Rachels v. The State Of Ga.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1874
• Citation: 51 Ga. 375
• Parties: Robert L. Rachels, plaintiff in error. v. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

51 Ga. 375

Robert L. Rachels, plaintiff in error. v. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

(Atlanta, January Term, 1874.)

New trial. Criminal law. Riot. Immaterial error. Before Judge Strozer. Mitchell Superior Court. May Adjourned Term, 1873.

Rachels was jointly indicted with one John Jones for the offense of riot, alleged to have been committed on October 21st, 1871. At the November term, 1872, Jones was tried and acquitted. At the May adjourned term, 1873, when the case against Rachels was called, he moved to quash the indictment on the ground that he could not, by himself, commit a riot. The motion was overruled, and defendant excepted.

The evidence made, substantially, the following case:

On the day alleged in the indictment, defendant and Jones approached one Capers King, in the town of Camilla, and asked him why he had levied on certain cotton. Defendant said to him that he had acted like a damned rascal. Jones said that he could whip King. Defendant pulled off his coat. They both advanced in a threatening manner. King stepped back and drew his pistol. At this time one Davis interfered and stopped defendant and Jones for a moment. They both again advanced, but were kept off by the pistol of King. There was some loud talking and cursing, but no blows were stricken. One witness testified that the manner of defendant and Jones was boisterous and tumultuous. They talked somewhat louder than the usual conversational tone; could have been heard one hundred yards. The excitement collected together quite a crowd of citizens.

The jury found the defendant guilty. He moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence, and because the court erred in refusing to *quash the indictment. The motion was overruled, and the defendant excepted upon each of the grounds aforesaid.

C. O. Davis; H. Morgan, for plaintiff in error.

B. B. Bower, solicitor general, for the state.

McCay, Judge.

1. Our Code, section 4514, is in these words: "If any two or more persons, either with or without a common cause of quarrel, do an unlawful act of violence, or any other act in a violent and tumultuous manner, such persons so offending shall be guilty of a riot." Evidently here are two modes in which, under our law, a, riot may be committed. If two or more persons do any un-lawful act of violence, this is a riot; it may or may not be done in a violent and tumultuous manner. Again, if two or more persons, either with or without a common cause of quarrel, do any act in a violent and tumultuous manner, this also is a riot. Our Code makes its own definition of a riot. Whether it accords or not with the common law definition is wholly immaterial. It is enough for us that the legislature has declared the law to be so and so. It is for the courts to obey, and not to legislate. Very clearly if two join to do an illegal act of violence it is a graver offense than if done by one, and if many join in it, it is aggravated according to the number, and it is still a serious offense, though it be done in silence and order. Some of the greatest outrages of the day fill this very definition, and they are only the more heinous from the fact that they are done so coolly and deliberately that they cannot be said to be tumultuously done. We think, therefore, there was no error in the charge of the court that the defendant was guilty if he and King had jointly done an unlawful act of violence.

2. Nor was there any error in refusing to quash the indictment on the ground that Jones had been acquitted....