R.A. Jones & Sons, Inc. v. Holman

• Decision Date: 04 June 1985
• Docket Number: 83-16 and 83-63,Nos. 82-2372,s. 82-2372
• Citation: 470 So.2d 60,10 Fla. L. Weekly 1384
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Parties: 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1384, 41 UCC Rep.Serv. 843 R.A. JONES & SONS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. John HOLMAN, Ralph A. Moody, Jr. and Donald E. Wade, as Trustees of Holman & Moody, Inc., a dissolved North Carolina corporation, and Ford Motor Company, a Delaware corporation, Appellees. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Appellant, v. R.A. JONES & SONS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

Page 60

470 So.2d 60

10 Fla. L. Weekly 1384, 41 UCC Rep.Serv. 843

R.A. JONES & SONS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. John HOLMAN, Ralph A. Moody, Jr. and Donald E. Wade, as Trustees of Holman & Moody, Inc., a dissolved North Carolina corporation, and Ford Motor Company, a Delaware corporation, Appellees.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Appellant, v. R.A. JONES & SONS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.

Nos. 82-2372, 83-16 and 83-63.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Third District.

June 4, 1985.

Magill, Reid & Lewis and R. Fred Lewis, Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine & Underberg, Miami, for appellant in Case Nos. 82-2372 and 83-16; for appellee in Case No. 83-63.

Blackwell, Walker, Gray, Powers, Hoehl & Flick and James E. Tribble and Todd A. Cowart, Miami, for appellee Ford Motor Co. in Case Nos. 82-2372 and 83-16; for appellant Ford Motor Co. in Case No. 83-63.

Before BARKDULL and DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.

Appellant R.A. Jones & Sons, Inc. (Jones), a designer and seller of irrigation systems for farm use, bought twenty-three industrial engines manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford) from Holman & Moody, Inc. (H & M), the local Ford distributor. Before purchasing the engines, Jones obtained from H & M a Ford publication describing the capabilities of its various engines. Jones inquired of H & M whether the published information was accurate and asked H & M's advice as to which model would be suitable for the kinds of irrigation systems Jones had planned. The engines purchased by Jones from H & M were, as an integral part of Jones' irrigation system, ultimately sold to farmers and placed into operation during the 1975-76 growing season. ¹

By October or November 1975, Jones became aware that most of the engines sold to the farmers were encountering mechanical difficulties. ² Jones attempted to perform minor repairs in the fields to keep the engines running and contacted H & M, which, unable to correct the problems, contacted Ford. In January 1976, Ford began an investigation ³ and authorized H & M to repair the engines. H & M rebuilt the engines after the 1975-76 growing season and returned them to the farmers for use during the next growing season. The engine rebuilding program was unsuccessful; the engines were still malfunctioning during the 1976-77 growing season.

On June 14, 1978, Jones sued Ford and H & M for breach of warranty of merchantability and breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, adding against Ford a claim for breach of express warranty. Jones sought damages for expenses incurred in the repair and maintenance of the engines, for loss of profits from cancelled contracts, and for loss of profits due to loss of prospective customers.

On December 31, 1979, after receiving an assignment of the farmers' rights and actions against Ford and H & M, Jones filed a motion to amend its complaint to add the assigned claims. ⁴ The trial court permitted the amendment by order dated February 15, 1980, specifying that the amended complaint was to be considered filed as of that date. The amended complaint alleged the same theories of liability against Ford and H & M and added claims for specific elements of damages which had been assigned to Jones by the farmers: (1) expenses incurred in the purchase, repair and maintenance of the engines; (2) loss of crops; (3) loss of profits; and (4) expenses related to the irrigation system for which the engines had been purchased.

The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. They contended, inter alia, that the assigned farmers' claims were in whole or in part barred by the statute of limitations because the farmers had discovered defects in the engines by December 1975-January 1976, but had not filed suit until February 15, 1980, when the court granted Jones, as assignee of these claims, leave to file the amended complaint. The motions were denied, and the case proceeded to jury trial.

A directed verdict was entered in favor of H & M at the close of the evidence and final judgment entered thereon. On Jones' claims against Ford, the jury found that the engines were defective, held Jones eighty per cent responsible and Ford twenty per cent responsible ⁵, and assessed the total amount of damages sustained by Jones at $1,300,000. Accordingly, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Jones for $260,000, but, in post-trial proceedings, granted Ford's request for a remittitur leaving Jones with an award of $130,000 or, alternatively, a new trial.

