Radwan v. Radwan
| Decision Date | 23 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 108649,108649 |
| Citation | 2020 Ohio 1613,154 N.E.3d 258 |
| Parties | Amina Ahmed RADWAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ahmed Loutfy RADWAN, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., Joseph G. Stafford, and Nicole A. Cruz, for appellant.
Coyne Stahl Jansen L.L.C., Richard J. Stahl, III and Edward R. Jansen, for appellee.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
{¶1} Appellant Amina Ahmed Radwan appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, that dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Upon review, we find that the trial court does have subject-matter jurisdiction in this case and that the trial court erred in granting appellee Ahmed L. Radwan's motion to dismiss. We reverse the trial court's decision and remand the case for further proceedings on the merits of the action.
{¶2} Amina and Ahmed were married in 1974. During their marriage, the parties purchased a residence and resided in Strongsville, Ohio. In 2014, after 40 years of marriage, Ahmed moved to Texas while Amina continued to reside in Ohio. Ahmed filed a petition for divorce in Texas in February 2015, and Amina filed a complaint for divorce in Ohio in August 2015.
{¶3} In the Texas case, No. 275,695-E, 426th Judicial District, Bell County, Texas, the court issued a final decree of divorce on November 17, 2015, granting the divorce and dissolving the marriage. The Texas court found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Amina, and it did not issue any orders regarding the marital estate or spousal support.
{¶4} In the initial Ohio case, Cuyahoga County C.P. No. DR-15-358277, the court issued an order for temporary support on September 20, 2017. On September 25, 2017, Amina filed a second complaint for divorce in Ohio, Cuyahoga County C.P. No. DR-17-388933. The initial Ohio case was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to an agreed judgment entry in which the parties acknowledged that all prior pleadings, claims, motions, and orders from the prior case would carry forward and remain in full force and effect.
{¶5} After trial dates were set in the Ohio divorce proceeding, Ahmed filed a complaint for writ of prohibition in State ex rel. Radwan v. Jones , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108462, 2019 WL 4134018 (dismissed Aug. 28, 2019), and the trial court stayed the underlying proceeding. Because the trial court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying case, Ahmed filed a limited motion to lift the stay and a limited motion to dismiss the divorce action, claiming that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the marriage had been terminated by the Texas court.
{¶6} On June 5, 2019, the trial court lifted the stay and granted Ahmed's limited motion to dismiss. The trial court found that the parties had previously divorced in Texas and that the action must be dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(H)(3) because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶7} Amina timely appealed the trial court's decision.
{¶8} Amina raises two assignments of error for our review. She claims that the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss and by failing to provide her an opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss after lifting the stay order.
{¶9} The trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(H)(3) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Civ.R. 12(H)(3) provides that "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." It is well recognized that "[t]he issue of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and therefore can be raised at any time during the proceedings." Byard v. Byler , 74 Ohio St.3d 294, 296, 1996-Ohio-163, 658 N.E.2d 735, citing Civ.R. 12(H)(3). "A court's subject-matter jurisdiction ‘connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits.’ " State ex rel. Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose , 156 Ohio St.3d 425, 2019-Ohio-1329, 128 N.E.3d 209, ¶ 10, quoting Morrison v. Steiner , 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus. We review a trial court's decision to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Assn. of Cleveland Firefighters v. Cleveland , 2015-Ohio-1538, 31 N.E.3d 1285, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.).
{¶10} Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution mandates that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." "Ohio courts are required to recognize the validity of a foreign judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Wyatt v. Wyatt , 65 Ohio St.3d 268, 269, 602 N.E.2d 1166 (1992), citing Durfee v. Duke , 375 U.S. 106, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963).
{¶11} In this case, after finding that the parties had already been divorced in Texas, the trial court determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying case. However, under the circumstances herein, full faith and credit to the Texas decree of divorce was required only insofar as it effectively dissolved the marital relationship of the parties. Because the Texas court did not have personal jurisdiction over Amina, it did not adjudicate the division of property or spousal support. Therefore, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over those matters and we must reverse its decision to dismiss the action.
{¶12} We recognize the trial court's reliance on Civ.R. 12(H)(3) would under normal circumstances have properly ended this case. This case presented the trial court with a unique and unusual process not normally seen in the typical divorce action. It is understandable how the trial court concluded there was a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we must more closely examine the concept of a divisible divorce, which results in our conclusion to reverse the decision of the trial court.
{¶13} In Estin v. Estin , 334 U.S. 541, 549, 68 S.Ct. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561 (1948), and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt , 354 U.S. 416, 418-419, 77 S.Ct. 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d 1456 (1957), the United States Supreme Court recognized the concept of divisible divorce, under which an ex parte divorce decree issued by a court that does not have personal jurisdiction over one spouse, is only effective insofar as it affects marital status, and is ineffective and not entitled to full faith and credit on extinguishing personal rights or obligations, such as spousal support. In Estin , the Court stated that "the result in this situation is to make the divorce divisible — to give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony." Id. at 549, 68 S.Ct. 1213. In Vanderbilt , the Court recognized that it was not material that "the wife's right to support had not been reduced to judgment prior to the husband's ex parte divorce" and that "[s]ince the wife was not subject to its jurisdiction, the Nevada divorce court had no power to extinguish any right which she had under the law of New York to financial support from her husband." Vanderbilt at 418, 77 S.Ct. 1360.
{¶14} Many states, including Ohio, have recognized the concept of divisible divorce. E.g. , Collins v. Collins , 165 Ohio App.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-181, 844 N.E.2d 910, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.) (); Walker v. Walker , 10 Haw.App. 361, 366-367, 873 P.2d 114, 116-117 (1994) ; Woods v. Woods , 285 Ark. 175, 178, 686 S.W.2d 387, 389 (1985) ; White v. White , 83 Ariz. 305, 307-308, 320 P.2d 702, 703-704 (1958) ; Hudson v. Hudson , 52 Cal.2d 735, 740, 344 P.2d 295, 297 (1959) (); Armstrong v. Armstrong , 162 Ohio St. 406, 406-411, 123 N.E.2d 267 (1954), aff'd , 350 U.S. 568, 76 S.Ct. 629, 100 L.Ed. 705 (1956) (); see also 24 American Jurisprudence 2d, Divorce and Separation, Section 179.
{¶15} In Armstrong , the United States Supreme Court affirmed an Ohio court's award of alimony to a wife in a divorce action in which full faith and credit was given to an ex parte divorce decree issued by a Florida court, which did not adjudicate the wife's right to alimony. Armstrong v. Armstrong , 350 U.S. 568, 568-569, 76 S.Ct. 629, 100 L.Ed. 705 (1956). The court stated as follows:
There was a valid decree in Florida dissolving the bonds of matrimony. There was no decree as to alimony. Ohio had personal service on both parties in a suit for divorce and alimony brought there by Mrs. Armstrong. The court denied her a decree of divorce because Florida had already dissolved the bonds of matrimony. The Ohio court found that, but for the decree in Florida, Mrs. Armstrong had established grounds...
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