Raftopol v. Ramey

• Decision Date: 05 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 18482.,18482.
• Citation: 299 Conn. 681,12 A.3d 783
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Anthony RAFTOPOL et al.v.Karma A. RAMEY et al.

299 Conn. 681

12 A.3d 783

Anthony RAFTOPOL et al.

v.Karma A. RAMEY et al.

No. 18482.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 16, 2010.Decided Jan. 5, 2011.*

Patrick B. Kwanashie, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, for the appellant (defendant department of health).Victoria T. Ferrara, with whom was Jeremy F. Hayden, Fairfield, for the appellees (plaintiffs).Kenneth J. Bartschi, Karen L. Dowd, Hartford, Thomas W. Ude, Bennett H. Klein, pro hac vice, Karen L. Loewy, pro hac vice, John Weltman, pro hac vice, and Scott Buckley, pro hac vice, filed a brief for the American Society for Reproductive Medicine et al. as amici curiae.ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.^**McLACHLAN, J.

This appeal raises the question of whether Connecticut law permits an intended parent ¹ who is neither the biological ² nor the adoptive parent of a child to become a legal parent of that child by means of a valid gestational agreement. The use of technology to accomplish reproduction by means other than sexual intercourse no longer may be considered “new” science, and, indeed, the legislature has recognized the validity of such agreements.³ Moreover, no one can deny that assisted reproductive technology implicates an essential matter of public policy—it is a basic expectation that our legal system should enable each of us to identify our legal parents with reasonable promptness and certainty. Despite the facts that assisted reproductive technology has been available for some time, and that the technology implicates the important issue of the determination of legal parentage, our laws, and the laws of most other states, have struggled unsuccessfully to keep pace with the complex legal issues that continue to arise as a result of the technology.⁴ It is our view that our laws should provide an answer to the following two basic questions: (1) who are the legal parents of children born as a result of such technology; and (2) what steps must such persons take to clarify their status as legal parents of such children? Our answers to these questions are limited by the scope of the question presented on appeal, and, even more importantly, by the fact that the broad public policy issues raised by modern reproductive technology and implicated by this appeal more appropriately would be addressed by the legislature. When, as in the present case, however, a statutory scheme is susceptible to an interpretation whereby a child born as a result of a gestational agreement could be deemed to have no legal parent, which rationally could not have been the legislature's intent, the court is bound to interpret the scheme in a manner that confers legal parentage on the intended parents pursuant to the legally valid gestational agreement.

The defendant department of public health (department) appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff Shawn Hargon, an intended parent under the gestational agreement.⁵ On appeal, the department argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction both to terminate the putative parental rights of the gestational carrier, the defendant Karma A. Ramey,⁶ and to declare Hargon a legal parent of the children to whom Ramey gave birth, and, consequently, to order the department to issue a replacement birth certificate pursuant to General Statutes § 7–48a,⁷ naming Hargon and the named plaintiff, Anthony Raftopol, the children's biological father, as the children's parents. The department also argues that the trial court improperly concluded that § 7–48a conferred parental status on Hargon solely on the ground that he was an intended parent and party to a valid gestational agreement.⁸ We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the declaratory judgment. Moreover, we conclude that the trial court's judgment declaring Hargon to be the parent of the children and ordering the department to place his name on the replacement birth certificate is supported by the applicable statutes. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reflects the following facts, either as found by the trial court or undisputed. The plaintiffs, who were domestic partners living in Bucharest, Romania,⁹ entered into a written agreement (gestational agreement), dated July 29, 2007, with Ramey, in which she agreed to act as a gestational carrier ¹⁰ for the plaintiffs. Pursuant to the gestational agreement, eggs were recovered from a third party egg donor and fertilized with sperm contributed by Raftopol. Three of the resulting frozen embryos were subsequently implanted in Ramey's uterus. As a result of the procedures, Ramey gave birth to two children on April 19, 2008.¹¹ DNA testing confirmed that Raftopol was the biological father of the children. Pursuant to the gestational agreement, Ramey had agreed to terminate her parental rights to any children resulting from the procedures, and to sign any forms necessary for the issuance of a replacement birth certificate naming the plaintiffs as the parents of such children. Ramey also had agreed to consent to the adoption of any such children by Hargon and to cooperate fully to obtain this goal. ¹²

Prior to the expected delivery date, the plaintiffs brought this action, seeking a declaratory judgment that the gestational agreement was valid, that the plaintiffs were the legal parents of the children and requesting that the court order the department to issue a replacement birth certificate reflecting that they, and not Ramey, were parents of the children. The department responded that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Hargon did not allege that he had conceived the children and because the court lacked jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of the gestational carrier, the egg donor, and any husbands either may have, which the department argued would be a necessary prerequisite to the declaration that Hargon is a parent of the children.¹³ Finally, the department contended that the allegations of the complaint did not sufficiently establish the paternity of the children. Following a hearing, the trial court issued a ruling declaring that: (1) the gestational agreement is valid; ¹⁴ (2) Raftopol is the genetic and legal father of the children; (3) Hargon is the legal father of the children; and (4) Ramey is not the genetic or legal mother of the children. The court therefore ordered the department to issue a replacement birth certificate pursuant to § 7–48a. This appeal followed. ¹⁵

I

We first turn to the issue of whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to declare Hargon a legal parent of the children because Hargon was not biologically related to the children and did not adopt them. Included within this issue is the question of whether the court was required, as a prerequisite to making any determination regarding Hargon's parental status, to terminate Ramey's parental rights, and, if so, whether the court had jurisdiction to terminate those rights. We conclude that: (1) because Ramey did not have any parental rights with respect to the children, the termination of those nonexistent rights was not a necessary prerequisite to a determination of Hargon's parental status with respect to the children; and (2) the court had jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling regarding Hargon's parental status.

A

Preliminarily, we address the department's claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to declare Hargon a parent because the termination of Ramey's parental rights—over which the trial court would have lacked jurisdiction—was a necessary prerequisite to Hargon's acquiring parental status with respect to the children.¹⁶ “[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented ... and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, 231 Conn. 563, 570, 651 A.2d 1246 (1995). Because Ramey had no parental rights to terminate, we conclude that the trial court was not deprived of jurisdiction.

Our statutes and case law establish that a gestational carrier who bears no biological relationship to the child she has carried does not have parental rights with respect to that child. We have long recognized that there are three ways by which a person may become a parent: conception, adoption or pursuant to the artificial insemination statutes.¹⁷ See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 435, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 116–17, 429 A.2d 833 (1980). The definitional section of chapter 803 of the General Statutes, which deals with termination of parental rights and adoption, defines “ ‘[p]arent’ ” as “a biological or adoptive parent....” General Statutes § 45a–707 (5). The same definitional section defines “ ‘[t]ermination of parental rights' ” as “the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ....” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 45a–707 (8). Reading these two subdivisions of the same statute together suggests that only persons who are biological or adoptive parents have parental rights with respect to the subject children.

In 1975, the legislature provided the third means by which a person may gain parental status. Public Acts 1975, No. 75–233, now codified at General Statutes § 45a–774. Section 45a–774 provides: “Any child or children born as a result of A.I.D. shall be deemed to acquire, in all respects, the status of a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife who consented to and requested the use of A.I.D.” “ ‘A.I.D.’ ” is defined as “artificial insemination with the use of donated sperm or eggs from an...