Rafferty v. Finstad
| Decision Date | 18 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-93-01079-CV,01-93-01079-CV |
| Citation | 903 S.W.2d 374 |
| Parties | Kathleen RAFFERTY, Appellant, v. Harold FINSTAD, Appellee. (1st Dist.) |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Shawn Casey, Houston, for appellant.
Robert Piro, Houston, for appellee.
Before OLIVER-PARROTT, C.J., and MIRABAL and O'CONNOR, JJ.
This is an appeal from a final divorce decree entered on August 12, 1993, after a trial to the bench. The divorce was filed by the appellee, Harold Finstad. Appellant, Kathleen Rafferty, cross-filed for divorce. Kathleen appeals the trial court's division of the community property and the trial court's refusal to enforce certain agreed temporary orders. We affirm.
The parties had been married for 12 years when Harold filed for divorce on the grounds of insupportability. Kathleen cross-filed, alleging insupportability and cruelty. After a bench trial, the court granted Harold a divorce based on insupportability, and divided the community estate. At Kathleen's request, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law. Kathleen then timely requested additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court failed to make. In five points of error, Kathleen challenges (1) the court's failure to file additional findings of fact and conclusions of law; (2) the court's failure to grant Kathleen reimbursement for allegedly fraudulent transfers by Harold; (3) the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's partition; (4) the court's dissolution of an agreed temporary injunction; and (5) the trial court's failure to grant Kathleen a hearing on her motion for contempt.
First point of error
The court made the following findings of fact:
1. The residency requirements of the Family Code have been met.
2. There is discord and a conflict of personalities such as to make further living together insupportable.
3. No children were born of this marriage and none is expected.
4. Petitioner brought separate property into the marriage which, while he was unable to trace it into existing assets, was used by the parties during the marriage.
5. Gambling was part of the life style [sic] of the parties both before their marriage and thereafter.
6. The earnings of the Respondent from her employment as a nurse were converted to cash and the use of that cash by the Respondent was not satisfactorily explained.
The trial court also made the following conclusions of law:
1. The equitable claims for reimbursement of both parties were taken into account and considered.
2. The property division was based on the evidence and such permissible factors as the evidence raised and is fair and equitable to both parties.
Kathleen requested 21 additional findings of fact and eight additional conclusions of law, all of which the trial court declined to make. In her first point of error, Kathleen argues that the trial court erred when it failed to make these additional findings and conclusions.
Kathleen's proposed findings seven through 15, 17, 18, 24, and 25 requested that the court recognize specific transfers by Harold. Proposed finding number 16 was that Kathleen invested her separate property in the parties' prior residence. Proposed finding number 19 was that Harold's earning capacity was four times that of Kathleen. Proposed findings 20 through 23 related to the temporary orders, and proposed findings 26 and 27 addressed Harold's cruel treatment toward Kathleen.
Kathleen's proposed conclusions of law three through seven state that Kathleen was not entitled to reimbursement for community funds paid by Harold, or for separate funds used by Kathleen to purchase the parties' prior residence. Proposed conclusion number eight states that Kathleen was not entitled to a hearing on her motion for enforcement of the temporary orders. Proposed conclusions numbers nine and 10 state that Kathleen was not entitled to a disproportionate split of the community estate based on fraud or disparity of income.
TEX.R.CIV.P. 298 requires additional findings of fact and conclusions of law only if they relate to "ultimate or controlling issues." Associated Tel. Directory Publishers v. Five D's Publishing Co., 849 S.W.2d 894, 901 (Tex.App.--Austin 1993, no writ); Dura-Stilts Co. v. Zachry, 697 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The trial court is not required to make findings that are unsupported in the record, that relate merely to evidentiary matters, or that are contrary to other previous findings. Simmons v. Compania Financiera Libano, S.A., 830 S.W.2d 789, 791-92 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Dura-Stilts, 697 S.W.2d at 661; Wallace v. Wallace, 623 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.). If a party makes a request for additional findings and conclusions and the trial court fails to make such findings, its failure is tantamount to a refusal. Stretcher v. Gregg, 542 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1976, no writ).
In a case of property division, the ultimate and controlling issue is whether the trial court divided the property in a "just and right manner" pursuant to TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1993). Finch v. Finch, 825 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Carter v. Carter, 736 S.W.2d 775, 781 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Lettieri v. Lettieri, 654 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd w.o.j.). This Court has repeatedly held that the value of specific property is not an ultimate issue, and therefore need not be set out in findings of fact. Finch, 825 S.W.2d at 221; Wallace, 623 S.W.2d at 725. Similarly, issues such as whether Harold conveyed certain items of property, the relative earning capacities of the parties, whether Kathleen invested her separate property in the community residence, or whether Harold was cruel, were issues which the trial court was entitled to consider, but which were merely evidentiary and would not have determined the ultimate, controlling issue of whether the partition was "just and right." We overrule Kathleen's first point of error.
Second point of error
In her second point of error, Kathleen challenges the trial court's failure to grant Kathleen reimbursement for funds that Kathleen alleges Harold dissipated in fraud of Kathleen's community property rights. The trial court has broad discretion in determining a just and right division, and on appeal, the trial court's division will be overturned only upon a clear showing of abuse. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex.1981); Humble v. Humble, 805 S.W.2d 558, 562-63 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1991, writ denied). To put it differently, in reviewing the trial court's judgment for abuse of discretion, we must determine whether the trial court acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner. Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.1991).
Kathleen failed to plead fraud below. See TEX.R.CIV.P. 94; Adams v. Tri-Continental Leasing Corp., 713 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1986, no writ). Moreover, when Kathleen attempted to introduce evidence of fraud, Harold's objection was sustained, and Kathleen does not complain about this ruling on appeal. Thus, Kathleen has preserved nothing for review. The trial court's conclusions of law noted that the parties' equitable claims for reimbursement had been considered. While Kathleen's motion for additional findings of fact requested that the trial court further explain how her reimbursement claim was factored into the final award, the court was not required to do so. See Dura-Stilts, 697 S.W.2d at 661. Finally, in the trial court's rendition of judgment, the judge addressed Harold's conveyances to his children, charging him with liability for any attorney's fees incurred in a lawsuit owned by the community. We overrule Kathleen's second point of error.
Third point of error
Kathleen also challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's partition. Kathleen's position appears to be that she proved as a matter of law that she was entitled to a disproportionate share of the community estate, and that the court's partition was against the great weight of the evidence.
Although her point of error purports to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, her argument actually challenges the court's discretion in dividing the community estate the way it did. Her point of error challenges findings of fact numbers 4, 5, and 6:
4. Petitioner brought separate property into the marriage which, while he was unable to trace it into existing assets, was used by the parties during the marriage.
5. Gambling was part of the life style [sic] of the parties both before their marriage and thereafter.
6. The earnings of the Respondent from her employment as a nurse were converted to cash and the use of that cash by the Respondent was not satisfactorily explained.
In her argument supporting this point of error, however, Kathleen claims that the trial court erred by failing to award her a disproportionate share of the community estate based on disparity of earning power, wasting of assets, gifts to or by a spouse during the marriage, and reimbursement. Kathleen's argument is more akin to an abuse of discretion challenge, and will be addressed accordingly.
The Texas Family Code gives the trial court wide discretion in dividing the community estate. Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 460 (Tex.1982). We will not disturb the trial court's exercise of discretion without a clear showing of abuse. Patt v. Patt, 689 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). The trial court's discretion is not boundless, however, and the property division must not be so disproportionate as to be inequitable. Smith v. Smith, 836 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ). It is not an abuse of...
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