R.E.N. v. City of Colorado Springs

• Decision Date: 13 January 1992
• Docket Number: Nos. 90SC659,90SC670 and 90SC693,s. 90SC659
• Parties: R.E.N., S.D.W., and C.B.H., Petitioners, v. The CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1359

823 P.2d 1359

R.E.N., S.D.W., and C.B.H., Petitioners, v. The CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, Respondent.

Nos. 90SC659, 90SC670 and 90SC693.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Jan. 13, 1992.

Gerald A. Kimble, Jr., Colorado Springs, for petitioners R.E.N. and C.B.H.

William H. Kirkman, Jr., Colorado Springs, for petitioner S.D.W.

James G. Colvin II, City Atty., Kurt G. Stiegelmeier, Pros. Atty., Colorado Springs, for respondent.

City of Aurora, Charles H. Richardson, George W. Zierk, III, Aurora, for amicus curiae City of Aurora.

Colorado Mun. League, Kathleen E. Haddock, Staff Atty., Denver, for amicus curiae Colorado Mun. League.

Justice VOLLACK delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This is a consolidated appeal by three juveniles, R.E.N., S.D.W., and C.B.H., from district court rulings that the municipal court of Colorado Springs is not required to afford a juvenile the procedures in the Colorado Children's Code, ¹ Title 19, §§ 19-1-101 to 19-11-110, 8B C.R.S. (1991 Supp.), when a juvenile is prosecuted for violating a municipal ordinance, the penalty for which may not be a jail sentence. We affirm the district court rulings.

I.

R.E.N. and S.D.W.

On September 30, 1989, S.D.W. was charged in Colorado Springs Municipal Court with shoplifting in violation of section 21-6-401 of The Code of the City of Colorado Springs (1980) (the City Code). On February 27, 1990, R.E.N. was charged in municipal court with conspiracy to commit shoplifting in violation of section 21-1-107 of the City Code. At the time of their offenses, S.D.W. was sixteen years old and R.E.N. was fifteen years old. Prior to their trials, each juvenile filed a motion to dismiss the charges, contending that the municipal court did not have jurisdiction to try the case; that the Colorado Children's Code (the Children's Code) should be liberally construed to give effect to its purpose to serve the welfare of children and the best interests of society; that the prosecution of juveniles in municipal court violated equal protection of laws; and finally, that the City violated the Home Rule Amendment because it did not provide the procedural safeguards that are afforded juveniles prosecuted in juvenile court under the Children's Code.

In each case, the municipal court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the case and concluded that the City must provide juveniles prosecuted under the municipal ordinance with the same procedural safeguards that juveniles are afforded when prosecuted under the Children's Code. The municipal courts granted the motions for dismissal, stating that the City of Colorado Springs (the City) violated the Home Rule Amendment, Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6, by not affording the juveniles the procedural provisions in the Children's Code.

The City filed an appeal in each case with the El Paso County District Court, which ordered the cases consolidated. The City argued that the municipal courts erred in concluding (1) municipal courts must prosecute juveniles in accordance with the Children's Code, and (2) the failure to provide such procedures violated the Home Rule Amendment. Additionally, the City contended that, even though the municipal court procedures were different than the juvenile court procedures, prosecution of juveniles in municipal court did not violate equal protection of the law. The district judge, Judge Toth, ruled that the City's prosecution of the juvenile offenders, without affording the juveniles the procedures in the Children's Code, did not violate the Home Rule Amendment or equal protection of laws and remanded the cases to the municipal courts.

C.B.H.

On February 2, 1990, C.B.H. was charged with unlawful concealment of a weapon in violation of section 21-7-102 of the Colorado Springs City Code. C.B.H. was fifteen years old on the day of the offense. On the day set for trial, C.B.H. filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that juveniles prosecuted in municipal court should be afforded the procedural rights in the Children's Code and that a failure to provide these rights violates the Home Rule Amendment and equal protection of laws. The municipal court denied the motion to dismiss and, after a bench trial, convicted C.B.H. of unlawful concealment. C.B.H. appealed the conviction to the El Paso County District Court. In ruling on the appeal, the district judge, Judge Martinez, incorporated Judge Toth's ruling in S.D.W.'s and R.E.N.'s case and, in addition, concluded that juveniles prosecuted in the municipal court for violating municipal ordinances are not similarly situated to juveniles prosecuted in district court for violating state statutes.

