Ragland v. Angelone

Citation420 F.Supp.2d 507
Decision Date14 March 2006
Docket NumberNo. 7:02 CV 00786.,7:02 CV 00786.
PartiesOmoro RAGLAND, Plaintiff, v. Ron ANGELONE, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

Omoro Ragland, Capron, VA, pro se.

Joel Christopher Hoppe, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TURK, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff Omoro Ragland, an inmate of Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC") who is proceeding pro se, complains that the VDOC's grooming policy, Departmental Operating Procedure 864 ("DOP 864"), punishes him for his religious practice of wearing his hair and beard uncut by reducing his privileges, increasing the security restrictions to which he is subject, and reducing his opportunity to earn good conduct time. Ragland asserts that the penalty provisions of DOP 864 violate his rights under the First Amendment, as actionable under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with jurisdiction vested under 28 U.S.C. § 1343; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et. seq., and various state laws, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 18.1 The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that RLUIPA is unconstitutional on several grounds and that Ragland is not entitled to relief under any constitutional provision or RLUIPA.2 Ragland responded to defendants' motions, making the matter ripe for the court's consideration.3 Upon review of the record, the court concludes that the motions for summary judgment must be granted.

I. Background

Section 3 of RLUIPA prohibits governments from enacting regulations, including rules of general applicability, or otherwise taking actions that impose a "substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution," unless the government demonstrates that imposition of that burden furthers "a compelling governmental interest" by "the least restrictive means." § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). This strict-scrutiny standard applies any time such a burden on religious exercise occurs "in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance," or "affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect," interstate or foreign commerce. Id. The statute creates a private cause of action for persons who allege that a government has substantially burdened their religious conduct. § 2000cc-2(a). Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on whether the challenged law places a substantial burden on his exercise of religious belief; if plaintiff proves this threshold issue, the government program is put to the burden of proving that the imposition of the burden furthers a compelling interest by the least restrictive means. § 2000cc-2(b).

On December 15, 1999, the VDOC began enforcing DOP 864, setting forth new personal grooming standards for all inmates who are incarcerated in VDOC facilities. Def. Mem., Dkt. # 33, Johnson Affid., Enclosure A ("DOP 864"). The policy covers hair care, hair style, beards, mustaches, fingernails and general hygiene. Defendants assert that this grooming policy, modeled after a similar policy implemented by the South Carolina Department of Corrections in. August of 1997, was designed to promote safety, security, and sanitation, and to facilitate the identification of inmates. DOP 864 directs that male inmates must keep their hair no more than one inch in depth and thickness. Male inmates may not wear beards, goatees, or sideburns below the middle of the ear unless they obtain an order from medical staff exempting them from shaving. Mustaches must be neatly trimmed and may not extend beyond the corner of the mouth or over the lip. Men who get a no-shave order for medical reasons must keep their facial hair trimmed to one eighth of an inch in length or shorter. DOP 864 prohibits male inmates from wearing certain hair styles such as braids, plaits, dreadlocks, cornrows, ponytails, buns, mohawks, partially shaved heads, designs cut into the hair, or any style which could conceal contraband.

Defendants offer evidence that an inmate's failure to comply with the DOP 864 standards poses potential risks regarding security, health, and inmate identification. Thus, the DOP authorizes prison officials to manage such inmates as potential risks to institutional order and safety. See DOP 864.4(J). Inmates who refuse to cut their hair, beards, and/or fingernails, or to alter their hair styles to comply with the specifications of this procedure will be given an order to do so. If an inmate continues to refuse to comply, he will be charged with a violation of Major Offense Code 201, disobeying a direct order, and be placed on pre-hearing detention. If convicted, that inmate will serve an isolation sentence. If he is convicted of two more violations, he will serve two additional, longer isolation sentences and then be referred to the Institutional Classification Authority for assignment to segregation, possible reclassification to a higher security level institution, and a possible reduction in the rate at which he can earn good time or earned sentence credit. The inmate will remain assigned to segregation until the inmate fully complies with the grooming standards.

Ragland states that he is of the Rastafarian religion, Nyahbinghi Order, and is a member of the International Rastafari for Inity Embassy in North Carolina and an associate member of the Rastafari Universal Order Rebirth 2000 in Florida. He states that as a Rastafarian, he has taken the Biblical vow of the Nazarite by which one pledges to JAH ("God") that no razor shall touch his head or beard until the time his consecration to JAH is completed.

Ragland alleges the following sequence of facts from which his claims arise. When DOP 864 took effect in December 1999, Ragland was in special housing at South Hampton Correctional Center ("SHCC"). Because he refused to cut his hair or shave his beard, he immediately lost the privilege of attending all program activities and was restricted to legal visits and telephone calls. Between December 15, 1999 and January 27, 2000, officials charged Ragland three separate times for refusing to comply with DOP 864. He was convicted on these charges and penalized with isolation sentences. In October 2000, officials transferred Ragland to the special housing unit at Keen Mountain Correctional Center ("KMCC"). Because he continued to refuse to comply with the grooming policy, officials continued to assign him to special housing at KMCC, then at Bland Correctional Center from March to July 2001, and then at Buckingham Correctional Center from July 2001 to the time he filed this complaint in July 2002.4 Ragland filed repeated grievances about the effects of DOP 864, complaining that the policy punished him for practicing his religious beliefs and deprived him of the right to rehabilitative and educational programs. In February 2001, officials reclassified Ragland as a high security risk, placing him in a category of inmates that do not earn any good conduct time. This change pushed his anticipated release date from January 2009 to July 2009.

Ragland complains that strict enforcement of the grooming policy punishes his religious exercise through the deprivation of programs and privileges, which has caused him to lose the ability to earn good conduct time. He asserts that this "disciplinary" aspect of the policy is disproportionate to his "misconduct." He claims that the policy thus places a substantial burden on his religious beliefs and that its provisions are not the least restrictive means by which officials could achieve their stated interests. Ragland argues that the policy should include an exception for inmates who fail to comply with the grooming requirements for religious reasons such that he could wear his hair and beard uncut and also retain the security classification, good time earning capacity, and privileges that he enjoyed before implementation of the policy.

II. Analysis

Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. Upon motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts, and the inferences to be drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). Rule 56(c) mandates entry of summary judgment against a party who "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion . . . fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, the moving party is not entitled to summary judgment if the parties' dispute over a material fact is "genuine." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. When a motion for summary judgment is made and properly supported by affidavits, depositions, or answers to interrogatories, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Instead, the non-moving party must respond by affidavits or otherwise and present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of disputed fact for trial. Id.

A. The grooming policy is constitutional.

The court must grant the motions for summary judgment as to Ragland's claims that the VDOC grooming policy violates his rights under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Prison regulations that infringe on inmates' constitutional rights are valid so long as they are rationally related to...

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    ...upon the fact that an inmate could choose to be placed in segregation rather that comply with the grooming policy. Ragland v. Angelone, 420 F.Supp.2d 507 (W.D.Va.2006) ("Ragland was not forced to cut his hair or beard. He continues to practice this aspect of his religious beliefs. This fact......
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