Radtke v. Lifecare Mgmt. Partners

• Decision Date: 28 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–7079.,14–7079.
• Citation: 795 F.3d 159
• Parties: Kathy RADTKE and Carmen Cunningham, Appellees v. LIFECARE MANAGEMENT PARTNERS and Advanta Medical Solutions, LLC, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

795 F.3d 159

Kathy RADTKE and Carmen Cunningham, Appellees

v.LIFECARE MANAGEMENT PARTNERS and Advanta Medical Solutions, LLC, Appellants.

No. 14–7079.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued April 23, 2015.

Decided July 28, 2015.

Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 10, 2015.

Alan Lescht, argued the cause and filed the briefs, for appellants.

S. Micah Salb, argued the cause, for appellees. With him on the brief was Dennis Chong.

Before: MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge:

Appellees, medical records coders employed by appellants, brought this action against their employers for unlawfully failing to pay overtime pay. Appellees prevailed in a jury verdict that found they were not exempt from overtime pay. The district court denied defendant-appellants' motions for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, and to alter or amend the judgment. Appellants brought the present appeal, contending that no reasonable jury could have found appellees not to be exempt, and that errors by the court require a new trial. Finding no merit in appellants' arguments, we affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons more fully set forth below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-appellees Kathy Radtke and Carmen Cunningham were employed as medical records coders by defendant-appellants. Appellees brought the present action against their former employers. Although the complaint and a subsequent amended complaint asserted multiple theories of relief, as relevant to the present appeal, plaintiffs asserted that defendants had failed to pay them compensation at the rate of one and a half times their normal pay for work in excess of forty hours per week, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)et seq.¹ Defendants contended that plaintiffs were exempt from the requirement to pay overtime pay under the administrative and professional exemptions defined in 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 and § 541.300.

This case came on for trial before a judge and jury. Plaintiffs offered testimonial and documentary evidence to support the proposition that they had worked beyond forty hours per week and not been paid at time and a half. Defendants offered evidence and arguments to the effect that plaintiffs were exempt from the statutory enhancement and offered descriptions of the employees' duties, which defendants contended were consistent with administrative and professional employment as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 and § 541.300, so that they would be exempt from the statutory requirement for payment of the enhanced wages.

The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., “ordinarily requires employers to pay employees time-and-one-half for hours worked beyond forty per week unless the employees are exempt.” Robinson– Smith v. GEICO, 590 F.3d 886, 888 (D.C.Cir.2010) ; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 213. Relevant to this case, an employer is not required to pay overtime to exempt “administrative” and “professional” employees. An employee falls under the administrative exemption if her compensation is high enough (not in dispute in this case), her “primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer's customers,” and her “primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a). An employee falls under the professional exemption if her compensation is high enough (not in dispute in this case), and her “primary duty is the performance of work ... [r]equiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction; or ... [r]equiring invention, imagination, originality or talent in a recognized field of artistic or creative endeavor.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.300(a). The employer bears the burden of establishing that its employee falls within a recognized overtime exemption. See Robinson– Smith, 590 F.3d at 891.

DISCUSSION

Appellants' main line of argument is that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, notwithstanding the verdict. Appellants rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which provides that, “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue,” the trial court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party on that issue. While we review the district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 570 F.3d 305, 311 (D.C.Cir.2009), “[w]e do not ... lightly disturb a jury verdict. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women could not have reached a verdict in plaintiff's favor,” Muldrow v. Re–Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 165 (D.C.Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This court must resolve all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor and “cannot substitute its view for that of the jury, and can assess neither the credibility nor weight of the evidence.” Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 753 (D.C.Cir.1996).

As to appellants' alternate argument that the district court erred in denying their motion for a new trial, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1) provides in relevant part that “[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues ... after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” “We review the district court's denial of [a] motion for a new trial ‘only for an abuse of discretion.’ ” Muldrow, 493 F.3d at 166 (quoting Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 443 (D.C.Cir.2000) ). “When the district court denies a motion for new trial, our scope of review is particularly narrow because the trial court's decision accords with the jury's.” Hutchinson v. Stuckey, 952 F.2d 1418, 1420 (D.C.Cir.1992) (emphasis in original). “In reviewing for an abuse of discretion, the Court considers ‘whether the decision maker failed to consider a relevant factor, whether [the decision maker] relied on an improper factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support the conclusion.’ ” Peyton v. DiMaro, 287 F.3d 1121, 1126 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1278 (D.C.Cir.1995) ).

A. Defendant—Appellants' Argument for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Appellants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as no reasonable jury could have come to the conclusion that Radtke and Cunningham were non-exempt based on the evidence adduced at trial. Appellants contend that “Ms. Radtke's and Ms. Cunningham's statements in their resumes, job applications and emails demonstrate that their jobs fell within the administrative exemption and that they were not simply looking up codes in a book.” Appellants' Br. 23. Appellants argue that Cunningham was exempt under the administrative exemption because Cunningham “supervised between 9 and 22 coders, ... provided training as well as feedback to physicians regarding documentation and coding,” id. at 24, and worked independently to evaluate and revamp the coding procedures of Walter Reed Medical Center, id. at 25–26. Appellants similarly argue that Radtke fell under the administrative exemption because “she was responsible for educating physicians and other clinicians and proper coding of visits, procedures and diagnoses,” id. at 27, and worked independently on projects such as creating a “new super bill for the doctors,” a document that “codifies the most typical diagnoses and procedures that a group of practitioners is handling so the provider can easily find the code,” id. at 28.

Appellees respond that the majority of their work, their “primary duties,” entailed simply medical records coding. Coding does not require independent judgment; the relevant codes and descriptions are all specified in manuals. Informing physicians and other professionals how to code properly does not require the exercise of discretion and independent judgment in matters of significance. See Appellees' Br. 23. And even if some of Radtke and Cunningham's time was spent on matters involving the exercise of discretion and independent judgment, appellants have not shown that these tasks constituted their “primary duties.” Id. at 24.

Appellees introduced time cards showing that they spent most of their time coding. Cunningham spent 75% of her time coding medical records, Radtke 92% of her time. Id. at 21. The time spent by an employee on various tasks is a useful guide in determining an employee's “primary duty.” Maestas v. Day & Zimmerman, LLC, 664 F.3d 822, 827 (10th Cir.2012). A relevant regulation provides, “employees who spend more than 50 percent of their time performing exempt work will generally satisfy the primary duty requirement.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(b).

Appellants contend that these time records do not support the jury's verdict because “ ‘a number of different functions ... were characterized under the rubric of coding.’ ” Appellants' Br. 30 (quoting testimony of defendant Maria Caschetta). Further, appellants point to Robinson– Smith, 590 F.3d at 894, for the proposition that an employee may still fall within the administrative exemption even if the employee spent the majority of her time engaged in non-exempt work. Appellants maintain that the time cards do not undermine the other evidence (adduced by appellees' testimony, resumes, internal communications, etc.), which overwhelmingly shows that the appellees fall under the administrative exemption.

Appellants further argue that...