R.S. v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 29 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. CR-19-0395-PR,CR-19-0395-PR
• Parties: Crime Victims R.S. and S.E., Petitioners, v. Hon. Peter A. THOMPSON, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Respondent Judge, Teddy Carl Vanders, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

251 Ariz. 111

485 P.3d 1068

Crime Victims R.S. and S.E., Petitioners,

v. Hon. Peter A. THOMPSON, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Respondent Judge,Teddy Carl Vanders, Real Party in Interest.

No. CR-19-0395-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed April 29, 2021

Jamie Balson (argued), Legal Services for Crime Victims in Arizona, Sun City, Attorney for R. S. and S. E.

Rosemarie Pena-Lynch, Legal Advocate, Grace M. Guisewite (argued), Elyse Fune, Deputy Legal Advocates, Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix, Attorneys for Teddy Carl Vanders

Brian Thredgold (argued), Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

Colleen Clase, Robert Swinford, Arizona Voice for Crime Victims & National Crime Victim Law Institute, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Voice for Crime Victims & National Crime Victim Law Institute

Allister Adel, Maricopa County Attorney, Robert E. Prather, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae The Maricopa County Attorney

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Linley Wilson, Chief Counsel, Jillian B. Francis, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorney General

David J. Euchner, Lauren K. Beall, Tucson, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Pima County Public Defender's Office

JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES BOLICK, BEENE, and PELANDER (RETIRED)^* joined^** .

JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court:

¶1 We hold that when a criminal defendant's due process right to present a complete defense conflicts with a victim's state constitutional or statutory rights governing privileged mental health records, the victim may be compelled to produce such documents for in-camera review if the defendant shows a reasonable possibility that the information sought includes evidence that would be material to the defense or necessary to cross-examine a witness.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Teddy Carl Vanders is charged with second-degree murder for killing his girlfriend, M.S., during a domestic dispute. In a 911 call placed at the time of the incident, Vanders told the operator that he shot M.S. because she was crawling around, "acting evil," and had abused and threatened him for years. He also stated that M.S. was previously admitted to a mental hospital and that he believed she had been diagnosed with a mental illness.

¶3 Before trial, Vanders moved to compel Magellan Hospital to disclose, for in-camera review, M.S.’s privileged mental health records from a visit six years before her death. The records stem from a 2011 domestic dispute between M.S. and Vanders, during which M.S. indicated she wanted to kill herself, and then assaulted Vanders before being taken by police to Magellan Hospital where she told staff she wanted to talk about suicidal ideations. Vanders argues that the records are essential to his justification defense and to his ability to effectively examine witnesses. Specifically, Vanders intends to show that he was afraid of M.S., that she had previously assaulted him on multiple occasions, and that a reasonable person in his position would have feared for his life.

¶4 The trial court ruled that Vanders’ due process rights required disclosure of M.S.’s privileged records for in-camera review, relying on State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court ( Roper ), which allowed the defendant to seek in-camera review of the victim's physician-patient privileged records in light of the due process right to present a complete defense. 172 Ariz. 232, 240–41, 836 P.2d 445, 453–54 (App. 1992). M.S.’s siblings, as victims (collectively, "Victims") under Arizona's Victims’ Bill of Rights ("VBR"), filed a special action challenging the ruling.

¶5 In the special action, Victims argued that M.S.’s records are protected under both the VBR and the statutory physician-patient privilege, A.R.S. § 13-4062(4), and contended that Vanders cannot establish a superseding constitutional right to the protected records. The court of appeals accepted jurisdiction and agreed, concluding that Vanders could only establish a rule-based right to the documents under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1(g). R.S. v. Thompson , 247 Ariz. 575, 578 ¶ 10, 454 P.3d 1010, 1013 (App. 2019). The court then reasoned that when a defendant's rule-based right to demand documents conflicts with a victim's statutory physician-patient privilege, the statute must prevail. Id. at 579 ¶ 12, 454 P.3d at 1014.

