R.W. v. Armor Corr. Health Servs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 November 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 11–CV–1326–EAK–AEP.
• Parties: R. W., Plaintiff, v. ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a Florida Corporation, and Michele Spinelli, an individual, and David Gee, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, in his official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

830 F.Supp.2d 1295

R. W., Plaintiff,

v.ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a Florida Corporation, and Michele Spinelli, an individual, and David Gee, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, in his official capacity, Defendants.

Case No. 11–CV–1326–EAK–AEP.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida,Tampa Division.

Nov. 21, 2011.

Virlyn B. Moore, III, Attorney at Law, Nokomis, FL, for Plaintiff.

Daniel L. Losey, Billing, Cochran, Lyles, Mauro & Ramsey, PA, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART

ELIZABETH A. KOVACHEVICH, District Judge.

THIS cause is before the Court on Defendants', ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC. (hereafter “ARMOR”), MICHELE SPINELLI (hereafter “SPINELLI”), and DAVID GEE (hereafter “GEE”), Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff, R.W.'S, Amended Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law. For the reasons outlined below. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss claims will be GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to state law claims and Plaintiff's claims alleging abridgement of the free exercise of religion and GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with regard to Plaintiffs claims alleging abridgement of equal protection and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim alleging abridgment of the right to privacy is DENIED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On or about January 26, 2011, Plaintiff petitioned the Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County. Florida, where the action was then pending, for removal to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The removal was granted on the grounds that Plaintiff sought damages based on allegations of civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On May 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed a twenty-two count Amended Complaint alleging twelve Federal, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims and ten state law claims in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 3.01 of the Middle District Local Rules. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (hereafter “Motion to Dismiss”) on June 21, 2011. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss alleges that this Court should dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims for various reasons, including Plaintiff's failure to comply with the pre-suit requirements of Chapter 766, Florida Statutes, which deals with medical malpractice claims. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss further argues that Plaintiff's federal and State law claims should be dismissed for various other reasons. On July 29, 2011, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Response and Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. Plaintiff argues that the Amended Complaint states a cause of action, with the exception of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Armor, which Plaintiff withdrew.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To meet the minimal pleading requirements, the Rules obligate the Plaintiff to provide the “grounds” of his or her “entitlement to relief” with more than just “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In order to survive a defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and those facts must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

A complaint will not be dismissed for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Considerations of the pleadings shall be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ill. ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assoc. Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 618, 123 S.Ct. 1829, 155 L.Ed.2d 793 (2003).

BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations derive from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed May 28, 2011 and are accepted as true for purposes of resolving the instant motion. This dispute arises out of events occurring during Plaintiffs incarceration at Hillsborough County Jail following a reported rape incident. On January 27, 2007, the Plaintiff filed a report with the Tampa Police Department (“TPD”) stating that Plaintiff had been raped earlier that day. (Am. Com. ¶ 28.) A TPD Officer took Plaintiff to the TPD's Rape Crisis Center (hereafter “Rape Crisis Center”), where specimens were taken, evidence was collected, and, following TPD “rape kit” procedure, two anti-conception pills were prescribed to Plaintiff. (¶ 29–30.) Plaintiff took the first pill while at the Rape Crisis Center with written instructions from the attending medical doctor to take the second pill twelve (12) hours later. (¶ 31.)

Later that day Plaintiff accompanied the TPD Officer to aid in identifying the crime scene. (¶ 32.) While en route, the TPD Officer discovered that Plaintiff was the subject of an arrest warrant arising from a juvenile ease. (¶ 33.) The TPD Officer placed Plaintiff under arrest and took Plaintiff to Hillsborough County Jail on Orient Road in Tampa, Florida (hereafter “Hillsborough County Jail”). (¶ 36.) While incarcerated at Hillsborough County Jail, the second anti-conception pill, along with the medical doctor's written instructions, were removed from Plaintiff's possession. (¶ 37.) Defendant Spinelli, employed by Armor, an independent contractor charged with providing medical services at Hillsborough County Jail, was responsible for decisions involving Plaintiff's medical care while incarcerated. (¶ 15, 39.)

The next morning, January 28.2007. Plaintiff requested the second anti-conception pill from Spinelli, explaining that Plaintiff had recently been raped, visited the Rape Crisis Center. and had a prescription from a medical doctor instructing her to take the second pill after twelve hours to prevent the rape from resulting in pregnancy. (¶ 39.) Spinelli refused to administer the pill to Plaintiff, allegedly stating that it was against her religious beliefs. (¶ 42.)

The Plaintiff remained in jail without bond until Plaintiff's bond was restored, posted, and the Plaintiff was released on January 29, 2007. (¶ 45.) Plaintiff was permitted to take the second pill before shortly before her release. (¶ 46.) The Court notes that there is no allegation that the failure of the Plaintiff to receive the pill resulted in a pregnancy.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff brings claims against both Spinelli and Gee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 1) abridgment of the right to free exercise of religion (Counts I, IX). 2) abridgment of the right to privacy (Counts II, X), 3) abridgment of the right of equal protection (Counts III, XI) and 4) deliberate indifference to a serious medical need (Counts IV, XII). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person acting under the color of state law who deprives any citizen of the United States of their rights, privileges or immunities is liable to the injured party. In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, one “must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999). For the reasons articulated below, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Counts I and IX are GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Counts III, IV, X and XI are GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Counts II and X are DENIED.

1. Abridgment of the Right to Free Exercise of Religion (Counts I, IX)

Plaintiff's claims alleging abridgment of the right to free exercise of religion are dismissed for lack of standing. In order to sustain a cause of action of the Free Exercise Clause, a plaintiff must allege that his or her “own particular religious freedoms are infringed.” Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 71 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n. 9, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963)). “It is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion.” Id. at 233, 83 S.Ct. 1560. Plaintiff fails to allege that her desire to proceed with the taking of the second anti-conception medication was compelled by her religious beliefs. Accordingly. Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a Free Exercise Claim and Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Counts I and IX are GRANTED with prejudice.

2. Abridgment of the Right to Privacy (Counts II, X)

In the absence of an express Constitutional guarantee of an individual's right to privacy, the Supreme Court has nonetheless recognized the right to privacy to exist within the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). This right includes protection of an individual's personal autonomy in making certain important decisions, such as those involving marriage, contraception, and procreation. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–99, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 ...