R.H. White Co. v. Murphy
| Decision Date | 02 January 1942 |
| Citation | 310 Mass. 510,38 N.E.2d 685 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | R. H. WHITE COMPANY v. JOHN MURPHY & others. |
April 14, 1941.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., DONAHUE, QUA & DOLAN, JJ.
Labor and Labor Union. State Labor Relations Law. Contract, Validity. Picketing. Jurisdiction, Labor. Unlawful Interference. Equity Jurisdiction, Unlawful interference, Labor, Picketing. Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech. Public Policy. Words "Peaceful picketing."
A closed shop contract, made by an employer with a labor union whose members were not a majority of his employees and because of his fear of labor trouble with that union, after there had been hearings, but before a decision, by the labor relations commission upon a petition by another union, whose members comprised a majority of such employees, for its certification under Section 5 (c) of G.L.c. 150A, inserted by St.
1938, c. 345 Section 2, as representatives for collective bargaining, was invalid as calling for unfair labor practices as defined in the statute, and was not a bar to later certification of the majority union by the commission.
Refusal by a court of equity to enforce a closed shop contract which was invalid as calling for unfair labor practices was not an infringement upon the jurisdiction given the labor relations commission by Section 6
(a) of G.L.c. 150A.
There is no conflict between the public policy of this Commonwealth as defined in the State labor relations act and that of the United States as defined in the National labor relations act.
Injunction, in a suit brought by an employer of picketing of his places of business by a labor union to compel him to perform a closed shop contract which was unlawful because calling for unfair labor practices in violation of Section 4 (3), (5), of G.L.c 150A did not violate the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech, although the picketing did not include any act of violence or any oral request to refrain from business with the employer, the picketers merely wearing arm bands with the legend, "Labor Dispute."
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on March 7, 1941. The suit was heard by Buttrick, J.
H. R. Donaghue, for the defendants.
C. B. Rugg, (P.
Shuebruk with him,) for the plaintiff.
S. S. Grant, (F.
F. Cohen with him,) for the interveners.
This is a bill in equity in which the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendants, who are officers and members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and officers and members of certain affiliated "locals" and are representatives from the Teamsters International Council No. 10, a Massachusetts division of the Brotherhood, from picketing the plaintiff's places of business in Cambridge and Boston. A temporary restraining order was entered on March 7, 1941. The defendants filed an answer and counterclaim seeking specific performance of a closed shop contract with the plaintiff dated January 31, 1941. Officer of the "New England Joint Board, United Retail and Wholesale Employees of America," hereinafter referred to as the C. I. O. union, were permitted to intervene in behalf of that union.
The judge filed findings of fact and entered an order for final decree dismissing the defendants' counterclaim and permanently enjoining certain named officers or members of the brotherhood, and of local 829 and local 82, and representatives of the Teamsters International Council No. 10, "from doing any of the following acts for the purpose of compelling the complainant to comply with the contract dated January 31, 1941 . . . (a) picketing complainant's place of business or in any manner causing . . . [its] places of business to be picketed; (b) refusing to deliver or urging others to refuse to deliver goods to or from any of . . . [its] places of business." Thereafter, at the request of the parties, the judge reserved and reported "the evidence, the findings of fact and order for decree and all question[s] of law therein for the consideration of" this court. Prior to this action by the judge, the defendants filed a stipulation that "pending the final decision" by this court, they would not strike or picket the plaintiff's place of business for the purpose of obtaining members or to enforce the contract dated January 31, 1941, between the plaintiff and locals 82 and 829. Final decrees were entered dismissing the bill as to four of the defendants. An interlocutory decree was also entered temporarily enjoining the plaintiff from negotiating for or entering into any contract written or oral with the C. I. O. union respecting any conditions of employment of the employees involved.
The evidence is reported in full, hence questions of fact as well as of law are brought before this court, whose duty it is under the familiar rule to examine the evidence and to decide the case upon its own judgment as to the facts, giving due weight to the findings of the trial judge, which will not be reversed unless plainly wrong. Trade Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Peters, 291 Mass. 79 , 83, 84, and cases cited. Kevorkian v. Moors, 299 Mass. 163, 166. Culhane v. Foley, 305 Mass. 542 , 543.
Material facts found by the judge may be summarized as follows: The plaintiff conducts a retail department store in Boston, and maintains a warehouse in Cambridge for the storage of its goods. About one hundred fifty persons are employed in the warehouse. The brotherhood and its locals 829 and 82 are affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. On December 23, 1937, the plaintiff and local 829 entered into a closed shop contract which expired January 31, 1939. Two similar contracts were entered into between them, the second expiring on January 31, 1941. This contract contained a clause providing that a list of desired changes in the contract for the following year should be submitted within sixty days prior to the date of expiration of the contract, and that negotiations for a new contract should be begun within thirty days prior to that date.
On November 25, 1940, local 829 of the brotherhood notified the plaintiff that it wished to negotiate a new contract for the year 1941. On November 22, 1940, however, the C. I. O. union had filed a petition with the State labor relations commission requesting that, under G.L.c. 150A, Section 5 (c) (inserted by St. 1938, c. 345, Section 2), it be certified as the representative of all persons working in or out of the plaintiff's warehouse, with certain exceptions, for the purpose of collective bargaining. This petition was withdrawn in December, 1940, but a new petition to the same effect was filed by the C. I. O. union on January 13, 1941. This petition was heard by the commission on January 27, 28, and 29, 1941. Representatives of the plaintiff, of locals 829 and 82, and of the C. I. O. union were present at the hearings. The plaintiff took a neutral position, being willing to bargain with whichever union should be certified by the commission. After hearing and argument the commission took the petition under advisement.
In the meantime the representatives of locals 829 and 82 of the brotherhood had presented a contract to the plaintiff which included a closed shop argument. The plaintiff desired to include in the contract a provision making it subject to the outcome of the proceedings for certification before referred to. The representatives of locals 829 and 82 refused so to do. During the month of January certain of the named defendants "and all the other officers and members of said locals 829 and 82, and of . . . council No. 10," acted in concert to compel the plaintiff to execute, and thereafter to comply with, a closed shop contract with said locals 829 and 82 covering all the plaintiff's warehouse employees, with certain exceptions hereinafter referred to. This request was refused. On January 29, 1941, the members of local 829 voted to authorize a committee of three business agents, which included two of the defendants, to call a strike against the plaintiff and to cause its places of business to be picketed unless the plaintiff signed the closed shop agreement with locals 829 and 82.
On January 31, 1941, representatives of locals 829 and 82 and council No. 10, on their behalf demanded that the plaintiff sign the closed shop contract that they had presented to it, and stated that unless the plaintiff complied the matter would be referred to council No. 10 for action. The contract was executed by the plaintiff and locals 829 and 82 on that day. The plaintiff, however, did not then know that a strike had been authorized, but owing to the fear of labor trouble signed the contract although the proceedings for certification of a collective bargaining agency were still pending. At the time that the contract was signed neither local 829 nor local 82 represented a majority of the warehouse employees. Then and at all subsequent times the C. I. O. union in fact represented a majority of the warehouse employees.
On February 4 1941, the commission rendered a decision on the petition of the C. I. O. union determining that the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining consisted of all persons working in or out of the plaintiff's warehouse, excluding persons engaged in selling on the second floor, carpenters and those engaged in a supervisory capacity, and directing that an election by secret ballot be held on February 12, 1941, to determine whether a majority of the employees in said unit had designated the C. I. O. union as their representative for the purposes of collective bargaining. On February 10, 1941, the commission rendered a supplemental decision directing that the election be held to determine whether the employees desired to be...
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