Raggencamp v. Converse

• Decision Date: 15 November 1883
• Citation: 17 N.W. 361,15 Neb. 105
• Parties: RAGGENCAMP v. CONVERSE AND OTHERS.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

15 Neb. 105

17 N.W. 361

RAGGENCAMP

v.CONVERSE AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Filed November 15, 1883.

Appeal from Lancaster county.

J. H. Foxworthy, for plaintiff.

O. P. Mason, for defendants.

LAKE, C. J.

This case comes here by appeal from the district court for Lancaster county. The plaintiff claims that he was erroneously denied a jury trial. There is no error in this particular. The action was brought to remove a cloud alleged to be resting on the plaintiff's title to land, of which he claimed to be the owner in fee, and was therefore an equitable one, in which the court might, but was not bound to, have given a jury trial. Code, §§ 280, 281. Harral v. Gray, 10 Neb. 186; [S. C. 4 N. W. REP. 1040.] It is claimed also that the finding and judgment are not supported by the evidence; and, in this connection, that a deed in fee-simple of the premises from the plaintiff and his wife to Joel W. Converse, one of the defendants, was improperly admitted in evidence in defense of the action. The objection made to the admission of this deed was that it was “immaterial and irrelevant, and not connected with this case at all.” That it can be seriously urged that this objection should have been sustained is not a little surprising.

In the endeavor to make out his case, the only title to the land which the plaintiff sought to show in himself was that of possession. He claimed simply that he had occupied it adversely to the defendants for 10 years and upwards; and that, consequently, whatever claim they had to it was barred by the statute of limitations. The due execution and delivery of this deed to Converse was abundantly proved; in reality it was admitted. And it was under this deed that the defendants asserted their claim to the ownership of the land. They claimed on the trial, and produced an abundance of evidence to show, that the plaintiff's possession was simply as lessee under the title conveyed by the deed and not in hostility to it. The deed was both competent and material evidence, not only for showing the character of the defendants' title, but as being strongly corroborative of the oral testimony given to the fact that, about the time of its execution, the plaintiff had fully recognized the ownership of Converse under it by becoming his tenant. The evidence is not only sufficient to sustain the finding of the district court upon it, but it leaves no doubt whatever as to the fact that the plaintiff's possession was such as...