckhannon, nor Roberson explaining it, explicitly instructs us, however, how to apply the rule in Buckhannon to fees awarded with respect to the state administrative proceedings relevant to this appeal. Nor has the scope of the district court's discretion to determine the amount of such an award been clarified in the context of fees for administrative proceedings.
The plaintiffs-appellees A.R., M.S., M.L., and S.W. and M.M.1 (collectively the "Parents") instituted four separate New York State administrative proceedings challenging, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., the special educational programs that the defendant-appellant New York City Department of Education (the "DOE")2 had provided for the Parents' disabled children. In two of the four proceedings, impartial hearing officers ("IHOs") entered decisions for the plaintiffs on the merits.3 In the two others, IHOs issued "Statements of Agreement and Order" that recorded the terms of settlement agreements between the parties. In one of the two latter cases, the plaintiff requested a second hearing on an additional claim, and an IHO entered an order and stipulation that disposed of that claim.
The IDEA grants courts the discretionary power to "award reasonable attorneys' fees ... [to] the prevailing party" "[i]n any action or proceeding brought under" the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Each parent sought, under that provision, to recover the legal fees he or she incurred in pursuing administrative proceedings against the DOE. When their non-judicial efforts proved unsuccessful, the parties brought suit in separate but similar actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Constance Baker Motley and Shira A. Scheindlin District Judges).4 The district judges awarded the Parents, as "prevailing parties" under the IDEA, the attorneys' fees that they sought.
Although these two appeals have not been consolidated, because of their similarity we heard them together. To resolve them, we must determine, inter alia, whether, through the administrative proceedings for which fees are sought, the Parents each sufficiently achieved a judicially sanctioned "material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties," or its equivalent, sufficient to entitle him or her to legal fees as the "prevailing party" under the IDEA and Buckhannon, and whether the fee awards conform to IDEA requirements. We ultimately agree with the district judges and therefore affirm.5
The Parents challenged under the IDEA the special educational programs that the DOE had provided for their disabled children.
M.S. participated in two administrative hearings before an IHO on behalf of her child, I.O. The first concluded when the IHO issued a "Statement of Agreement and Order" that recorded the terms of a settlement agreement between M.S. and the DOE.
The M.S. Agreement and Order, signed by the IHO, recites, in part:
[I.O.'s] parent [M.S.] sought an impartial hearing to obtain compensatory services for him for the remainder of the academic year or until such time as he actually enters a private school. The parent and student were both present at the hearing, and were represented by counsel. The [DOE] was represented by [the] supervisor of psychologists,... District 4 ....
At the hearing, the parties engaged in extensive discussions held off the record. As a result of these discussions, the parties reached various points of agreement. These were put into the record, with the assent of the parties. [The IHO] issued, where appropriate, orders implementing the points of agreement. These are repeated [in this Statement of Agreement and Order].
In re I.O., Case No. 39106, Statement of Agreement & Order at 2 (). The Agreement and Order then sets forth the terms of the parties' agreement, principally that I.O. would receive from the DOE (1) the right to attend private school at the district's expense, (2) one-on-one tutoring, therapy, and counseling, and (3) an immediate transfer to a more appropriate public school until I.O. was placed at a private school. The Agreement and Order concludes: Id. at 3.
M.S. then sought another hearing on a separate claim, asserting that the first "hearing and agreement did not address issues relating to prior years, because [M.S.]'s request for the [first] hearing made reference only to the current year." Letter from Michael D. Hampden, Legal Services for Children, Inc., to the New York City BOE, Impartial Hearing Office of Apr. 24, 2000, at 2. On November 6, 2000, in this second administrative hearing, held before a different IHO, the IHO "so ordered" a three-page written Order and Stipulation of the parties setting forth the terms of a settlement agreement between them. The Order and Stipulation provides that M.S.'s son I.O. is entitled to receive from the DOE three years of "compensatory education," to be provided after he graduates or reaches the age of twenty-one, whichever comes first. At a telephonic hearing the same day, transcribed and reduced to a verbatim transcript, the IHO stated that he would order, and thereby give effect to, the terms of the parties' agreement.
[IHO]: Okay, I understand that
you've both settled
this case
[Lawyer for I.O.]: That's right
[Lawyer for DOE]: Yes
[IHO]: And, you've settled it
pursuant to an order
and stipulation that the
[DOE] faxed me about a
half hour ago. Correct
[Lawyer for DOE]: Yes.
[Lawyer for I.O.]: That's right.
[IHO]: Okay, then at this point,
I will so order, and sign
the order and stipulation
and mark this case
as settled.
[Lawyer for DOE]: Great.
[Lawyer for I.O.]: Thank you.
[IHO]: Are there any objections
for the [DOE]?
[Lawyer for DOE]: No.
[IHO]: [Inquiring the same of
the lawyer for I.O.:]
[Lawyer for I.O.]: No.
[IHO]: Okay, then the order is
hereby—I hereby order
the stipulation to be put
into [e]ffect, and I'll
send the paperwork in.
[Lawyer for DOE]: Wonderful.
Tr. of Hearing, Nov. 6, 2000, at 14-15, In re I.O., Case No. 39486. About a week later, on November 14, 2000, the IHO signed an order dismissing the case.
M.L. challenged the DOE's treatment of her child J.L. in a proceeding that also culminated in a settlement agreement among the parties. On May 14, 2001, the IHO recited the terms of the agreement orally at the conclusion of a brief administrative hearing. He preceded the recitation with the following observations:
[IHO]: Okay. We had an off
the record discussion
regarding this matter
I'll just recap some
things.
....
[J.L.]'s supposed to be
provided with a bilingual
teacher....
For some reason, that
service hasn't been provided
....
....
So that's why we're
here today because ...
[J.L.]'s mother[] was
asking that the service
be provided and that I
so order.
The [BOE and the lawyers
for all parties]
[seem to] have ... come
to an agreement. Basically,
they're stipulating
to an agreement which
they have asked me to
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