R.E.L. Mccaskill Co. v. Dekle

• Decision Date: 22 October 1924
• Citation: 102 So. 252,88 Fla. 285
• Parties: R. E. L. McCASKILL Co. et al. v. DEKLE. R. E. L. McCASKILL CO. v. DEKLE et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

102 So. 252

88 Fla. 285

R. E. L. McCASKILL Co. et al. v. DEKLE.

R. E. L. McCASKILL CO. v. DEKLE et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

October 22, 1924

Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 1924.

Suit by the R. E. L. McCaskill Company and another against M. L Dekle. From a decree for defendant, and from an order confirming sale of land thereunder, plaintiffs appeal.

Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Title may be acquired by adverse possession against former owners as well as strangers. Title to lands may be acquired, not only as against strangers, but also as against former owners as effectively as if there had been a formal conveyance, by the exclusive adverse possession of such land, maintained and continued under claim of title for the statutory period.

Purchaser under contract for good and sufficient warranty deed, cannot rescind nor avoid specific performance where vendor's title by adverse possession provable beyond doubt. The purchaser of land, where the contract calls for no more than 'a good and sufficient warranty deed,' is not entitled to a rescission, nor can he avoid specific performance of his contract to purchase, on the ground that the vendor's title rests wholly or partially upon parol proof of adverse possession, where exclusive adverse possession may, for the statutory period, be so clearly proved as to be free from doubt.

That relief to vendor enforces vendee's payment of agreed purchase price, immaterial. The remedy by specific performance is mutual as between the vendor and the vendee and, where this remedy is sought by the vendor, it makes no difference that the relief obtainable thereby enforces payment by the vendee of the agreed purchase price.

Deficiency judgment, where proceeds of land sale applied in part payment of purchase price and lien not involved, unauthorized. In a suit by the vendor for the specific performance of a contract to convey land, where, in accordance with the terms of the decree, the land is sold and the proceeds applied in part payment of the purchase price, no lien being involved, the entry of a deficiency decree for the balance is unauthorized.

Not legal right but rests in trial court's discretion. The enforcement in equity of performance of a contract to convey land is not a matter of course like the right to enforce a lien in equity or to recover a judgment at law, but rests in the sound discretion of the court, controlled by well-established doctrines of equitable jurisprudence.

Expert opinion evidence of value of attorney's services not conclusive; allowance of attorney's fee largely within chancellor's discretion; chancellor's allowance of attorney's fee, if excessive, should be reversed. The opinion evidence of expert witnesses as to the value of service rendered by an attorney is not conclusive, and a large discretion in fixing the amount of fees awarded is vested in the chancellor, but where, under all the circumstances, the fee allowed to an attorney by a chancellor appears excessive, the decree awarding it should be reversed.

Courts take judicial notice of fluctuating values of land. Courts will take judicial notice of the fluctuating values of real estate.

Deflation of land values for specified years in specified locality held within judicial cognizance. It is a common knowledge within judicial cognizance that between the year 1918 and the year 1922 there was a deflation of land values in the locality in which the land involved in this litigation is situated. Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; C. L. Wilson, judge.

COUNSEL

W. W. Flournoy, of De Funiak Springs, for appellants.

Paul Carter, of Marianna, and Carter & Yonge, of Pensacola, for appellee Dekle.

E. C. Maxwell, of Pensacola, for appellee Patterson.

OPINION

WEST J.

These appeals are in the same suit. The first is from a final decree; the second is from an order of confirmation of sale made under this final decree. For convenience they are considered together.

On November 11, 1918, Matthew L. Dekle and William Marshall Patterson entered into a contract in writing by which the former contracted to sell and convey and the latter to purchase certain farm land and personal property in Jackson county, Fla. On July 2, 1920, Patterson, joined by his wife, assigned and transferred his interest in the contract to the R. E. L. McCaskill Company, a corporation. Payment of installments of the agreed purchase price maturing prior to the time of the assignments were made by the vendee, but an abstract of the title having been obtained and it disclosing that the record title to the land, or parts of it, which was the subject of the contract, was imperfect, the assignee, R. E. L. McCaskill Company, declined to make further payments, and brought suit against Dekle to rescind the contract and recover from him amounts paid on account of the purchase price, and other amounts alleged to have been paid by complainant for abstracts and other expenses incurred in an investigation made by it to ascertain the condition of the title to the land.

