R & R Land Dev., L.L.C. v. Am. Freightways, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. SD 31820.,SD 31820.
• Citation: 389 S.W.3d 234
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: R & R LAND DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. AMERICAN FREIGHTWAYS, INC., a/k/a and f/k/a American Freightway Corporation, Defendant–Respondent.

389 S.W.3d 234

R & R LAND DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.AMERICAN FREIGHTWAYS, INC., a/k/a and f/k/a American Freightway Corporation, Defendant–Respondent.

No. SD 31820.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division One.

Dec. 19, 2012.

Motion for Rehearing and Transfer Denied Jan. 7, 2013.

Application for Transfer Denied by Supreme Court March 19, 2013.

Steven E. Marsh, Hulston, Jones & Marsh, L.L.C., Springfield, MO, for Appellant.

Kregg Keltner, Haden, Cowherd, Bullock & McGinnis, Springfield, MO, for Respondent.

GARY W. LYNCH, P.J.

R & R Land Development, L.L.C. (“R & R”), appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of American Freightways, Inc. (“American”), with respect to R & R's claims for fraud, breach of contract, specific performance, and rescission, all arising from a real estate transaction. In two points on appeal, R & R argues that (1) the trial court misapplied the law in denying rescission because R & R was entitled to rescission based on the trial court's finding that both parties believed American had fee simple title to the real estate, and (2) the trial court's finding that there was no mutual or unilateral mistake is against the weight of the evidence because all the evidence showed that both parties believed American had fee simple title to the real estate. R & R's arguments fail because they rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of the trial court's findings and conclusions. The trial court found that in spite of the parties' beliefs about American's title to the property, there was no mutual mistake about the nature of the transaction between the parties. Finding no merit in R & R's points, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

On November 20, 2000, R & R entered into a written contract with American to purchase a 40–foot by 725–foot strip of land (“the property”). The contract required R & R to pay $29,000 in exchange for conveyance of the property by warranty deed. The original contract did not close on the date specified, and an addendum was executed with a closing date on or before February 28, 2001. The addendum also called for the payment of $1,000 earnest money by R & R. The earnest money deposit was never paid, and the February 28, 2001, closing did not occur. There were no further addenda to the contract, and none of the other obligations of the contract were met by either party.

From February 28, 2001, to April 2, 2001, there were communications between R & R and American, which was still contemplating conveying the property to R & R. There were also discussions about the possibility of R & R acquiring an easement over the property in lieu of an actual deed.

On April 2, 2001, Ron Hinds, a principal of R & R, called Randy Smith at American and indicated, in an impatient and perhaps aggressive manner, that he intended for American to convey its interest in the property to R & R that day. After consulting with his superiors, Smith called Hinds and told him that if R & R wanted to purchase American's interest that day, as Hines insisted, then in exchange for $29,000, American would convey it only by quitclaim deed. Upon receiving this information, Hinds traveled to American's offices in Harrison, Arkansas, and exchanged a $29,000 cashier's check for a quitclaim deed conveying all of American's interest in the property to R & R. On April 9, 2001, R & R obtained a title report showing that there was a 1953 quitclaim deed to the city of Springfield which affected title in the property.

R & R subsequently filed suit alleging fraud and breach of contract and seeking damages and specific performance or rescission and restitution. American answered, responding that R & R breached the original contract. Following a bench trial, the trial court issued its judgment with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that “[a]t all times during the negotiations between R & R and American, and including from the date of the initial contract through April 2, 2001, American believed in good faith that it held fee simple title to the subject property[,]” but that “[n]o competent evidence was offered suggesting that as of April 2, 2001, a mistake, whether mutual or unilateral,accident or fraud was committed by American in its tender of a Quit Claim Deed for the subject property in exchange for the agreed payment.” The trial court also concluded that the original contract had been materially breached when R & R failed to pay the earnest money and that, as a result of that breach, American was relieved of the responsibilities outlined in the original contract. The trial court went on to conclude that the entire agreement of the parties was contained within the April 2, 2001, quitclaim deed. The trial court entered judgment in favor of American on all the claims raised in the petition. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

