Raasch v. Elite Laundry Co.
| Decision Date | 22 June 1906 |
| Docket Number | 14,768 - (139) |
| Citation | 108 N.W. 477,98 Minn. 357 |
| Parties | CLARA RAASCH v. ELITE LAUNDRY COMPANY and Another |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $10,000 for personal injuries. The case was tried before Brill, J and a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $8,500. From an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but granting a motion for a new trial, defendants appealed. Affirmed.
Master and Servant -- Question for Jury.
An employee, while operating an ironing mangle in a laundry, had her fingers caught between the rollers, and the master having been notified of the situation, started the machine, thereby drawing her hand farther in and greatly increasing the injury.
Held, the master, after notice of the situation, was required to exercise ordinary care to release employee and alleviate her suffering, and whether he did so under the circumstances was a question for the jury.
Contributory Negligence.
The fact that the employee contributed to the injury by her own negligence in assuming the risks of operating the machine, and that the master was not responsible for the injury occasioned in the first instance, does not change the application of the rule.
Daniel W. Lawler and Frank M. Nye, for appellants.
How, Butler & Mitchell, for respondent.
Appellant company had in use in its laundry an ironing mangle of ordinary pattern, which was heated and operated by steam, and consisted of a steel cylinder about four feet in diameter, and a series of felt rolls about six inches in diameter, with a number of other rolls, pulleys, aprons, etc. Close to the cylinder was located a small roller, called the "whipper," and its purpose was to separate the articles and fabrics from the surface of the cylinder and cause them to pass, by means of aprons and other appliances, to a delivery platform on the other side of the mangle. It was respondent's duty to feed articles into the machine, and she was assisted by Leone Waldock, who stood upon the platform to the left of the feeder, and operated the lever under respondent's direction, and applied the power and stopped it upon signals by her. It sometimes happened, while feeding fabrics into the mangle, that they would wind around the whipper, and on the occasion of this accident a couple of sheets wound around it. The machine was stopped by Leone for the purpose of unwinding the articles, and, while respondent was in the act of doing so, Leone, without the usual signal, started the machine, thereby catching the tips of the fingers of respondent's right hand between the cylinder and whipper. Respondent cried out, and the machine was immediately stopped, but she could not extricate her fingers, and Mr. Carter, president and manager of appellant company, was notified and came over to respondent, and for some reason took hold of the lever and started the mangle sufficiently to draw respondent's hand at least four or five inches farther between the rollers and bring it in contact with the heated cylinder. Respondent again cried out, and the machine was stopped, but before her hand was released serious damage resulted, and this action was based upon the following acts of negligence: That the machine was of a complex construction, difficult of operation, and inherently defective; that necessary tools were not provided for its adjustment; incompetency of assistant, and failure to properly instruct her; and also that, after being notified that respondent's hand was caught between the rollers, appellants negligently started the machine in motion, thereby drawing respondent's hand in still farther between the rollers and causing additional injury.
The trial resulted in a verdict of $8,500 for respondent, whereupon appellants made an alternative motion for judgment in their favor notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial. The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied, and a new trial granted, upon the ground that the verdict was excessive and not justified by the evidence, and upon the further ground that the court had committed error in not giving certain requests in respect to appellants' negligence in starting the machine.
The trial court was of opinion that there was no evidence indicating negligence on the part of appellants except the act of Mr. Carter in starting the mangle after he had been notified that respondent's fingers were caught, and submitted to the jury for their determination whether appellants were in the exercise of ordinary care when Mr. Carter so manipulated the machine as to increase her injuries. The evidence tends to support respondent's claim that after Mr. Carter was notified her fingers were caught in the mangle he came over, took hold of the lever and started the machine, but there is no evidence to support the suggestion that it was done with any wilful purpose to injure her. It is evident that if he had not touched the lever and started the mangle, but had resorted to means at his command for loosening the whipper, respondent's hand might have been released with comparatively slight injury. The act of starting the mangle without pausing to investigate the extent to which respondent's hand was caught, and without endeavoring to release it by unfastening the set screw, or by some other method, is difficult of comprehension. Mr. Carter denied that he did move the lever, but the evidence to the contrary is strong, and at least that question was for the jury, but he says that if he did take hold of the lever and move the machine, it was for the purpose of testing it to see if the motive power was entirely turned off, and if injury resulted it was because of mistake in judgment on his part.
We are asked by appellants to rule that, under the circumstances presented by this case, it appears, as a matter of law, that Mr. Carter was placed in an emergency, and there being no evidence to indicate that he was actuated by any wilful purpose against respondent, appellants must be exonerated. In our judgment, the record does not conclusively show that the act of Mr. Carter in starting the machine is to be accounted for solely upon the ground of mistake of judgment. His explanation of why he started the mangle, if he did so, indicates lamentable ignorance on his part of the possible consequences, or extraordinary recklessness, unless he was greatly excited and made a mistake. Mr. Carter was required to use ordinary care to prevent further injury to respondent after discovering that her hand was caught in the mangle, and whether he did use ordinary care depended upon his knowledge and means of acquiring knowledge of the details of the business. This involved the mechanism of the machine, the different ways in which respondent's hand might have been released, the fact that it had been customary to keep tools in the near vicinity for the very purpose of adjusting the machine, the fact that the safe way to unwind a wrapper was to loosen the set screw and so release it, and the fact that, at the time Mr. Carter was called, the mangle was at rest; all of which have a bearing upon his conduct, and if, in the opinion of the jury, he failed to exercise the care which an ordinarily prudent superintendent would have done, then he and the company were responsible for his act. On the contrary, if the jury were of opinion that, in view of all the facts, Mr. Carter did what he believed to be the proper thing, and that the accident occurred as a result of a mistake, or error in judgment such as ordinary prudence could not have foreseen, then no responsibility followed.
In the case of Allen v. Hixson, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 810, a young woman operating a laundry mangle discovered that the rollers were out of adjustment and notified the superintendent thereof, and in order to show him the real...
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