¶6 The court of appeals declined to embrace Roper ’s "broad extension of a defendant's right to present a complete defense," see id. at 579–81 ¶¶ 14, 18–20, 454 P.3d at 1014–16, and determined there was no binding precedent that "held that a defendant's due process right to a fair trial evolves into a general constitutional right to discovery, which could then work to overcome an individual's physician-patient privilege," id. at 580 ¶ 19, 454 P.3d at 1015.

¶7 The court also found that the "reasonable possibility" standard for in-camera review—extracted by the court in State v. Connor , 215 Ariz. 553, 558 ¶ 10, 161 P.3d 596, 601 (App. 2007), from Roper ’s view of a defendant's constitutional right to discover privileged records—was inadequate. Id. at 581–82 ¶¶ 23–24, 454 P.3d at 1016–17. Instead, the court held that a defendant is entitled to in-camera review of privileged records not subject to Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), when the defendant demonstrates (1) a substantial probability that the protected records contain information that is trustworthy and critical to an element of the charge or defense or (2) that their unavailability would result in a fundamentally unfair trial. Id. at 577 ¶ 3, 454 P.3d at 1012. The court then concluded that Vanders had not demonstrated the necessary substantial probability that the records from Magellan Hospital contain information critical to his justification defense. Id. at 582–83 ¶¶ 27–28, 454 P.3d at 1017–18. Consequently, the court granted relief, and Vanders petitioned this Court for review.

¶8 After the court of appeals’ decision in this case, another panel of that court declined to follow the more stringent "substantial probability" standard, creating a split between divisions in our appellate court. See Fox-Embrey v. Neal , 249 Ariz. 162, 171 ¶ 27 n.4, 467 P.3d 1102, 1111 (App. 2020). In Fox-Embrey , the court applied the standard articulated by Roper , Connor , and their progeny:

When a defendant's due process right to a meaningful opportunity to present a defense directly conflicts with the victim's rights under the VBR, the victim may be compelled to produce treatment records for in camera inspection if the defendant shows a reasonable possibility that the information sought includes information the defendant is entitled to as a matter of due process.

Id. at 170 ¶ 23, 467 P.3d at 1110 (cleaned up) (emphasis added).

¶9 We granted review to resolve this split and to determine the appropriate standard a criminal defendant must meet to obtain in-camera review of a victim's privileged mental health records—a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶10 Whether a defendant's due process right to present a complete defense permits in-camera review of a victim's privileged records upon demonstrating a reasonable possibility that the documents contain evidence necessary to vindicate that right is a matter of constitutional and statutory interpretation that we review de novo. See State v. Hegyi , 242 Ariz. 415, 416 ¶ 7, 396 P.3d 1095, 1096 (2017).

I.

¶11 We first consider the scope of a criminal defendant's due process rights under these circumstances. Victims argue that Vanders does not have any countervailing constitutional right that would supersede their rights under the VBR and the physician-patient statutory privilege. We disagree.

¶12 A trial court may order third parties to produce information not in the possession of the prosecutor when the defendant demonstrates (1) a substantial need in the preparation of the defendant's case for the information and (2) that the defendant is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent by other means without undue hardship. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(g). However, when production of the evidence would infringe a victim's constitutional and statutory privileges, the defendant must first "demonstrate that his ‘substantial need’ for the information would ... amount to one of constitutional dimension." Connor , 215 Ariz. at 561 ¶ 22, 161 P.3d at 604. If the defendant makes this showing, the trial court must balance the competing rights and interests of the defendant and the victims and may order production of the information for its in-camera review. Id. "If the court then determines any disclosure is necessary, it may then carefully circumscribe the disclosure to the extent permissible consistent with the defendant's exercise of the constitutional right to a fair trial." Id. We next turn to the relevant jurisprudence describing the substance of a defendant's due process rights.

¶13 Due process requires that a defendant receive a fundamentally fair trial, including a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) ("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); California v. Trombetta , 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) ("Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of...