By answer defendant Dekle admitted making the contract with Patterson; denied that he had consented to its assignment to the R. E. L. McCaskill Company, or released Patterson from his obligation thereunder; averred that he, Dekle, held and owned, under a valid fee simple title, the land agreed to be conveyed; prayed that Patterson be made a party defendant to the suit; that the contract for the purchase of the land be specifically enforced and performed; that Patterson and the R. E. L. McCaskill Company be required to pay the balance due on the purchase price in accordance with the contract, together with reasonable solicitor fees, as provided by the contract, to the solicitor for defendant Dekle, upon the delivery by him of a good and sufficient warranty deed of conveyance for said land, which deed he offered to make and delivery to the vendee Patterson, or the assignee complainant, R. E. L. McCaskill Company, and, upon default in the payment of said balance by them, the land be sold and the proceeds derived therefrom paid over to defendant Dekle on the contract price; and if there be a deficiency that defendant Dekle have a judgment or decree against complainant R. E. L. McCaskill Company and defendant Patterson for such balance.

Upon final hearing the court found the equities of the cause to be with defendant Dekle and against complainant R. E. L. McCaskill Company and cross-defendant Patterson, and entered a decree in accordance with the prayer contained in the answer.

This first appeal is from the final decree. Errors are assigned generally upon the decree, and specifically upon the allowance of counsel fees for the attorney of the defendant.

By the terms of the contract Dekle, the vendor, agreed that upon the prompt payment of all installments of the purchase price as therein stipulated and agreed, he would make, execute, and deliver to Patterson, the vendee, 'a good and sufficient warranty deed of conveyance' for the property contracted to be sold and conveyed. During the taking of evidence it was stipulated between the parties 'that the defendant, M. L. Dekle, has present at this time witnesses by whom he will be able to prove and can prove, if such parol evidence be admissible. that he and his predecessors in title, have for more than 30 years prior to November 11, 1918, had actual possession by substantial inclosure, by cultivation and improvement, of all the lands embraced in the contract of November 11, 1918, between M. L. Dekle and W. M. Patterson, claiming same under instruments constituting color of title, and that such possession was actual, open, notorious, continuous, adverse, and exclusive during said period of time, and that defendant and his said predecessors have claimed the fee-simple title to all of said lands during said period, and no other person has claimed or asserted any right, interest, or title as against them during such time, or since. * * * That if such facts are held to be admissible in evidence in this cause, they shall be treated by the court in the same manner as if they were given in evidence by witnesses produced by M. L. Dekle, and sworn and examined at this hearing.'

In logical order the question first to be decided is whether a duly executed conveyance of the vendor by 'warranty deed' to the vendee, or his assignee, would amount to performance by the vendor of the contract by which he obligated himself to convey by 'a good and sufficient warranty deed' the land described, it being admitted that he and his predecessors in title had, at the time of making the contract, been in the actual, adverse, and exclusive possession under color of title, claiming title to the land for a period of years sufficient under the statute to acquire title thereto, even against persons under the disabilities of imprisonment, insanity, or infancy.

That title may be acquired by the exclusive adverse possession of land maintained and continued for the statutory period under claim of title, not only as against strangers, but also as against former owners as effectively as if there had been a formal conveyance, and that such title is marketable, are established in this jurisdiction and generally. Sections 2935, 2937, Rev. Gen. Stat.; Horne v. Carter, 20 Fla. 45; Skinner Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 56 Fla. 561, 47 So. 931; 1 R. C. L. 689; 39 Cyc. 1460.

This case is differentiated from the case of Barclay v. Bank of Osceola County, 82 Fla. 72, 89 So. 357, in that the contract involved here bound the vendor to make, execute, and deliver to the vendee 'a good and sufficient warranty deed of conveyance' for the land contracted to be sold, whereas, in that case the contract of purchase required 'an abstract showing a...