In a court-tried civil case, “[t]he judgment of the trial court will be affirmed ‘unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.’ ” Pearson v. Koster, 367 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Mo. banc 2012). Reviewing courts treat questions of fact and questions of law differently. Id. “In reviewing questions of fact, the reviewing court will defer to the trial court's assessment of the evidence if any facts relevant to an issue are contested.” Id. at 44. “Once contested, ‘a trial court is free to disbelieve any, all, or none of th[e] evidence,’ and ‘the appellate court's role is not to re-evaluate testimony through its own perspective.’ ” Id. (quoting White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 308–09 (Mo. banc 2010)). “The trial court receives deference on factual issues ‘because it is in a better position not only to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the persons directly, but also their sincerity and character and other trial intangibles which may not be completely revealed by the record.’ ” Id. On the other hand, “[t]his Court applies de novo review to questions of law decided in court-tried cases.” Pearson, 367 S.W.3d at 43 (quoting StopAquila.org v. City of Peculiar, 208 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Mo. banc 2006)).

Discussion and Decision

For ease of analysis, we address R & R's points on appeal in reverse order.

The trial court's finding that neither of the parties was mistaken about the nature of the April 2 transaction is not against the weight of the evidence.

Our first task in addressing R & R's second point is determining the nature of the challenge. R & R's second point is not a model of clarity. It states as follows:

The trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of [American] denying rescission of the transaction that occurred on April 2, 2001, and restitution to [R & R], because the trial court's judgment is against the weight of the evidence in failing to find either a mutual mistake, or a unilateral mistake by [R & R] with knowledge of such mistake by [American], in that the trial court specifically found, and all the evidence on the issue showed, that [American] believed that it held fee simple title to the subject property, and agreed and intended to “convey” that “property” to [R & R], and the undisputed documentary evidence showed that [American] represented to [R & R] that [American] held such title but in fact [American] did not have any title to the property, and that [R & R] paid [American] $29,000.00 for the property based upon such belief but received nothing of value in exchange.

The problem with this point is that it fails to explicitly state about which fact the trial court failed to find the parties were mistaken. The point could be read as challenging either (1) the trial court's failure to find a mistake of fact with respect to the parties' beliefs about American's title in the property

or (2) the trial court's failure to find a mistake of fact with respect to the nature of the April 2 transaction.

Based on the trial court's express factual findings, we conclude that the point challenges the trial court's failure to find a mistake of fact with respect to the nature of the April 2 transaction. This is because a challenge to the trial court's failure to find a mistake of fact with respect to the parties' beliefs about American's title in the property would be logically impossible. The trial court expressly found that American believed in good faith that it had fee simple title to the property. That is the exact proposition the facts listed in the point tend to support. Thus, if the point challenged the failure to find a mistake of fact with respect to American's belief about its title in the property, the point would be challenging exactly what the trial court found. A party cannot appeal a finding of the trial court with which it agrees because as to that finding the party is not aggrieved. Seesection 512.020, RSMo Cum.Supp.2010; Betty G. Weldon Revocable Trust ex rel. Vivion v. Weldon ex rel. Weldon, 231 S.W.3d 158, 168 (Mo.App.2007). Consequently, we construe R & R's point as claiming that the trial court erred in denying R & R's claim for rescission because the trial court's finding that there was no mistake of fact with respect to the nature of the April 2 transaction is against the weight of the evidence in that American believed it had fee simple title to the property and therefore must have intended to transfer fee simple title via the quitclaim deed executed during the April 2 transaction.

R & R's claim has no merit. A claim that a judgment is against the weight of the evidence presupposes the existence of substantial evidence to support the judgment and instead challenges the effect of that evidence to induce belief. Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178, 186 (Mo.App.2010). The term weight of the evidence means “weight in probative value, not the quantity or the amount of evidence.” Id. Reversal based on a claim that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence is...