R.F. & P. Co. v. City of Richmond

Decision Date17 June 1926
Citation145 Va. 225
CourtVirginia Supreme Court
PartiesRICHMOND, FREDERICKSBURG AND POTOMAC RAILROAD COMPANY v. CITY OF RICHMOND.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Inalienable Rights. — Man as an individual possesses certain rights which are called inherent rights, inborn and inbred, the gift of his Maker, and essential to his existence and well being, such as the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, which are not surrendered by entering into organized society. They existed before society was organized and are not surrendered by entering into the organization, and this is recognized in section one of the Constitution of 1902.

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Inalienable Rights. — Municipal corporations have no such inherent rights as those recognized by section one of the Constitution of 1902 as being possessed by individuals. Municipal corporations have no existence and hence no rights prior to the organization of society.

3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Character — Power — Creatures of State — Charter not a Contract. — Municipal corporations are mere political subdivisions of the State created for the convenient administration of such governmental powers as may be entrusted to them. They are creatures of the State, which may grant or withhold such powers as to it shall seem meet. The State may grant these powers in whole or in part, conditionally or unconditionally, and may, at its pleasure, modify or withdraw them, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. It may, if it chooses, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. The charter is not a contract between the State and the municipality.

4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Police Power — Abridgment — Section 159 of the Constitution of 1902. Section 159 of the Constitution of 1902, providing that the exercise of police power of the State shall never be abridged, has reference to the police power of the State and not to the police power of municipal corporations.

5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Crossings — At Whose Expense Improvements Shall be Made — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action by a railroad against a city for half the expense of improvements to "existing crossings," the power of the legislature to determine at whose expense such improvements should be madecannot be doubted.

6. CROSSINGS — Municipal Corporations — Expense of Improvements of Crossings — Claim of Set-off by City — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action by a railroad against a city for half the expense of improvements made at "existing crossings" by the railroad at the request of the city, the city claimed a set-off for certain drainage. The trial court committed no error in refusing to allow this set-off as the city contracted to pay for this drainage in a stipulation contained in the deed of dedication by the railroad to the city of an easement and right of way across the railroad for an avenue, and it formed a part, at least, of the consideration of that deed.

7. CROSSINGS — Municipal Corporations — Expense of Improving Crossings — Original Price Increased — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action by a railroad against a city for one-half the expense of improvements at crossings, the railroad company had let to contract the building of bridges at the crossings. Owing to delay, for which the contractor was not responsible, the prices of material and labor having greatly increased in the meantime, the contractor refused to perform his contract, and the railroad company was compelled to relet the contract at a much higher price.

Held: That the trial court did not err in holding the city liable for one-half of the increased price instead of the price fixed by the original contract, the court being satisfied that the railroad company did what was best in the interest of all parties.

8. CROSSINGS — Duty of Railroad — Inadequate Bridges — Continuing Duty. — The duty of railroads as to the crossing of streets and highways is a continuing duty and however adequate a bridge may have been when constructed, if, from the increase of population or other cause, the bridge became inadequate for the convenience of the public, it is the duty of the railroad company to make it adequate.

9. CROSSINGS — Municipal Corporations — Improvements — Inadequate Bridge — Liability of City for Part of Cost of New BridgeCase at Bar. — In the instant case, an action by a railroad against a city for half the expense of the improvements at crossings, the city contended that it should be exonerated from any part of the cost of a certain bridge for the reason that the railroad voluntarily separated the grades at that point a number of years previously but built an inadequate bridge and not one in conformity with the laws of that time. The bridge when erected was accepted by the supervisors of the county in which it was then situated and no complaint was made of inadequacy either by the county or the city after annexation, or any demand for widening the bridge. The crossing was an "existing crossing" and the city was asking for its improvement by lowering the grade of the railroad and the construction of a new bridge the width of the street, and this was what the railroad company did. The reconstruction of the bridge was not because of its insufficiency nor in response to any continuing duty on the part of the railroad, but to carry out a detail of a plan of improvement accepted both by the city and the railroad.

Held: That there was no merit in the city's contention and it was not liable for half the cost of the construction of the bridge.

10. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Crossings — Liability of the Municipality — Bonus Given to Contractor by Railroad Case at Bar. — In an action by a railroad company against a city to recover half the cost of improvements at crossings, the city is not liable for any part of a sum paid by the railroad to the contractors in the nature of a bonus without consultation with the city.

11. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Crossings — Liability of the Municipality — Interest — Case at Bar. — In the instant case it was stipulated in a deed between a railroad and a city that in case it should be established in a proceeding to be instituted by the railroad that the city was liable for any part of the expense of improvements at crossings to be done by the company, the company would accept in settlement notes of the city for the amount so due by it, and the time for which interest was to run was fixed as "the date at which the portion of the expense to be paid by the city becomes due and payable."

Held: That this did not mean from the date of the judgment against the city in the proceedings by the railroad against the city, that judgment simply fixed the date at which the amount was to become due and payable and from that date, which was properly fixed by the judgment, interest was to run by the terms of the contract.

12. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Crossings — Liability of the Municipality — Interest — Case at Bar. — In the instant case it was stipulated in a deed between a railroad and a city that in case it should be established in a proceeding to be instituted by the railroad that the city was liable for any part of the expense of improvements at crossings to be done by the company, the company would accept in settlement notes of the city for the amount so due by it. The notes were to bear interest at the rate at which the city could borrow money which it was agreed was four per cent.

Held: That this agreement to pay four per cent on the amount in controversy meant that it was to carry that rate until payment and not merely until maturity.

13. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Crossings — Liability of the Municipality — Interest — Case at Bar. — In the instant case it was agreed between a railroad and a city that the railroad reserved the right to proceed against the city to recover one-half of the cost of the crossing improvements when work on the improvements should "have been completed and said expense paid." The agreement further provided for the payment of any balance found against the city in one and two years, with interest at the rate which the city could borrow from the banks.

Held: That the payment of interest during construction was not contemplated by the parties; that their intention was that the sums actually paid out by the railroad should constitute the cost to be apportioned between them.

14. CROSSINGS — Grade Crossings — Policy of the State. — In the earlier years of railroad construction and for many years thereafter the country was sparsely settled, and such construction was so greatly favored that it was the policy of the State to encourage grade crossings, in order to reduce the cost of construction. But with the increased traffic on the public highways, and the manifest danger of such crossings, the policy of the State was changed by the Act of 1902-3-4, page 968, and it was "declared to be the policy of this State that all crossings of one railroad by another, or of a county road or highway by a railroad, or of a railroad by a county road or highway, shall, wherever reasonably practical, pass above or below the existing structure."

15. POLICE POWER — Alienation or Abridgment. — The police power of the State cannot be aliened or abridged by contract, or otherwise.

16. POLICE POWER — What Constitutes. — To provide for the safety and welfare of the citizen is a police power.

17. POLICE POWER — Delegation to Municipality. The State may delegate to a city the exercise of so much of its police power within its limits as it may see fit.

18. STREETS AND HIGHWAYS — Streets are Public Highways. — The streets of a city are public highways of the State.

19. STREETS AND HIGHWAYS — State may Control Streets — Delegation of Power to Municipality. The State exercises such control over the streets of a city as to it seems proper; this control may be exercised either directly or delegated to the city; and...

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