Radovich's Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 15 March 1957
• Parties: ESTATE of Jack R. RADOVICH, etc., Deceased. Robert C. KIRKWOOD, as State Controller, Appellant, v. CITIZENS NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK OF LOS ANGELES, and George Radovich, Respondents. L. A. 24034.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 14

308 P.2d 14

48 Cal.2d 116

ESTATE of Jack R. RADOVICH, etc., Deceased Robert C. KIRKWOOD, as State Controller, Appellant, v. CITIZENS NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK OF LOS ANGELES, and George Radovich, Respondents.

L. A. 24034.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

March 15, 1957.

Rehearing Denied April 10, 1957.

James W. Hickey, Chief Inheritance Tax Atty., Sacramento, Walter H. Miller, Chief Asst. Inheritance Tax Atty., Los Angeles, William R. Elam, Los Angeles, and Milton A. Huot, Asst. Inheritance Tax Attys., Sacramento, for appellant.

Louis Thomas Hiller, Nat Wilk, Los Angeles, Scudder & Forde and George A. Forde, Pacific Palisades, for respondents.

CARTER, Justice.

This is an appeal by the Controller of the State of California from a judgment of the superior court, sitting in probate, which sustained respondent George Radovich's objections to the report of the inheritance tax appraiser and which fixed the inheritance tax on the estate of Jack R. Radovich, deceased.

The facts are not in dispute.

In 1934, when George Vukoye (now legally known as George Radovich) was 17 years of age, his natural parents entered into an oral agreement with the decedent, Jack R. Radovich, whereby George was to live with Jack who promised that he would consider George his son and would adopt him. George lived with Jack until Jack's death in October, 1953, changed his name to George Radovich and was publicly acknowledged by Jack as his son and the heir to his estate. During the time George lived with Jack, he worked in Jack's liquor store, conducted himself as a natural child and considered himself the son of Jack. Jack died intestate without having narried or leaving issue of his body. He left no father or mother surviving him but did leave some blood relatives in Yugoslavia. ¹ Jack had not, during his lifetime, instituted formal proceedings for the adoption of George.

On the death of Jack, the Citizens National Trust and Savings Bank of Los Angeles and Novak D. Novcic, a nephew of the decedent, were appointed as coadministrators of Jack's estate. On June 14, 1954, George filed a petition in the probate proceeding to determine his heirship in the estate of Jack. After a hearing, Judge John Gee Clark made findings (which included the facts heretofore set forth) and concluded that 'George Radovich occupies in equity the equitable status of an adopted son and by reason thereof is entitled to distribution of all of the Estate of the decedent.' A decree was then entered on the findings of fact to the effect that George had the equitable status of an adopted son of the decedent and was entitled to all of the estate (with the exception of the sum transferred to the relatives in Yugoslavia). Although the heirship proceeding was contested no appeal was taken and that decree is now final.

Subsequent to the decree of the probate court, an inheritance tax appraiser was appointed who filed his report claiming that George Radovich was a stranger in blood to the decedent and that he should be allowed a specific exemption of $50 as a Class D transferee and computing the inheritance tax due at the rate of a stranger under sections 13310 and 13407 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The bank, Novak Novcic, and George filed objections to the report of the inheritance tax appraiser under section 14510 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. A hearing was had before Judge Hansen who filed findings of fact, conclusions of law and a memorandum opinion and signed a judgment determining that George was a Class A transferee (adopted child). This appeal followed that judgment.

The only question involved here and one which is of first impression in this state is whether under the facts presented George is a Class A transferee. Section 13307 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provides that a Class A transferee is '(b) A transferee whose relationship to the decedent is that of a child adopted by the decedent in conformity with the laws of this State, provided such child was under the age of 21 years at the time of such adoption.'

It is contended by appellant that since George was not adopted in conformity with the statutory requirements of this state that he takes as a stranger and only because of the contract made by his natural parents with the decedent. Respondents contend that the heirship proceeding in which it was declared that George was, in equity, the adopted son of the decedent is a final judgment in rem which is binding on the appellant and all others. It is also argued by respondents that the words of the statute 'adopted by the decedent in conformity with the laws of this state' (emphasis added) should be construed to mean not only in conformity with the statutory law of this state but the law as set forth by a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction. Respondents also argue that George took the money by inheritance; that a stranger may not inherit; that it was only by reason of his inheritance that George is subject to an inheritance tax.

