R. L. v. State
| Decision Date | 08 July 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-182A22,1-182A22 |
| Citation | 437 N.E.2d 482 |
| Parties | R. L., Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Frances Watson, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for petitioner-appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Palmer K. Ward, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for respondent-appellee.
R. L., a juvenile, appeals from the disposition for his adjudication of delinquency entered by the Putnam Circuit Court, Juvenile Division. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
R. L. was adjudicated a delinquent child by the Juvenile Division of the Putnam Circuit Court for his violation of the criminal trespass and criminal mischief statutes. At the dispositional hearing the court ordered the juvenile sent to jail for ten (10) days and ordered him to make restitution. He was thereafter also committed to the Indiana Boys' School. This appeal followed a denial of R. L.'s petition for post-conviction relief.
Appellant presents only one issue for consideration by this court. Did the juvenile court err in ordering multiple dispositions for a single adjudication of delinquency?
This appeal presents the question of whether Ind.Code Sec. 31-6-4-16(g) (Supp.1980) provides a number of mutually exclusive alternatives to the juvenile court at a dispositional hearing on an adjudication of delinquency or whether such section offers the juvenile court the opportunity to combine certain of the remedies in dealing with the juvenile.
When asked to construe a statute, this court must give meaning to the words used when such meaning is clear and unambiguous. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., (1981) Ind., 418 N.E.2d 207, 210. However, where the meaning of the statute is unclear or ambiguous or where more than one construction of the statute is possible, we must construe the statute so as to give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. Id. See also State v. Kokomo Tube Co., (1981) Ind.App., 426 N.E.2d 1338, 1345. Words will generally be accorded their plain meaning, State ex rel. Van Buskirk v. Wayne Township, Marion County, (1981) Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 234, 241, and due regard will be given to punctuation. Murphy v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 414 N.E.2d 322, 324. But the intent of the legislature will take precedence over a strict literal interpretation, Combs v. Cook, (1958) 238 Ind. 392, 397, 151 N.E.2d 144, 147, especially where necessary to prevent hardship or absurdity, and to favor the public convenience. Walton v. State, (1980) Ind., 398 N.E.2d 667, 671. In construing a statute, this court will give the disputed provisions a construction which is synonymous with the language of the statute, so as to give effect to the entire statute. Foremost Life Insurance Co. v. Department of Insurance, (1980) Ind., 409 N.E.2d 1092, 1096.
(1) enter any dispositional decree specified by subsection (e);
(2) place him in a secure private facility for children licensed under the laws of any state (placement under this subdivision includes authorization to control and discipline the child);
(3) award wardship either to the department of correction for housing in any correctional facility for children or to any community-based correctional facility for children (wardship under this subdivision does not include the right to consent to the child's adoption);
(4) order him to pay restitution if the victim provides reasonable evidence of his loss, which the child may challenge at the disposition hearing; or (5) order confinement in a secure facility for children or in the juvenile part of the county jail for not more than ten (10) days; or
(6) if the child is seventeen (17) years six (6) months old or older, order confinement in a secure facility for children or in the juvenile part of the county jail for not more than thirty (30) days."
On its face subsection (g) presents an ambiguity. The statute as written includes the disjunctive "or" between clauses four and five and clauses five and six, yet does not provide such disjunctive between clauses one, two, and three. It is unclear why our legislature included the disjunctive twice in the positions that such word is used. This presents an ambiguity insofar as it is unclear whether the legislature intended by its placement of the disjunctives to provide for a combination of some or all of the dispositional alternatives. When an ambiguity is present this court must be guided in its construction by the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.
Determination of legislative intent may include considerations of all legislation in pari materia, legislative history, and all acts passed either before or after the statute in question. Pruden v. Trabits, (1977) Ind.App., 370 N.E.2d 959, 963. Prior to the 1980 enactment under which this action was brought, subsection (g) read as follows:
"If the child is a delinquent child under section 1(b)(1) of this chapter, the juvenile court may:
(1) enter any dispositional decree specified by subsection (e);
(2) place him in a secure private facility for children licensed under the laws of any state (placement under this subdivision includes authorization to discipline the child);
(3) award guardianship either to the department of correction for housing in any correctional facility for children or to any community-based correctional facility for children (guardianship under this subdivision does not include the right to consent to the child's adoption or marriage);
(4) order him to pay restitution if the victim provides reasonable evidence of his loss, which the child may challenge at the dispositional hearing; or
(5) order temporary confinement in a detention facility for children or in the juvenile part of the county jail for not more than ten (10) days."
Subparagraph five was amended slightly and subparagraph six was added to give the enactment with which we are concerned. Subsequently, the subsection was again amended by addition of a seventh subparagraph:
"If the child is a delinquent child under section 1(b)(1) of this chapter, the juvenile court may:
(1) enter any dispositional decree specified by subsection (e);
(2) place him in a secure private facility for children licensed under the laws of any state (placement under this subdivision includes authorization to control and discipline the child);
(3) award wardship either to the department of correction for housing in any correctional facility for children or to any community-based correctional facility for children (wardship under this subdivision does not include the right to consent to the child's adoption);
(4) order him to pay restitution if the victim provides reasonable evidence of his loss, which the child may challenge at the dispositional hearing;
(5) order confinement in a secure facility for children or in the juvenile part of the county jail for not more than ten (10) days;
(6) if the child is seventeen (17) years six (6) months old or older, order confinement in a secure facility for children or in the juvenile part of the county jail for not more than thirty (30) days; or
(7) order the child to surrender his driver's license to the court for a specified period of time."
In both the prior and subsequent enacted versions of subsection (g) only one "or" is present between alternatives and is found in both cases between the last subparagraph of the subsection and the preceding subparagraph. Looking to these three enactments of subsection (g), it appears that the legislature intended the 1980 version, under which this action is brought, to read as did the previous enactment and as does the present enactment. The legislature apparently neglected to remove the "or" that originally separated subparagraphs four and five when it added subparagraph six in the 1980 enactment. This construction seems to most nearly comport with the legislature's intent as evinced by the prior and subsequent enacted versions of subsection (g). With this correction of the statute's facial ambiguity, we are squarely presented with the appellant's contention that section 16(g) provides mutually exclusive dispositional alternatives.
Subsection (g) gives the court a number of alternatives to deal with a child adjudged delinquent for having committed an act which would have been a crime if committed by an...
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