Ragland v. State
| Decision Date | 05 April 1900 |
| Parties | RAGLAND v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from city court of Talladega; G. K. Miller, Judge.
Nathan Ragland was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appeals. Reversed.
The trial was begun on October 31, 1899. Before entering upon the trial on that day, the defendant moved the court in writing to quash the venire of the petit jury in said cause on the following grounds:
The state admitted the truth of the allegations of fact in all the grounds of said motion, except the allegation in the seventh ground that the regular jury for the week during which the cause was set for trial was not organized as the regular jury for such week. The court overruled the motion on all of the grounds, and the defendant then and there duly excepted. The defendant then made a written motion to quash the venire on the following grounds:
The state admitted all of the allegations of the last-named motion to be true, whereupon the court overruled the said motion and the defendant then and there duly excepted. The defendant pleaded two pleas: (1) not guilty, and (2) not guilty by reason of insanity.
The state offered evidence showing that the defendant shot the deceased with a pistol late in the afternoon on the streets of Talladega, and that the deceased died from the effects of said shot, and rested.
The defendant offered evidence showing that he was struck a heavy blow upon the front part of the head, over the left eye, and about where the forehead and the hair meet, when he was a boy, which rendered him speechless and unconscious for a month or six weeks, and that since said injury the defendant at frequent intervals acted and spoke without reason, his eyes glaring and expression of his face being abnormal, and that at such intervals the defendant was insane. The state admitted that the defendant would prove the above facts by H C. Bingham had he been present, and this admission was introduced in evidence. Several other witnesses testified in substance to the same facts.
The defendant introduced the following letter, which was shown to have been in the handwriting of defendant's daughter Lena, an unmarried girl, under 18 years of age, living up to the date of the letter with the defendant and her mother in the town of Talladega, and which was shown to have been read by the defendant at about 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the day of the killing, and that the defendant thereupon was first thereby informed of the seduction of his said daughter by the deceased:
The defendant offered the testimony of expert and other witnesses tending to show that since the blow upon his head he was insane and subject to spells of recurrent manifestations of the insanity superinduced by the blow and frequently brought on by great exciting cause, and sometimes provoked by trivial irritating causes. The state introduced several witnesses who testified they had never seen any manifestations of insanity in the defendant, and who also testified that his general character was bad; but that they had never heard his character for truth and veracity questioned.
The other facts of the case and the rulings of the court upon the evidence to which exceptions were reserved are sufficiently shown in the opinion. The circumstances and the facts relating to the argument before the jury by counsel for the state are also sufficiently shown in the opinion.
The court was requested by the defendant, before the argument of the case was begun, to deliver his charge to the jury in writing, which he did, and his charge is contained in the bill of exceptions. As soon as the court had finished reading said written charge to the jury and defendant excepted to the said written charge as a whole, he then excepted to each sentence separately of the court's said written charge. He then excepted to that portion of the court's written charge which reads as follows: "Now applying this principle to the case at bar, the court charges you as a matter of law as applied to the facts of this case that the defendant did have cooling time, and that if he was sane at the time of the homicide, the offense, if any was committed would not be manslaughter." Defendant, also, then excepted to that portion of the court's written charge which reads as follows: "If it is shown that a person is insane only at intervals, his mind being lucid at all other times, if such person commits an act of criminal character, the presumption is that he committed it during a lucid interval and the burden is upon him to show that he committed it while insane." Defendant also then excepted to that portion of the court's written charge which reads as follows: "Manslaughter in the first degree as embraced in this indictment is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice-that is as the unpremeditated result of passion-heated blood caused by a sound, sufficient provocation-and such provocation can in no case be less than an assault, either actually committed or threatened, under such pending circumstances as reasonably to convince the mind that the accused had cause for believing and did believe that he would be presently assaulted, and struck in consequence of the passion suddenly aroused by the blow given, or apparently about to be given." Defendant, also, then excepted to that portion of the court's written charge which reads as follows: "Manslaughter in the second degree is where death is unintentionally caused by an unlawful (though not felonious act) or by a lawful act done in an unlawful manner, and the burden rests upon the state in all criminal cases to establish the guilt of the defendant by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." Defendant, also, then excepted to that portion of the court's written charge which reads as follows: "And such provocation can, in no case, be less than an assault, either actually committed or threatened, under such pending circumstances as reasonably to convince the mind that the accused had cause for believing and did believe that he would be presently assaulted, and struck in consequence of the passion suddenly aroused by the blow given, or apparently about to be given."
The court refused to give many charges requested by the defendant, but under the opinion it is unnecessary to set out these charges in detail.
Browne & Dryer, for appellant.
Chas. G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Whitson & Graham, and Alex M. Garber, for the State.
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Barbour v. State
...of evidence concerning the wife's infidelity arose under conditions different from those in the present case. In Ragland v. State, 125 Ala. 12, 28, 29, 27 So. 983, 987, this court 'The letter of Lena, the daughter of defendant, set out in the record, was admitted in evidence very clearly, u......
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Lewis v. State
...him to the jury. A hypothetical state of facts is, therefore, not an allowable basis for the opinion of a nonexpert.' Ragland v. State, 125 Ala. 12, [26,] 27 So. 983, 986, and cases therein cited. The reason for the above rule is that the hypothetical form of presentation is proper only whe......
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State v. Barry
...11 S.E. 639; State v. Rose, 4 S.W. 734; Love v. State, 11 Tex.App. 502; State v. Mears, 66 Mo. 13; Lewis v. State, 15 S.E. 697; Ragland v. State, 27 So. 987; Jackson State, 15 S.E. 677; Sanders v. State, 38 S.E. 841; Gardner v. State, 17 S.E. 86; Rockmore v. State, 19 S.E. 32; Peo. v. Lee G......
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Duncan v. State
...to cool, Palmore v. State, 253 Ala. 183, 43 So.2d 399 (1950). Four hours may be time for sufficient cooling of passions. Ragland v. State, 125 Ala. 12, 27 So. 983 (1900). Under a legion of decisions in Alabama case law, only the provoking events which occur shortly before a killing can be c......