Each of the juveniles petitioned for certiorari in this court pursuant to C.A.R. 49(a)(1). We ordered the three cases consolidated and granted certiorari to determine whether the City of Colorado Springs violates the Home Rule Amendment when it prosecutes juveniles for violating city ordinances which do not carry a jail sentence, without affording the juveniles the rights provided in the Children's Code. ²

II.

The Home Rule Amendment grants home rule municipalities the authority to enact and enforce ordinances involving matters of local affairs. Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6; see City and County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo.1990). In determining the extent of this authority, this court has recognized three broad categories into which regulatory matters fall. Id. First, in matters of local concern, both home rule cities and the state may legislate. City of Greenwood Village v. Fleming, 643 P.2d 511, 515 (Colo.1982). The local ordinance, however, supersedes a conflicting state statute on the same local matter. Id. Second, in matters of statewide concern, home rule cities are without the power to act unless authorized by the constitution or state statute. City and County of Denver, 788 P.2d at 767. Third, in matters of mixed local and state concerns, a home rule city ordinance may coexist with a state statute if there is no conflict between the local ordinance and state statute. Id. If there is a conflict, the state statute supersedes the local ordinance. Id.

The district courts concluded, and the parties all agree in this appeal, that the City's ordinance scheme involves matters of mixed local and state concerns. We agree. Both the City and the State have a strong interest in prosecuting and deterring juveniles who commit minor offenses such as shoplifting and unlawful concealment. Cf. Quintana v. Edgewater Mun. Court, 179 Colo. 90, 92, 498 P.2d 931, 932 (1972) (shoplifting of items of relatively small value "constitutes a great problem and should be combated not only by our state authorities in state courts, but by our police departments in municipal courts").

Thus, we must ascertain whether the City's ordinance scheme conflicts with the Children's Code. The test to determine whether a conflict exists is whether the City's ordinance scheme authorizes what the Children's Code forbids, or forbids what the Children's Code expressly authorizes. See Sant v. Stephens, 753 P.2d 752, 756 (Colo.1988); City of Aurora v. Martin, 181 Colo. 72, 75, 507 P.2d 868, 869-70 (1973).

A.

The juveniles contend that a conflict exists because the City's ordinance scheme does not provide them the procedures in the Children's Code. They argue that because the municipal courts obtained jurisdiction under section 19-2-102, 8B C.R.S. (1991 Supp.), of the Children's Code, they should be afforded the remainder of the statutory procedures in the Children's Code. We disagree.

The Children's Code does not prohibit the City from prosecuting juveniles without affording juveniles the procedures in the Children's Code. Neither party has found, nor have we discovered, any provision stating that all the procedures in the Children's Code apply to municipal court proceedings.

Moreover, the ordinance scheme does not forbid what the Children's Code authorizes. The Children's Code provides procedural safeguards to juveniles charged in juvenile court under a petition in delinquency. The City's ordinance scheme does not prohibit the juvenile court from providing these procedures. In fact, the City's ordinance scheme does not even forbid the municipal court from adopting the procedures. Section 1-2-102(d) of the Colorado Springs Municipal Code provides: "The Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court may promulgate such rules or orders regarding the procedural processing of minor offenders appearing before the municipal court as he may, from time to time, deem appropriate."

Municipalities are not required to follow the procedures in the Children's Code simply because the Children's Code contains detailed and comprehensive procedures for juvenile delinquency proceedings brought in state juvenile courts. See People v. Wade, 757 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Colo.1988) ("city's choice of sentencing scheme different from the state's is well within the city's constitutional power as a home rule city"). To impose such a requirement "would diminish, to a large degree, the independence and self-determination vested in those cities by the constitution." Id. at 1077. Municipal courts are only required to afford the constitutionally mandated procedures that protect an individual's due process rights. See City of Greenwood Village v. Fleming, 643 P.2d 511, 516 (Colo.1982) (guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the privilege against self-incrimination are basic criminal safeguards in a prosecution for violation of a municipal ordinance). The additional procedures that the juveniles request are not constitutionally based due process protections but are statutory procedures provided to juveniles in state juvenile court proceedings. ³

B.

The juveniles also contend that the prosecution of juveniles in the municipal court as a criminal proceeding conflicts with this court's holdings that petition-in-delinquency proceedings in juvenile court are civil in nature. See S.A.S. v. District Court, 623 P.2d 58, 60 (Colo.1981) ...