R.R. Comm'n of Indiana v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co.

Decision Date18 February 1913
Docket NumberNo. 22,166.,22,166.
Citation100 N.E. 852,179 Ind. 255
PartiesRAILROAD COMMISSION OF INDIANA v. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN R. CO.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Superior Court, Lake County; Virgil S. Reiter, Judge.

Action by the Railroad Commission of Indiana against the Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Lincoln V. Cravens, of Hammond, for appellant. G. W. Kretzinger, of Chicago, Ill., and Peter Crumpacker, of Hammond, for appellee.

SPENCER, J.

Appellant sued to recover statutory penalties for the use of the state of Indiana as provided by Act 1907, c. 205, p. 353, approved March 9, 1907 (Burns' Statutes 1908, sections 5292-5294). Complaint in one paragraph. Demurrer for want of facts was sustained. Appellant refused to plead further, and the court rendered judgment accordingly. The error assigned is sustaining the demurrer.

The objections urged to the complaint were that the act upon which the complaint was based was unconstitutional, violative of the interstate commerce provision of the federal Constitution, inoperative, discriminative, ambiguous, and void for uncertainty, being penal, for these reasons the provisions thereof could not be enforced. The lower court sustained this theory. Said act, being “An act to promote the safety of passengers, employés and property in transportation over railroads by steam power,” approved March 9, 1907, is as follows:

Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of Indiana, that after the 1st day of July, 1909, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, or the lessee or receiver of any person, firm or corporation, which shall own or operate any line of railroad in this state, to operate any train over such railroad by steam power unless such railroad is equipped with and has in operation an approved block system for the control of train movements thereon; provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any such railroad as shall not have a gross annual income from the operation of seventy-five hundred ($7,500.00) dollars or more per mile of line, to be determined from its last preceding annual report to the Railroad Commission of Indiana.

Sec. 2. Power and authority are hereby conferred upon the Railroad Commission of Indiana to extend the time specified in section 1 of this act when it shall be made to appear to it that a reasonable necessity for such extension shall exist, provided that the extension so granted shall not exceed one year. Full power and authority are also conferred upon such Commission to relieve any such party from complying with this act as to any branch or spur lines when it shall be made to appear that no reasonable necessity therefor exists. Full power and authority are also hereby conferred upon such Commission to relieve any such party from the obligations imposed by section 1 of this act when it shall be made to appear that the volume of traffic and train movement over any such railroad are such only that the same can be dispatched without substantial hazard to life and property over a line not so protected.

Sec. 3. Any person, firm or corporation, receiver or lessee who or which shall violate section 1 of this act shall forfeit and pay to the state of Indiana the sum of one thousand dollars per week for each week that trains shall be operated over any such railroad in violation of such section, the same to be collected by the Railroad Commission of Indiana by suit in its name for the use of the state of Indiana in any court of competent jurisdiction.”

[1][2][3] This law was passed under the police power which is inherent in the several states, and is left with them under the federal Constitution, and may be exercised by the General Assembly of the state. “The power being such an important comprehensive one, its application must be expected and allowed to expand and take in new subjects from time to time as trade and business advance and new conditions arise.” 22 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, p. 922. “The police power of the state extends to the regulation and control of the entire business of railroads, so far as this is necessary to prevent injury to persons or property. *** The police power also extends to regulating the speed of railroad trains and locomotives and the method of switching cars.” 22 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 933. “The United States Constitution was not intended to restrict, limit or abridge the police power of the states. Under the police power the state can interfere where-ever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the Legislature to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.” 22 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 936.

[4] “It may therefore be stated as a general proposition that with few exceptions *** the police power in the United States is located in the states. The state is intrusted with the duty of enacting and maintaining all those internal regulations which are necessary for the preservation and the prevention of injury to the rights of others. The United States government cannot exercise this power, except in those cases in which power of regulation is granted to the general government expressly or by necessaryimplication.” Tiedeman's Limitations, of Police Power, p. 613.

[5] “The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States support the proposition that, in the absence of legislation by Congress, the state may enact reasonable laws under the police power, which are local in their operation, although they may incidentally affect interstate commerce.” United States Express Co. v. State, 164 Ind. 196, 73 N. E. 101, cases cited; Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission (No. 22,140), 100 N. E. 337, decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana, January 3, 1913; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. R. R. Commission, 171 Ind. 189, 86 N. E. 328; Pittsburg R. Co. v. State, 172 Ind. 147-162, 87 N. E. 1034;Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 164, 24 L. Ed. 97.