By this appeal, Jones seeks review of the directed verdict entered in favor of H & M and the order granting the remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial. Ford appeals the final judgment which determined Ford's liability to Jones in the amount of $260,000, reduced by the remittitur to $130,000. We conclude that (1) the trial court improperly directed a verdict in favor of H & M; (2) only three of the nine assigned farmers' claims--the claims of Iori Farms, Inc., International Botanicals, Inc., and Pine Island Farms Enterprises--were not limitations-barred, and thus evidence relating to the other six assigned claims was improperly considered by the jury in calculating the amount of Jones' damages; and (3) there is no record support for the remittitur. We reverse for a new trial against H & M and a new trial on damages only against Ford.

I.

We first address the impropriety of the directed verdict in favor of H & M on Jones' claim against H & M for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. Section 672.314, Florida Statutes (1975), provides that in a contract for the sale of goods where the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, there is an implied warranty that such goods shall be merchantable, as that term is defined in succeeding portions of the section. ⁶ See Smith v. Burdines, Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940); Perry v. Luby Chevrolet, Inc., 446 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Clearly, H & M, as the seller of the engines to Jones and the distributor of Ford industrial engines, is both a "seller," see § 672.103(d), Fla.Stat. (1975), and a "merchant," see § 672.104(1), Fla.Stat. (1975), under Section 672.314. The only remaining question, namely, whether the engines sold by H & M to Jones were merchantable, was resolved in favor of H & M by the trial court's directed verdict. Jones contends that in this case, this question was one for the jury to determine. We agree.

The long-standing caveat which controls here is that:

"[T]he court should never direct a verdict for one party unless the evidence is such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite party can be sustained under the law. Where there is room for a difference of opinion between reasonable men as to the proof or facts from which an ultimate fact is sought to be established, or where there is room for such differences as to the inferences which might be drawn from conceded facts, the court should submit the case to the jury for their finding, as it is their conclusion, in such cases, that should prevail, and not primarily the views of the judge."

Smith v. Burdines, Inc., 198 So. at 229 (quoting Gravette v. Turner, 77 Fla. 311, 315, 81 So. 476, 477 (1919)).

The evidence presented by Ford showed that the engines were overworked, improperly maintained, and too small to power the irrigation systems designed by Jones. On the other side, Jones' employees and customers, as well as independent mechanics, testified that the piston rings were not seating properly, and the compression was not being held in the engine, resulting in "blow-by" of oil and oil loss. H & M's service manager admitted that the problems with all of the engines were lack of power and "blow-by." Thus, there is substantial, albeit conflicting, testimony from which a jury could find that the engines were not merchantable, and it was error for the trial court to determine on motion for directed verdict the credibility and probative value of such conflicting testimony. See Smith v. Burdines, Inc., 198 So. 223.

Likewise, we find that the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of H & M on Jones' claim of breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose ⁷ where the evidence adduced at trial created a jury question of whether Jones relied upon its own judgment at the time of the purchase, or the skill or judgment of H & M, the seller. See Smith v. Burdines, Inc., 198 So. 223. Specifically, it will be for the jury to resolve whether, as H & M contends, Jones' purchase of the engines was made in reliance upon literature of the Carter Pump Company, which recommended use of the Ford engine in conjunction with its pump, or whether, as Jones contends, Jones was persuaded by the assurances of H & M with respect to the reliability of the information published by Ford. Compare Halpryn v. Highland Insurance Co., 426 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

Accordingly, we reverse the directed verdict entered in favor of H & M and remand for trial on Jones' claims for breach of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. Trial shall be confined to the allegations relating to losses incurred by Jones and by Iori Farms, Inc., Pine Island Farms Enterprises, and International Botanicals, Inc., because, as we have noted and as will be seen infra, the other six farmers' claims, assigned to Jones, were barred by the statute of limitations.

II.

A.

We turn now to Jones' claims against Ford. It is undisputed that, at the latest, Jones knew of the defects in the engines in January 1976. ⁸ Because a party has four years to bring an action based upon warranty, see § 95.11(3)(k), Fla.Stat. (1975), the suit brought by Jones in 1978 was timely. Jones' original complaint, however, sought damages only for its loss of profits from cancelled contracts, its expenses incurred in the repair and maintenance of the engines, and its loss...