Raffone v. Stack
| Decision Date | 01 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. N-76-115. |
| Citation | 425 F. Supp. 345 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Salvatore J. RAFFONE a/k/a Joseph Louis Rossi v. Edward J. STACK, Sheriff of Broward County, Florida. |
Robert S. McCain, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., for petitioners.
Richard J. Registro, Asst. State's Atty., Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., for respondent.
This petition for a writ of habeas corpus was transferred from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida so that this Court might consider the propriety of hearing petitioner's claims: (1) that Connecticut has failed to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him to trial, see Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969), and (2) that taking into account (a) the length of and reasons for the delay between indictment and trial, (b) his efforts to assert his right to trial, and (c) prejudice to him, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the state criminal charges should be dismissed in order to vindicate petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy trial, see Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967).
The initial question, however, is whether there exist "special circumstances" that justify a federal court proceeding to adjudicate the merits of the speedy trial defense prior to the state criminal trial. The rule is well settled that while 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) confers jurisdiction in the federal courts over this kind of claim, pretrial petitions by state defendants alleging a speedy trial defense are normally dismissed without prejudice by federal courts in order to afford the state courts first opportunity to rule on the claim. United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 1976); Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1975); Prock v. District Court, 391 F.Supp. 315 (W.D.Okl.1974); McDonald v. Faulkner, 378 F.Supp. 573 (E.D.Okl. 1974); see Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 489-92, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 418-20, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886). Recognizing the general rule, petitioner argues that the facts of this case bring it within the "special circumstances" exception.
A precise definition of "special circumstances" has not been written; only guidelines exist. Professor Amsterdam, a critic of the general rule requiring exhaustion, has categorized its exceptions as including three types of cases: (1) cases "of urgency, involving the authority and operations of the general government," Ex parte Royall, supra, 117 U.S. at 251, 6 S.Ct. at 740; see, e. g., In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 658, 34 L.Ed. 55 (1890) (); In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372, 10 S.Ct. 584, 33 L.Ed. 949 (1890) (); (2) cases involving petty offenses where the burden of trial and appeal will be greater than the penalty and, therefore, presenting the probability of widespread deterrence of federally protected conduct without challenge; and (3) cases in which state processes though theoretically available are, in practice, ineffective due to procedural obstructions. Amsterdam, "Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial," 113 U.Pa.L.Rev. 793, 892-908 (1965). Some courts have spoken in terms of delay, harassment, and bad faith prosecution as possibly furnishing additional types of "special circumstances." See, e. g., Moore v. DeYoung, supra, 515 F.2d at 446 n.12. See also Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975). The typical speedy trial defense does not fit easily into any of these categories.
The affirmative defense to a pending prosecution based upon denial of a speedy trial must be distinguished from the demand for a speedy trial entertained in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, supra. There the petitioner was a state prisoner seeking to bring to a head the issue of the continuing validity of a pending out-of-state indictment and associated detainer. The Court explained:
Petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies as a prelude to this action. It is true, of course, that he has not yet been tried on the Kentucky indictment, and he can assert a speedy trial defense when, and if, he is finally brought to trial. It is also true, as our Brother Rehnquist points out in dissent, that federal habeas corpus does not lie, absent "special circumstances," to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a state court. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed.2d 868 (1886). Petitioner does not, however, seek at this time to litigate a federal defense to a criminal charge, but only to demand enforcement of the Commonwealth's affirmative constitutional obligation to bring him promptly to trial. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969). He has made repeated demands for trial to the courts of Kentucky, offering those courts an opportunity to consider on the merits his constitutional claim of the present denial of a speedy trial. Under these circumstances it is clear that he has exhausted all available state court remedies for consideration of that constitutional claim, even though Kentucky has not yet brought him to trial.
Id. 410 U.S. at 489-90, 93 S.Ct. at 1127. This petitioner would raise, instead, the question of the merits of the speedy trial defense.
Petitioner is to be tried in state court on charges of robbery and binding, which have been outstanding since 1970. From October, 1971, until September, 1975, petitioner was incarcerated in Canada after conviction for an unrelated offense. Petitioner alleges that from at least April, 1974, when Connecticut filed a detainer with Canadian authorities, state officials have been aware of his whereabouts and have made no effort to bring him to trial until recently, even though he requested a speedy trial in June, 1974. Upon his release from Canada, petitioner was taken into federal custody and transported to Florida for trial on a 1971 counterfeiting indictment. Petitioner's motion to dismiss that indictment for lack of a speedy trial was granted on December 17, 1975, by the Federal Court in which it had been pending. United States v. Raffone, 405 F.Supp. 549 (S.D.Fla.1975).
While petitioner was in federal custody in Florida, a fugitive warrant was issued on behalf of Connecticut. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in a Florida state court, the petition was dismissed, and then he commenced this action in federal district court in Florida. He also petitioned for an order staying the state court extradition proceedings until the federal habeas corpus action was finally determined on its merits. The stay was denied on March 4, 1976. On Friday, March 5, petitioner was taken into custody by a Florida sheriff and on Sunday he was turned over to Connecticut authorities and transported to Connecticut. The federal habeas corpus petition was then transferred here.
Petitioner pled not guilty to the state charges on March 31, 1976, and was able to post bond on April 6. On April 15, he filed pretrial motions in state court, including a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. On April 27, he filed a civil complaint against the Governors of Connecticut and Florida and the sheriffs allegedly involved in his weekend arrest and transfer to Connecticut and charged them with violating his constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Petitioner argues that the weekend spiriting to Connecticut and the ruling of the Federal Court in Florida dismissing a 1971 federal indictment on grounds similar to those pressed here constitute "special circumstances" justifying the exercise of this Court's habeas corpus jurisdiction without first requiring petitioner to raise his speedy trial defense in state court.
Whether illegality was involved in the transportation of petitioner to Connecticut will be an issue in his suit alleging violation of his federally protected rights, Raffone v. Grasso, Civil No. N-76-141 (D.Conn. filed April 7, 1976). Should petitioner prevail on that claim, he will be entitled to compensation for whatever adverse consequences he is found to have suffered due to that violation. But even if petitioner was brought into the jurisdiction illegally, he may still be subject to trial on the Connecticut charges; the jurisdiction of the state court is not necessarily defeated. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886). Compare United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974), with United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), and United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975). Certainly the competency of the state court to hear and decide the merits of petitioner's speedy trial defense is not affected. The petitioner's allegations concerning the circumstances of his removal to Connecticut do not constitute sufficient "special circumstances" to justify a federal forum hearing his speedy trial defense before a state court has had an opportunity to rule on its merits. See Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 16 S.Ct. 297, 40 L.Ed. 406 (1895); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 13 S.Ct. 40, 36 L.Ed. 934 (1892).
Some support for petitioner's claim of "special circumstances" might be read from Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952). In Collins, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Vinson v. Department of Probation
...to rule on the merits of the claim. See United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292 (2 Cir. 1976); Raffone v. Stack, 425 F.Supp. 345 (D.Conn. 1976). Moreover, it is also possible that various State remedies are available, including an Article 78 proceeding, New York C.P.L.R. § ......