The Supreme Court of the United States has approved the validity of state laws designed to secure the safety and comfort of passengers, employés, and regulations intended for the public welfare. C., C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 20 Sup. Ct. 722, 44 L. Ed. 868. The laws held valid require locomotive engineers to be examined and licensed by the state authorities (Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 564, 31 L. Ed. 508), that such engineers must be examined from time to time as to ability to distinguish colors (Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 9 Sup. Ct. 28, 32 L. Ed. 352), for immediate transmission and delivery of telegraph messages (Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 16 Sup. Ct. 934, 40 L. Ed. 1105), forbidding the running of freight trains on Sunday (Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 16 Sup. Ct. 1086, 41 L. Ed. 166), requiring railroad companies to fix and publish their rates annually and post a copy of the same in every station along their line (Railway Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560, 21 L. Ed. 710), forbidding the consolidation of parallel and competing lines of railroad (L. & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, 16 Sup. Ct. 714, 40 L. Ed. 849), regulating the heating of passenger coaches and placing guard posts on bridges and trestles (N. Y., etc., R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 17 Sup. Ct. 418, 41 L. Ed. 853), that no contract shall exempt any railroad corporation from liability of a passenger (Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. 289, 42 L. Ed. 688), that all tracks be fenced, cattle guards constructed and speed of locomotives regulated (Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 6 Sup. Ct. 110, 29 L. Ed. 463), that all trains use safety couplers (Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fé R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150-157, 17 Sup. Ct. 255, 41 L. Ed. 666), that railroad corporations shall be responsible for damages to property caused by fire communicated directly or indirectly by locomotive engines (St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1, 17 Sup. Ct. 243, 41 L. Ed. 611). Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Indiana uphold the validity of state statutes requiring railroad corporations in this state to equip their locomotives with automatic bell ringers (State v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 96 N. E. 340) and cars with grabirons (Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana, supra). All the above statutes held valid and constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States and this state are general in their scope, certain, definite, specific, and unambiguous in their provisions and requirements, and do not leave the persons, firms, or corporations to which they apply in doubt as to their specific requirements.

[6] “If the laws enacted by a state be within the legitimate sphere of legislative power, and their enforcement be attended with the observance of those general rules which our system of jurisprudence prescribes for the security of private rights, the harshness, injustice and oppressive character of such laws will not invalidate them as affecting life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 6 Sup. Ct. 110, 29 L. Ed. 463.

[7] “The statute under its police power has the right to regulate any and all kinds of business to protect the public health, morals and welfare, subject to the restriction of reasonable classification.” Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, 97 N. E. 1;Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind. 591, 37 N. E. 402, 39 N. E. 869, 28 L. R. A. 679, 683, 49 Am. St. Rep. 222;Adams Ex. Co. v. State, 161 Ind. 328, 67 N. E. 1033;Seelyville Coal & Mining Co. v. McGlosson, 166 Ind. 561, 77 N. E. 1044, 117 Am. St. Rep. 396, 9 Ann. Cas. 234;Knight & Jillson Co. v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N. E. 823, 18 Ann. Cas. 1146;Selvage v. Talbott, 175 Ind. 648, 95 N. E. 115, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 9...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • Morgan v. Ownbey
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Delaware
    • November 27, 1916
    ...... 217, 219, 220, 43 N.Y.S. 560; Kiefer v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 55. Hun. 604, 8 N.Y.S. 230; ... Railroad Commission v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., . 179 Ind. 255, 100 N.E. 852, 855. . ......
  • Board of Com'rs of Howard County v. Kokomo City Plan Commission
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • May 20, 1974
    ...(1971) 255 Ind. 545, 266 N.E.2d 25. The reason for the classification must inhere in the subject matter. R.R. Comm. v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co. (1913) 179 Ind. 255, 100 N.E. 852. If the rational relationship does not exist or if the populational distinction drawn does not justifiably be......
  • McIntosh v. Melroe Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • May 26, 2000
    ...added). See also Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State, 188 Ind. 173, 181, 122 N.E. 584, 587 (1919); Railroad Comm'n of Ind. v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 179 Ind. 255, 262, 100 N.E. 852, 854 (1913); Bedford Quarries, 168 Ind. at 674, 80 N.E. at 529-30. It is not sufficient simply to identify the ch......
  • Martin v. Richey, 53A04-9603-CV-104
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • January 13, 1997
    ...said that the basis for the classification "must inhere in the subject matter." Id. at 78 (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 179 Ind. 255, 262, 100 N.E. 852, 854 (1913); Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, 177 Ind. 1, 10, 97 N.E. 1, 5 (1912)). More pointedly, this means where the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT