Racicky v. Simon, 91-197
| Decision Date | 15 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-197,91-197 |
| Citation | 831 P.2d 241 |
| Parties | C. Bud RACICKY, Appellant (Defendant), v. James A. SIMON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Dorothy D. Simon, Deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Georg Jensen, Cheyenne, for appellant.
Richard P. Boley, Boley & McKellar, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee.
Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
The principal legal question presented by this appeal is whether the buyer, under a contract for the sale of real estate, is entitled to the remedy of rescission if the buyer has completed performance and the seller is unable to perform. The issue is presented in the context of a summary judgment awarding rescission of the contract to the personal representative of the estate of the deceased buyer and providing for restitution in the total amount paid plus interest. A collateral issue presented in the brief of the personal representative is whether the amount of restitution ordered by the district court is subject to modification. That issue was not raised by a cross-appeal as required by the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. We hold rescission is available as a remedy; restitution was properly awarded by the trial court; and the amount of restitution is not subject to a change on appeal. We affirm in its entirety the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in the trial court.
C. Bud Racicky (Racicky), in his Brief of the Appellant, states the issues in this way:
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the proper relief on a breach of contract for the sale of real property was a rescission of the sale rather than an award of damages?
2. Did the District Court err in finding that there was no material issue of fact in light of the affidavit of the defendant in opposition to the motion for summary judgment?
3. Did the District Court err in granting equitable relief of rescission when damages at law were capable of being awarded?
James A. Simon, as personal representative of the Estate of Dorothy D. Simon, deceased (when appropriate, "Simon" in this opinion may refer either to the deceased or to the personal representative as a party), offers this statement of issues in the Brief of Appellee:
I. Was there a disputed issue of material fact preventing summary judgment?
II. Was appellee entitled to rescission of the contract for sale of real property?
III. Was the proper measure of damages to appellee resulting from appellant's total failure of performance of the contract for sale of real property repayment of the purchase price, plus interest, from the date of each payment to appellant?
On January 30, 1980, Racicky entered into a contract to sell 320 acres of land to Simon. The stated consideration was $144,000 to be paid in three installments: $75,000 upon execution of the contract; $34,500 plus 10% interest on January 30, 1981; and $34,500 plus 10% interest on January 30, 1982. The contract bears the notation that it was paid in full on January 30, 1982. The land was not specifically described other than its location in Sections 9 and 10, Township 15 North, Range 66 West, and encompassing 320 acres. Racicky explained that he had an understanding with Simon as to the general location of the land which was the subject of the contract and the parties understood the land description would be particularized by survey.
At the time of this contract, Racicky was buying the land, which he had agreed to convey to Simon, from a third party under a contract for deed. In September of 1985, when he had not completed his contract to purchase and, obviously, had not conveyed to Simon, Racicky sought bankruptcy relief pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1979). As a result of the bankruptcy proceeding, Racicky forfeited the contract for deed that he had entered into with the owner of the land. At that juncture, it became impossible for Racicky to perform his contract with Simon. After Simon died, her personal representative discovered the agreement; determined that the payments had been made to Racicky; and recognized a transfer of the land to Simon had not been effected.
The personal representative then brought this action against Racicky seeking rescission of the contract and restitution of the full amount of the payments made by Simon to Racicky. Racicky defended the suit, essentially by asserting that damages in a much smaller amount than the payments made by Simon was an adequate remedy under the circumstances. After the personal representative had filed a motion for summary judgment, the district court granted that motion. The relief afforded was rescission of the contract and restitution in the amount of the payments received, together with interest at 10% which was calculated from the time that Racicky's performance became impossible. The total restitution awarded was $212,267.33. It is from the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that Racicky has taken his appeal.
Racicky contends that money damages is an adequate remedy at law for breach of a contract to sell real estate, and it follows that the equitable remedy of rescission together with restitution should not have been afforded to Simon. In making this argument, Racicky concedes that Simon performed completely her obligations under the contract and acknowledges that he failed to perform because performance was impossible. It is clear that Racicky was unable to obtain title to the land that he had agreed to sell.
We recognize that the payment of money damages generally is considered an adequate remedy for a breach of contract, but this general rule does not control a situation in which the contract is one for the sale of land. In the instance of a contract for the sale of land, the legal presumption is that equitable concepts will control the resolution of the dispute. The rationale underlying this presumption is that the unique character of each individual parcel of land renders the remedy of money damages inadequate. 11 Walter H.E. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 1418A (3d ed.1968). If Racicky's argument were to be recognized and accepted, the difference between the money damages that he suggests is an appropriate award and the amount actually paid to him by Simon would result in unjust enrichment to him by more than $100,000. Obviously, the parties could not be returned to the status quo at the time the contract was made by invoking the remedy of money damages. We are satisfied that Racicky cannot enjoy the benefit of any bargain that he...
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...attack a judgment in this court. Our requirement is that a cross-appeal be perfected in order to attack the judgment." Racicky v. Simon, 831 P.2d 241, 244 (Wyo.1992). STANDARD OF [¶ 8] We will affirm a summary judgment provided there is no genuine issue of material fact and the law clearly ......
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...has a more precise meaning than merely relevant or pertinent. See Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 615 (Wyo.1993); Racicky v. Simon, 831 P.2d 241, 244 (Wyo.1992); Reoh v. Suchor Investments, Inc., 699 P.2d 284, 286-88 (Wyo.1985); Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867, 871-72 (Wyo.1975) (has legal si......
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Collins v. Finnell, 00-127.
...we will not address whether the sellers are entitled to payment of the remaining amounts owed under the contract. Racicky v. Simon, 831 P.2d 241, 244 (Wyo.1992). ...
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Millheiser v. Wallace
...Prejudgment interest has also been recognized as appropriate in certain cases dealing with the rescission of contracts. See Racicky v. Simon, 831 P.2d 241 (Wyo.1992). Upon finding conditions appropriate, courts generally employ the equitable remedy of restitution in an attempt to return the......