R.M.R. ex rel. P.A.L. v. Muscogee County School Dist.

Decision Date20 January 1999
Docket NumberNo. 96-9235,96-9235
Citation165 F.3d 812
Parties131 Ed. Law Rep. 943, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 413 R.M.R., by his natural parent and next friend, P.A.L., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MUSCOGEE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; Herman Larry Carr, Defendants-Appellees
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

A. Leroy Toliver, Joseph H. King, Jr. and Jack T. Brinkley, Jr., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lance D. Lourie and J. Calhoun Harris, Jr., Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

Thirteen-year-old R.M.R. was sexually molested at school by his music teacher. R.M.R. then brought this suit against the Muscogee County School District ("Muscogee"), alleging that Muscogee was vicariously liable for this abuse under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub.L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (1972) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)) ("Title IX") and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Muscogee. Robbie and his mother appeal, claiming that the district court erred by: (1) denying their motion to compel discovery of certain student records before trial, (2) barring certain testimony of other witnesses at trial, and (3) improperly excluding a last-minute witness who was not listed in the pretrial order. We affirm the district court's judgment for the reasons set forth below.

I.
A.

In 1993, R.M.R. was a student at Richards Middle School, where he attended a boys chorus class taught by Herman Larry Carr. Carr had been teaching at the school since 1982, and he was both well-respected by other teachers and well-liked by the students. Carr and R.M.R. shared a particularly strong rapport; Carr had shown special interest in R.M.R.'s music instruction, and R.M.R. thought of Carr as his "idol." Consequently, when Carr asked R.M.R. to come to school on a student vacation day, March 12, 1993, to assist with some work, R.M.R. readily agreed.

While the two were alone in Carr's office on March 12, Carr molested R.M.R.; he pulled R.M.R. down onto his knee and held R.M.R. against his chest. Carr then touched R.M.R.'s groin with his hand, and moved R.M.R.'s hand onto Carr's own groin. Moments later there was a noise in the adjoining room, and Carr threw R.M.R. off his lap.

R.M.R. did not immediately tell anyone about the incident. Around Friday, April 23, however, he told both his girlfriend and Mrs. Becker, the mother of another friend, about the attack. 2 Then on Monday, April 26, accompanied by his girlfriend, R.M.R. explained to the school counselor what Carr had done. The school counselor immediately reported the incident to the principal, William Arrington. The next morning, Arrington confronted Carr with R.M.R.'s claim and when Carr did not deny the charges, Arrington suspended him from teaching classes. Later that same day, Carr directly admitted to the Muscogee superintendent that he had molested R.M.R. The superintendent gave Carr the option of resigning or facing termination, and on May 4 Carr tendered his resignation.

Meanwhile, the word had spread around the school that R.M.R. was responsible for Carr's suspension. Some students speculated about what had happened, and frequently told R.M.R. that they believed he was lying. Arrington did not inform the students or their parents that Carr had confessed to the attack.

Carr was arrested for child molestation on May 19. The arrest, including the fact that R.M.R. was Carr's accuser, received considerable media attention. On May 20, R.M.R. left the school, and on May 29, he and his mother moved from Georgia to Alabama.

B.

Appellants filed this suit on July 17, 1994. The complaint alleged that Carr's sexual harassment interfered with R.M.R.'s school activities and was sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute a hostile school environment in violation of Title IX. 3 The complaint asserted that Muscogee was liable under Title IX because it knew or should have known that Carr had molested boys in the past, and therefore constituted a danger to the children entrusted to his care. 4 Despite knowledge of Carr's proclivity to molest boys, the complaint asserted, Muscogee failed to take action to protect R.M.R.

The complaint also alleged that Carr's sexual contact violated R.M.R.'s "constitutional right to be free from intrusion into his body and the right to be free from the infliction of unnecessary pain." Because Carr engaged in this sexual contact while acting under color of state law, Muscogee was liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5

In defense to appellants' claims, Muscogee responded that it did not know, and could not reasonably have known, that Carr posed a danger to children. Consequently, it was not liable for Carr's misconduct.

