Radford v. Utah Dep't of Commerce

• Decision Date: 19 March 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:11-cv-00997-EJF
• Parties: CRAIG RADFORD, Plaintiff, v. UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

CRAIG RADFORD, Plaintiff,

v. UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,a political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant.

Case No. 2:11-cv-00997-EJF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

DATED: March 19, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Magistrate Judge Evelyn J. Furse

Plaintiff Craig Radford brought this action against the Utah Department of Commerce (the "Department") alleging causes of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The Department moved this Court to dismiss Mr. Radford's Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and mootness, and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which this Court can grant relief. In the alternative, the Department seeks an order directing Mr. Radford to provide a more definite statement of his claims under Rule 12(e).

The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the undersigned Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. section 636(c). (Docket No. 14.) The Court has read the Motion and Memoranda submitted for and against Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or for More Definite Statement (Docket No. 17) and GRANTS that Motion.¹ Mr. Radford's Complaint fails to allegethat he qualified for participation in the program at issue in spite of his disability: specifically, the lien brought against Mr. Radford initially did not qualify for the state program because it did not pertain to materials used in the renovation of Mr. Radford's home. Hence, Mr. Radford fails to state a claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. The Court must therefore DISMISS his Complaint. The Court DENIES the Motion for a More Definite Statement because the facts alleged make pleading a claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act impossible.

LEGAL STANDARD

To withstand a motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must have enough allegations of fact, taken as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While "a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint," this rule does not apply to legal conclusions. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "[A] plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim." Id. (citation omitted). A complaint survives only if it "states a plausible claim for relief." Id. (citation omitted).

A challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) may take one of two forms. First, a party may bring a facial attack, which "looks only to the factual allegations of the complaint in challenging the court's jurisdiction." Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010). Second, a party may bring a factual attack, which "goes beyond the factual allegations of the complaint and presents evidence in the form of affidavits or otherwise to challenge the court's jurisdiction." Id. (citation omitted). Because the Department makes a facial attack, the same standard applies toDefendant's 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) attacks. Id.; M.A.C. v. Betit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304 (D. Utah 2003).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND²

Plaintiff Craig Radford is deaf and communicates using American Sign Language. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Mr. Radford contracted for work on his home and paid the contractor for the work. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) A payment dispute arose between one of the subcontractors and that subcontractor's supplier. (Id. ¶ 15.) The supplier placed a lien on Mr. Radford's home. (Id. ¶ 15.) Although the contractor assured Mr. Radford that it had taken care of the lien, Mr. Radford later faced a default judgment in favor of the supplier because he had not resolved the lien. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.)

Mr. Radford applied for a Certificate of Compliance³ under the Utah Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act (the "Lien Recovery Fund Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-11-101 to -302, in order to settle the lien, but the Lien Recovery Fund told Mr. Radford his application was incomplete. (Id. ¶ 20.) Mr. Radford attempted to cure his application but could not understand what additional information he needed to include. (Id. ¶ 20.) In early August 2009, Mr. Radford met with a representative of the Lien Recovery Fund to remedy his defective application. (Id. ¶ 21.) Mr. Radford requested the Lien Recovery Fund have an American Sign Language interpreter present at the meeting, but no interpreter came. (Id. ¶ 21.) Soon thereafter, the Lien Recovery Fund sent Mr. Radford a letter denying his claim. (Id. ¶ 21.)

Mr. Radford hired an attorney to assist him by explaining his need for an American Sign Language interpreter to the Lien Recovery Fund. (Id. ¶ 22.) In December 2009, the Lien Recovery Fund dismissed its denial of Mr. Radford's application and agreed to hold another meeting with Mr. Radford—this time with an interpreter present, on the condition Mr. Radford give two weeks written notice. (Id. ¶ 22.) Mr. Radford requested such a meeting but received notice from the Lien Recovery Fund that it could not schedule the meeting at that time due to a back-log of cases. (Id. ¶ 23.) This January 2010 notice also promised the Lien Recovery Fund would schedule a meeting before Mr. Radford's case went up for review. (Id. ¶ 23.)

In April 2010—before the Lien Recovery Fund scheduled any meeting—Mr. Radford paid $7,868.00 to the supplier's attorney to satisfy the lien and thus avoid a sheriff's sale. (Id. ¶ 24.) In August 2010, Mr. Radford's attorney received another notice from the Lien Recovery Fund that Mr. Radford's application was incomplete. (Id. ¶ 25.) The Residence Lien Recovery Fund Advisory Board (the "Board") later considered and rejected Mr. Radford's application because information from the supplier showed the supplier had not actually used the materials giving rise to the lien on Mr. Radford's home. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 26.) The supplier eventually stipulated to vacate its judgment on the lien. (Id. ¶ 29.)

DISCUSSION

A. ADA Claims & Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity

Under the Eleventh Amendment, states have immunity from "any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted . . . by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. This grant of immunity also extends to unconsented suits brought by a state's own citizens. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (citations omitted). "'[A]rms' of a state may assert the Eleventh Amendment as a defenseto suit in federal court."⁴ Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Congress may, however, abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004).

The Supreme Court, in United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), "explained the procedure by which courts should address Title II cases brought against states." Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1035 (10th Cir. 2006) (Guttman III)⁵ Under Georgia's procedural roadmap, a court must:

[D]etermine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the State's alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.

546 U.S. at 159. The first step under Georgia requires this Court "identify the state's conduct that allegedly violated Title II's prohibition against disability discrimination in the provision of state services or programs." Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101, 1113 (10th Cir. 2012) (Guttman V). The Tenth Circuit has clarified that this first step requires this Court first to determine whether Mr. Radford states a valid claim under Title II before determining "whether Congress abrogated sovereign immunity as applied to the class of conduct at issue in this case." GuttmanIII, 446 F.3d at 1035-36 (citation omitted).⁶ Following that instruction, the Court now addresses whether Mr. Radford validly states any claims under Title II.

B. Mr. Radford Cannot State a Valid Claim Under Title II

Title II of the ADA states "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) that he [or she] is a qualified individual with a disability;

(2) that he [or she] was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity;⁷ and

(3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability.

Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, theremoval of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).

The parties do not dispute Mr. Radford, who is deaf, has a disability under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)-(2). But the parties do dispute...