R.A. v. State
| Decision Date | 08 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3D22-0546 |
| Parties | R.A., a Juvenile, Appellant, v. The State of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County Lower Tribunal No. 21-751, Dawn Denaro, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Katryna Santa Cruz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.
R.A., a juvenile, challenges her adjudication of delinquency for the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer. A charge of battery on a law enforcement officer requires that the officer engage in the lawful performance of his or her duties at the time of the battery. R.A. contends that because the officer impermissibly detained her, the officer failed to meet that predicate and the adjudication must be vacated. Because we find that the officer was engaged in a reasonable seizure at the time of the offense, we affirm.
At approximately 9:20 PM on July 19, 2021, a Miami-Dade Police officer patrolling the Richmond Heights neighborhood of unincorporated Miami-Dade County observed R.A. sitting alone in a dark corner of a breezeway next to the entrance of BioTECH High School. The encounter occurred well after the school closed.[1] The officer, concerned by the presence of a young female alone at night, in front of a closed school in a high-crime area, approached R.A. Attempting to discern the reason for R.A.'s presence, the officer asked if she was all right, why she was there, if her parents knew where she was, and why she looked scared. R.A. responded that she was fine and not scared. However, the video evidence from the officer's body-worn camera reveals a tone and tenor that belied R.A.'s representations. R.A. answered tentatively and appeared, if not scared, then, at a minimum hesitant and unsure. The officer asked for her name and age. She responded with her name and said she was 17 years old. The officer asked if R.A.'s parents knew where she was and R.A. answered affirmatively, explaining that she'd attempted to visit a friend who lived nearby but he wasn't home.
RA claimed she was waiting for a bus home, but she took shelter in the school entryway to wait for the rain to pass. However the officer observed that it was not raining at the time, nor had it been raining recently, and would later testify that there was "not a cloud in the sky." R.A. was carrying a face mask, but didn't have a cell phone, an ID, or a bus pass or schedule, and she didn't know which bus she was looking for or when she expected it. Nonetheless she told the officer that she knew how to get home safely. She also said that she previously had a cell phone, but lost it a few days prior and did not remember her number. The officer then asked if R.A. wanted her parents to pick her up or send for a rideshare. R.A. explained that her parents did not have phones, that her mother did not have a car, that her father had a car but was working, and that they didn't have the money to send for a rideshare. In response to the officer's attempt to elicit more vital information about her family, R.A. provided her mother's name and a partial address, but professed to not know her mother's full address (which was also R.A.'s home address).
After expressing skepticism about R.A.'s explanation and taking note of the tone, evasive and incomplete answers, and the fact that a 17-year-old could only provide such basic information, the officer asked R.A. to "wait a second" and returned to her vehicle to contact the Department of Children and Family Services. After eventually locating R.A. in their system, the officer learned that R.A. was 16, not 17, and had given an incorrect spelling of her surname. The officer also could not locate R.A.'s mother or confirm an address. The officer called for a backup unit.
After a second officer arrived, R.A. fled from the scene. The officers chased her on foot for about a block before catching her, handcuffing her, and placing her in a police vehicle. While walking back, the officer asked R.A. "what are you doing here, for real," but R.A. did not respond. The officer also explained to R.A. that "you're not in trouble" and that they were "just trying to make sure you get home safe." Approximately 35 minutes later (during which time the officers were discussing the situation and questioning an unrelated older male who arrived at the scene),[2] the officers checked on R.A. to find her kicking the partition between the front and back seats of the police car. The officers then attempted to hold R.A. down and place her in leg restraints, causing her to kick at them and hit one officer in the chest.
R.A. was subsequently arrested for loitering and prowling, resisting an officer without violence, and battery on a law enforcement officer. The State declined to bring charges for loitering and prowling, but petitioned for delinquency on the battery and resisting charges. At the adjudicatory hearing, the State introduced testimony from two of the officers involved, as well as body camera footage of the encounter.
At the conclusion of the hearing, R.A. moved for a judgment of dismissal, arguing that the battery and resisting offenses occurred in the context of an illegal seizure. She argued that the officers were not engaged in the lawful performance of their duties at the time the offenses were committed, rendering the evidence sufficient only to support a lesser charge of simple battery. Conversely, the State argued that the officers were properly engaged in a reasonable community caretaking function during the offenses. The trial court denied the motion and acquitted R.A. of the resisting charge, but found her guilty of battery on a law enforcement officer, expressly finding that the officers were engaged in the lawful performance of their duties at the time of the offense. R.A. now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her motion for judgment of dismissal on the battery charge.[3]
"The standard of review that applies to a motion for judgment of dismissal in a juvenile case is the same standard that applies to a motion for judgment of acquittal in a criminal case." X.B. v. State, 337 So.3d 99, 101- 02 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (quoting A.P.R. v. State, 894 So.2d 282, 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)). Accordingly, "our review of the denial of a motion for judgment of dismissal is de novo." Id. at 102 (quoting J.W.J. v State, 994 So.2d 1223, 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). The purpose of a motion for judgment of dismissal is to "test[] the legal sufficiency of the State's evidence." Id. "When moving for judgment of dismissal, the movant admits the facts in evidence, as well as every conclusion favorable to the adverse party that a jury might fairly and reasonably infer from the evidence." Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, we construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and if we conclude that a rational trier of fact could find the existence of all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, we will sustain the conviction. Id.; see also J.W.J. v. State, 994 So.2d 1223, 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) ().
Section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes, enhances the crime of battery to a third-degree felony when committed on a law enforcement officer who is "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties." See also Mills v. State, 822 So.2d 1284, 1290 (Fla. 2002) (). While the term "lawful performance of his or her duties" is not defined in the statute, the Florida Supreme Court instructs that when evaluating section 784.07, "courts must apply the legal standards governing the duty undertaken by the law enforcement officer at the point that an assault, battery, or act of violent resistance occurs." Tillman v. State, 934 So.2d 1263, 1272 (Fla. 2006) (superseded on other grounds by statute, as stated in J.M. v. Gargett, 101 So.3d 352 (Fla. 2012)). Therefore, we must consider whether the officer legally detained R.A. in the time leading up to the battery. See Rodriguez v. State, 964 So.2d 833, 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution prohibit "unreasonable searches and seizures." Accordingly, "any warrantless seizure of an individual by law enforcement officers," including those involving only "'a brief detention short of traditional arrest,'" must be "based on reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in wrongdoing." Caldwell v. State, 41 So.3d 188, 195 (Fla. 2010) (quoting in part U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980)). "Whether a suspicion is 'reasonable' will depend on the existence of 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.'" Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
A "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes occurs when, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that they are not free to leave or otherwise terminate the police encounter. Florida v. Bostick 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991). A determination of whether a seizure occurred "is a fact-intensive analysis in which the reviewing court must consider the totality of the circumstances." Golphin v. State, 945 So.2d 1174, 1183 (Fla....
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