This court has held In re Estate of Wise, 34 Cal.2d 376, 210 P.2d 497, 502, that the jurisdiction of the probate court is a jurisdiction in rem; that an heirship proceeding is not an ordinary civil action, but a specialized proceeding in rem. The res is the right of heirship and distribution and as to that issue the decree is binding on the whole world. We said there that 'So it has been said that such heirship 'decree (is) conclusive against all persons' as the 'basis for the decree of distribution which (is) to follow', In re Estate of Blythe, 110 Cal. 231, 234, 42 P. 643, 644; it settles 'the rights of all persons claiming as heirs of the decedent, whether or not they are named in the complaint or personally served with summons', Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 307, 88 P. 356, 359, 8 L.R.A., N.S., 682, 119 Am.St.Rep. 199 * * *. The decree is not one 'in personam in favor of one of the parties against another.' Edlund v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. 690, 695, 289 P. 841, 843. Rather, as founded in a specialized proceeding in rem 'not against persons as such, but against or upon the thing or subject matter itself' the decree, when rendered, 'is a solemn declaration of the status of the thing, and ipso facto renders it what the (decree) declares it to be.' 11A Cal.Jur. sec. 73, p. 135, and cases there cited. While it may 'not be questioned that justice and sound policy require that the estates of decedents be distributed to persons rightfully entitled thereto, and that every concern and endeavor of a probate court should be to the accomplishment of that purpose', that does not mean that a 'valid decree' determinative of rights 'of distribution * * * when once final, may be disturbed at the behest of any rightful claimant, known or unknown, when the decree was rendered, for it is the wellsettled policy of the law to preserve the inviolability of final judgments and decrees of courts of law and equity, and a valid decree of a court of probate partakes of the nature of such judgments.' Edlund v. Superior Court, supra, 209 Cal. 690, 695, 289 P. 841.' (See, also, 29 Cal.Jur.2d § 294, p. 273.)

Section 1908, subd. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the effect of a judgment or final order is as follows: 'In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a decedent, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will, or administration, or the condition or relation of the person.' In Abels v. Frey, 126 Cal.App. 48, 53, 14 P.2d 594, 596, it was held: 'The jurisdiction of the probate court is a jurisdiction in rem, the res being the estate of the decedent, which is to be administered and distributed with regard to the rights of creditors, devisees, legatees, and all the world. Warren v. Ellis, 39 Cal.App. 542, 179 P. 544; Nicholson v. Leatham, 28 Cal.App. 597, 153 P. 965, 155 P. 98. By giving the notice prescribed by the statute, the entire world is called before the court, and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons for the purpose of determining their rights to any portion of the estate, and every person who may assert any right or interest therein is required to present his claim to the court for its determination. Whether he appears and presents his claim, or fails to appear, the action of the court is equally conclusive upon him, "subject only to be(ing) reversed, set aside, or modified on appeal". The decree is as binding upon him if he fails to appear and present his claim, as if his claim, after presentation, had been disallowed by the court. William Hill Co. v. Lawler, 116 Cal. 359, 48 P. 323; Mulcahey v. Dow, 131 Cal. 73, 63 P. 158; Hanley v. Hanley, supra (114 Cal. 690, 46 P. 736).' (See also, Bath v. Valdez, 70 Cal. 350, 361, 11 P. 724; Barnard v. Wilson, 74 Cal. 512, 516, 16 P. 307; Howell v. Budd, 91 Cal. 342, 349, 350, 27 P. 747.

In the heirship proceedings, it was adjudged that George was entitled to inherit all of Jack's estate, and for the purposes of probating the estate he was adjudged to be in equity 'an adopted son.' That determination has long since become final.

In Re Estate of Bloom, 213 Cal. 575, 580, 2 P.2d 753, it was held that the tax imposed by the Inheritance Tax Law is on the right to succeed to the property of the estate, rather than upon the porperty itself. In re Estate of Letchworth, 201 Cal. 1, 225 P. 195. The heirship decree adjudging that George was, in equity, the adopted son of Jack, and therefore entitled to succeed to his property, as an heir, was the basis for the imposition of the inheritance tax. Inasmuch as George takes Jack's estate only by reason of the adjudication of his status as Jack's adopted son and heir, it appears that appellant may not claim that he inherits as a stranger. The...