In order to prove that Muscogee had prior knowledge of Carr's propensity to molest children, appellants decided to contact each of Carr's former students and ask whether Carr had molested them. To accomplish this goal, appellants served on Muscogee a set of discovery requests, including the following interrogatories:

2. Identify by title each document, including, but not limited to, class rolls, which lists the names of students who were enrolled in each class [taught by Carr]. State the location of each such document, each form in which it exists (i.e., paper record, computer file, etc.), and the name of its custodian.

3. Identify by title each document, including, but not limited to, student directories, containing "directory information" such as name, address, and/or phone number, which lists the names of students who were enrolled in each class [taught by Carr]. State the location of each such document, each form in which it exists (i.e., paper record, computer file, etc.), and the name of its custodian.

Appellants also served on Muscogee a request to produce all documents identified in response to these two interrogatories.

Muscogee responded to Interrogatory 2 and the corresponding request for document production by identifying and producing grade books that listed the name of each student taught by Carr. In response to Interrogatory 3 and its corresponding document request, however, Muscogee objected that the discovery request was "overly broad, burdensome, and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Subject to that objection, Muscogee identified rolodex cards for each student taught by Carr between 1988 and 1993. Muscogee refused, however, to produce the rolodex cards. 6 Appellants moved the district court to compel production of the cards but the court denied the motion, concluding that the discovery request was "overly broad."

The case went to trial before a jury on September 23, 1996. On the second day of trial, in the absence of the jury, appellants proffered the testimony of several students and parents that they had publicly supported Carr after he resigned, and that they had believed that R.M.R. was lying about the molestation. Appellants argued that this testimony bolstered their claim that Muscogee's failure to announce that Carr had admitted to the molestation "poisoned [the] community atmosphere" against R.M.R. because it "allowed this belief to fester in the community that Mr. Carr was innocent...." According to appellants, this poisoned community atmosphere was one element of the hostile school environment that was caused by Carr's abuse and that drove R.M.R. out of Richards Middle School and eventually out of Georgia. The district court excluded appellants' proffer as irrelevant.

On the third day of trial, after appellants had rested their case and Muscogee had presented most of its defense--four of its six witnesses (including Arrington)--appellants moved the court for leave to reopen their case in order to call a witness whom they had not listed in the pretrial order. This witness, D.L.J., had appeared at the courthouse that morning, after hearing about the case in the media. D.L.J. had been a student in Carr's class in 1984, and, according to D.L.J., had been molested by Carr approximately fifty times. D.L.J. claimed that he repeatedly told Arrington about this sexual abuse.

Muscogee opposed appellants' motion, arguing that allowing D.L.J. to testify without first giving it an opportunity to depose him and conduct whatever investigation might be required to rebut his testimony would be highly prejudicial. The district court agreed, and therefore denied appellants' motion.

After Muscogee rested its case, appellants attempted to call D.L.J. to the stand to rebut Arrington's testimony. Arrington had testified (during Muscogee's case) that he "[a]bsolutely [did] not" have prior notice that "Carr had previously engaged in any behavior similar to what R.M.R. was saying was done...." Muscogee objected, reiterating the argument it made in opposition to appellants' motion for leave to reopen their case. The court sustained their objection.

Appellants presented no rebuttal, and the evidence was closed. Following counsels' summations and the court's instructions, the jury returned a verdict for Muscogee.

C.

Appellants raise three claims on appeal. First, appellants contend that the district court abused its discretion by denying their motion to compel production of the student rolodex cards. According to appellants, identifying other victims was crucial in order to prove that Muscogee had prior notice of Carr's propensity to molest children. Second, appellants contend that the court improperly barred students and parents from testifying that they had believed R.M.R. was lying. Appellants argue that this testimony was relevant to show that Carr's abuse created a hostile school environment. Third, appellants contend that the court abused its discretion when it barred D.L.J. from testifying....

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