R. J. C., In re
| Decision Date | 09 April 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. U--338,U--338 |
| Parties | In re the Interest of R.J.C. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Leo A. Thomas of Levin, Warfield, Graff, Mabie & Rosenbloum, Pensacola, for appellant.
Joseph C. Rubel, of Hahn, Reeves, Barfield & King, Pensacola, for appellee.
The maternal grandmother of the referenced minor child seeks review and reversal of the trial court's Order of Permanent Commitment declaring said child to be dependent and permanently committing said child to the Children's Home Society of Florida, a licensed child placing agency, for subsequent adoption.
Via our Order denying the Home Society's motion to quash this appeal and our subsequent Order denying a petition for rehearing, we have previously disposed of the Society's contention as propounded both in the above motions and again in its brief, that the maternal grandparents have no standing to appeal from the Order of Permanent Commitment. As will be more fully developed elsewhere in this opinion, we find sufficient language in Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A., as amended in 1973 by Chapter 73--231, Laws of Florida, to illustrate the legislative intent to provide close relatives of children adjudged to be dependent a legal means by which to challenge orders of permanent commitment.
The material facts of this case are not in dispute. On September 4, 1972, the minor child herein was born out of wedlock to the daughter of the appellant herein. Since that date and until approximately the middle of June, 1973, the appellant's daughter and grandchild lived with appellant and the rest of appellant's family in Iowa. The mother and child then left for parts unknown and sometime thereafter arrived in Pensacola, Florida. On August 30, 1973, the mother of the child, as well as the purported father of the child, 1 signed and delivered to the Home Society a form entitled 'Surrender of Child to Licensed Child Placing Agency.' The purpose of said form was to obtain consent from the mother and the father ot the entry of an order permanently committing the child to the Children's Home Society for subsequent adoption. On the same date, August 30, 1973, the Home Society filed a petition with the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County to declare said minor child dependent.
The following weekend, the maternal grandmother of the child came to Pensacola from Iowa for the purpose of reversing the prior actions of her daughter. She spoke with her daughter and asked her to meet her at the Children's Home Society on September 4, 1973, to see if they could get the child back. The daughter never met her at the agency and evidently she left town. The Home Society offered to wait until October 2, 1973, before processing the papers signed by the minor child's parents in order to give appellant ample time to locate her daughter. Apparently, the daughter was never located, as the agency never heard from her or the purported father.
Thereafter, the maternal grandmother filed an answer and a counterpetition to the Home Society's petition to declare the minor child dependent. The answer denied that the child was dependent and the counterpetition requested, in the alternative, that the child be declared dependent and placed in the custody of its maternal grandparents. At the hearing on the petition, the trial judge stated the issue to be 'whether or not a relative may come in and set aside the consent of an unwed mother.' When the Home Society was asked about its position on whether, if the child were placed with that agency, the grandparents would be able to adopt, the following answer was given: 'We feel any plan to place with relatives should be made before coming to an agency, if this is what the mother wished to do.' The Home Society representative further testified that 'the mother of this child requested we place her for adoption, and I am not free to make any other plan.' She refused to answer a question concerning the fitness of the maternal grandparents for custody on the grounds that this was not an issue. The issue, contended the agency, was 'whether or not the mother has the right to release the child for adoption.' Testimony was taken from the maternal grandmother and she unequivocably stated that she loved the minor child and that she desired and was willing and able to take the child and place it in her home.
The trial court took the matter under advisement and, on the following day, rendered its Order of Permanent Commitment declaring the child to be dependent, permanently committing the child to the Children's Home Society for subsequent adoption and permanently depriving the parents and all other persons of all rights to the child. The appellant's motions for rehearing and/or relief from judgment were denied.
This Court is now faced with two issues: (1) Is this minor child a 'dependent' child within the meaning of the Florida Statutes, and (2) if so, did the Home Society err in its contention and did the trial court err in its final Order by holding that the maternal grandparents of the child should not be awarded custody? We answer both of these questions in the affirmative.
As to the first issue, Chapter 73--231, Section 2, Laws of Florida, which amends § 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, defines a 'dependent child', inter alia, as a child who 'is surrendered to the division of family services or a licensed child placing agency for purposes of adoption.' (§ 39.01(10)(g)). Thus, from the facts above recited, it is clear that the referenced child herein falls within the statutory definition of a 'dependent child'.
This, however, is as far as we intend to go in agreement with the court below and the contentions of the Home Society. In custody proceedings the welfare and best interests of the child are of paramount importance. The welfare of the child is the dominant and controlling consideration in any custody proceeding. It overrides all other considerations, even the natural rights of a parent. In determining the issue of the child's welfare and best interests, the trial court is vested with broad, though not unbridled, discretionary powers. A determination by the trial court as to the custody of a child may be set aside where the determination constitutes an abuse of discretion. With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to the statutory law and case law of this State as applied to the particular facts of this case.
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