Rader v. Prather

• Decision Date: 05 August 1930
• Citation: 130 So. 15,100 Fla. 591
• Parties: RADER v. PRATHER et ux.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

130 So. 15

100 Fla. 591

RADER v. PRATHER et ux.

Florida Supreme Court

August 5, 1930

Commissioner's Decision.

Suit by Leo J. Rader against Walter W. Prather and wife. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the bill, complainant appeals.

Reversed and remanded. Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; W. L Freeland, Judge.

COUNSEL

Arthur S. Friedman and Whelan & Weintraub, all of Miami, for appellant.

Price Price, Kehoe & Kassewitz, of Miami, for appellees.

OPINION

DAVIS C.

In this case the appellees, on November 12, 1925, as lessors, leased certain property in Bay Vista Park, Dade county, Fla., for a term of two years, at a total rental of $1,800, payable $600 in advance for the first year and $100 per month on the 1st day of each month in advance for the second year. It was provided that the lessees should have the privilege of removing all improvements from said property at the expiration of the term, and that they should have 'an additional three-year option on the above described property at the rate of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) per year, to be paid in twelve (12) monthly installments of $333.33 each, in advance.'

The lease was assigned to the appellant, and on December 10, 1925, appellees entered into a supplemental agreement with appellant, whereby appellant was given the option to lease the premises for a period of five years next ensuing after November 12, 1930, at a rental value to be determined as therein provided. It was also agreed that the appellant should place on the property, at his expense, a concrete block building covering the entire frontage of the property, the same to conform to the requirements of the building code of the city of Miami, and to become a part of the freehold and to pass with the land at the expiration of the lease, should the option be exercised, and further that, if appellant should fail to pay the rent when due, 'such breach shall be a sufficient cause for the lessee to become, and will become a tenant at will, and the lessors may re-enter and take possession of the said property, together with all buildings and fixtures thereon.'

In addition to the foregoing facts, the bill shows that appellant erected upon the property a building at an expense to him of $12,000, and that on the 19th of September, 1926, it became so badly damaged by wind and water that he spent an additional $2,000 to make it tenantable; that appellees verbally agreed with appellant that they would not press him for rent until he could pay for said repairs, and that, because of the expense thus incurred, appellant fell behind in the payment of rent for October, November, and December, 1926; that appellees thereupon instituted suit in the county court for possession of the premises, appellant being required to appear in the cause on January 7, 1927; that on the 11th of January, 1927, appellant appeared in the cause by attorney and paid into court the total amount of rent then due and costs of said suit; and that judgment was therein afterwards entered against appellant, and he was ousted from possession of the property. The appellant prayed that the forfeiture be set aside, and that possession of the premises be restored to him, and for an accounting. The bill was filed on September 28, 1927.

The appellees demurred to the bill upon the following grounds:

'1. That there is no equity in the bill.

'2. It is apparent from the averments of the said bill and the exhibits thereto attached that the said complainant has or had a plain and adequate remedy at law.

'3. It is affirmatively shown by the averments of the said bill of complaint that complainant had breached his said contract of lease, and that these respondents were entitled to the possession of the premises mentioned and described in said bill, together with all improvements thereon.

'4. It affirmatively appears from the averments of said bill that the matters of difference between complainant and these respondents had been tried in a court of competent jurisdiction and judgment entered against complainant in this behalf for the possession of the premises and improvements thereon set forth and mentioned and described in said bill of complaint.

'5. It is apparent from the averments of said bill of complaint that all matters and things set forth and mentioned in said bill of complaint have been adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction.'

The demurrer was sustained by order of the court on January 12, 1928, and from this order appellant appealed to this court.

That forfeiture clauses are not favored in either law or equity is admitted. Baker v. Clifford-Mathew Inv. Co. (Fla.) 128 So. 827.

A court of equity has inherent power to relieve a tenant from a forfeiture of his estate because of a failure to pay rent at the time required by the terms of his lease. Sheets v. Selden, 7 Wall. 416, 421, 19 L.Ed. 166; Kann v. King, 204 U.S. 43, 27 S.Ct. 213, 51 L.Ed. 360; Abrams v. Watson, 59 Ala. 524; Charles Mulvey Mfg. Co. v. McKinney, 184 Ill.App. 476; South Penn. Oil Co. v. Edgell, 48 W.Va. 348, 37 S.E. 596, 86 Am. St. Rep. 43; Bonfils v. Ledoux (C. C. A.) 266 F. 507, 16 A. L. R. 430; Wylie v. Kirby, 115 Md. 282, 80 A. 962, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 825. And this court has held that courts of equity always mitigate forfeitures when it can be done without doing violence to the contract of the parties. McCaskill v. Union Naval Stores Co., 59 Fla. 571, 52 So. 961.

'Where a lease contains a condition that the lessor may re-enter and put an end to the lessee's estate, or even that the lease shall be void, upon the lessee's failure to pay the rent at the time specified, it is well settled that a court of equity will relieve the lessee and set aside a forfeiture incurred by his breach of the condition, whether the lessor has or has not entered and dispossessed the tenant. This rule is based upon the notion that such condition and forfeiture are intended merely as a security for the payment of money.' 1 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) § 453. See, also, Gordon v. Richardson, 185 Mass. 492, 70 N.E. 1027, 69 L. R. A. 867.

In 10 R. C. L. 334, the authors say:

'The jurisdiction of equity to relieve from forfeitures seems to have been invoked most frequently in favor of defaulting lessees. If a lease provides that on the failure of the lessee to pay the rent at the specified time the lease shall be void, or the lessor may reenter and declare the lease at an end, equity will ordinarily intervene to relieve the lessee, and set aside the forfeiture. And this will be done whether the lessee has been dispossessed by the lessor or not. This doctrine is based on the principle that in all cases where the penalty or forfeiture is designed to secure the payment of a certain sum of money, a court of equity will grant relief on the payment of the money secured with interest, also that such covenants in leases are intended merely as security for the payment of money, and therefore the money being paid the purpose of the forfeiture is gone.'

In Sheets v. Selden, supra, the court said:

'The grounds upon which a court of equity proceeds are, that the rent is the object of the parties, and the forfeiture only an incident intended to secure its payment; that the measure of damages is fixed and certain, and that when the principal and interest are paid the compensation is complete. In respect to other covenants pertaining to leasehold estates, where the elements of fraud, accident, and mistake are wanting, and the measure of compensation is uncertain, equity will not interfere.'

Indeed it is generally held that equity will relieve against the forfeiture of a lease for the nonpayment of rent whenever it is just and equitable to do so; the only...