Rabideau v. Albany Medical Center Hosp.

• Decision Date: 29 July 1993
• Citation: 600 N.Y.S.2d 825,195 A.D.2d 923
• Parties: Leroy RABIDEAU, Appellant, v. ALBANY MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 825

600 N.Y.S.2d 825

195 A.D.2d 923

Leroy RABIDEAU, Appellant, v. ALBANY MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL et al.,

Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

July 29, 1993.

John J. Ciavardoni, Albany, for appellant.

Bond, Schoeneck & King (Nicholas D'Ambrosio Jr., of counsel), Albany, for respondents.

Before WEISS, P.J., and YESAWICH, LEVINE, MERCURE and MAHONEY, JJ.

LEVINE, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Harris, J.), entered November 2, 1992 in Albany County, which granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In January 1990 plaintiff, then age 49, was terminated from at-will employment as a mechanic with defendant Albany Medical Center Hospital (hereinafter the Hospital), based upon a report by defendant John Sweatman, his supervisor, that he had unauthorized possession of or had misappropriated Hospital property. Sweatman's oral and written reports concerning plaintiff's conduct were made to David Aldrich, the Hospital's manager of plant facilities. Plaintiff thereafter commenced this action against the Hospital and Sweatman alleging, inter alia, defamation based on Sweatman's statements to superiors, age discrimination and prima facie tort. After discovery was completed, Supreme Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint, finding that plaintiff had failed to raise any triable issues of fact as to any of the causes of action. Plaintiff now appeals.

Plaintiff's first contention is that there were outstanding issues of fact precluding granting summary judgment on his defamation cause of action. The uncontroverted evidence established that Sweatman observed a bulge under plaintiff's clothing as plaintiff was leaving work at the end of his shift on January 22, 1990. When Sweatman inquired about it, plaintiff admitted the bulge was concealed Hospital wiper blades. Sweatman promptly reported the incident to Aldrich. The next morning at a meeting with Sweatman and Aldrich, plaintiff acknowledged having made that admission to Sweatman, and then submitted a written statement explaining that he "pull[ed] a stunt" on Sweatman by making it appear that he took wipers, essentially to test Sweatman. At his deposition, plaintiff testified that when he was confronted by Sweatman, he was actually concealing his own personal screwdriver in his jacket; that his behavior in stating that he was concealing the wiper blades was in response to harassment by Hospital supervisors other than Sweatman, with whom he previously had a good working relationship; that Sweatman should have realized this because he was "smiling" when he made the statement; and that he explained all of this to Aldrich at their meeting the day after the incident.

Sweatman's oral and written statements to Hospital employees concerning plaintiff's conduct were subject to a qualified privilege, because they were made by a person having an interest in the subject to others with a corresponding interest in furtherance of the common interest of the employer (see, Loughry v. Lincoln First Bank, 67 N.Y.2d 369, 376, 502 N.Y.S.2d 965, 494 N.E.2d 70; Licitra v. Faraldo, 130 A.D.2d 555, 515 N.Y.S.2d 289; Mock v. LaGuardia Hosp.-Hip Hosp., 117 A.D.2d 721, 722, 498 N.Y.S.2d 446). The uncontroverted evidence was that Sweatman's alleged defamatory statements were communicated to and reviewed only by a limited number of people in Hospital management. As such, Sweatman's statements are not actionable for defamation absent proof that the statements were published by defendants with malice or ill will or with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of their accuracy (see, Loughry v. Lincoln First Bank, supra, at 376, 502 N.Y.S.2d 965, 494 N.E.2d 70; Cosme v. Town of Islip, 63 N.Y.2d 908, 909, 483 N.Y.S.2d 205, 472 N.E.2d 1033; O'Rorke v. Carpenter, 55 N.Y.2d 798, 799, 447 N.Y.S.2d 434, 432 N.E.2d 136; McGovern v. Hayes, 135 A.D.2d 125, 128, 524 N.Y.S.2d 558, lv. denied 72 N.Y.2d 803, 532 N.Y.S.2d 368, 528 N.E.2d 520; Restatement [Second] of Torts §§ 599-600, 603, comment a).

Even if Sweatman's accusations of plaintiff's theft of wiper blades were false, the evidence submitted by defendants on the motion prima facie refuted any inference of malice, i.e., Sweatman's observation that plaintiff was concealing something in his jacket when leaving work; plaintiff's admission of his possession of Hospital wiper blades; and plaintiff's failure to dispel Sweatman's misapprehension of his misconduct by revealing what he was actually concealing. Under these circumstances, Sweatman and Aldrich were not obliged to accept plaintiff's exculpatory explanation the day after the incident, and no ill will or malice can be inferred from their quite rational decision not to do so. Apart from his claim that defendants showed malice in rejecting his explanation, plaintiff's other averments regarding defendants' malice are purely conclusory and, thus, are also insufficient to defeat defendants' motion for summary judgment (see, Mock v. LaGuardia Hosp.-Hip Hosp., supra, 117 A.D.2d at 722, 498 N.Y.S.2d 446). Accordingly, plaintiff's defamation action fails because of the absence of...