Ragland v. State
Decision Date | 16 June 2015 |
Docket Number | No. A15A0052.,A15A0052. |
Citation | 332 Ga.App. 510,773 S.E.2d 772 |
Parties | RAGLAND v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Steven Mitchell Harrison, for Appellant.
Karl David Cooke Jr., Dist. Atty., Dorothy Vinson Hull, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Appellee.
Terrance Devon Ragland appeals his convictions of rape and enticing a child for indecent purposes. Ragland argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel but has failed to overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. He argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a similar transaction but has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting that evidence. Finally he argues that the evidence does not support his convictions, but we find the evidence sufficient. We therefore affirm.
In considering whether the evidence is sufficient to support a defendant's conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). So viewed, the evidence showed that on the evening of June 23, 2010, the 13–year–old victim was walking to her aunt's house when a man drove up and offered her a ride. She recognized the man because he had spoken with her mother before. She therefore felt safe with him and accepted the ride.
Instead of driving the victim to her aunt's house, the man drove her behind a vacant apartment building. He locked the doors of the vehicle and climbed into the back seat where the victim was sitting. Then he held her down, removed her pants, and put his penis in her vagina.
At one point, the man got off the victim, returned to the driver's seat, and began driving. When he slowed down, the victim got out of the car and ran to her aunt's house. She told her aunt what had happened and the aunt called the victim's mother, who came over, as did police.
The victim described the man's appearance, his clothing, and his car, and told her mother that the man said he knew her. The mother determined that the victim was referring to Ragland and told the police. An officer drove the victim and her mother to the hospital, where, from a photograph, the victim identified Ragland as the perpetrator. The emergency room physician who examined the victim testified that the victim's hymen had been lacerated and her cervix bruised, injuries that were consistent with the victim having been sexually assaulted.
Ragland testified on his own behalf at trial. He admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the victim. But he testified that the victim had told him that she was 17 years old. He also testified that the sex was consensual.
The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ragland was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. at 319(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781.
Ragland argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in two regards. Because Ragland failed to call trial counsel to testify at the motion for new trial hearing, however, he has failed to overcome the presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Ragland is required to show both deficient performance by trial counsel and actual prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687(III), 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783(1), 325 S.E.2d 362 (1985). If Ragland “fails to meet his burden of proving either prong, then we do not need to examine the other prong.” Works v. State, 301 Ga.App. 108, 114(7), 686 S.E.2d 863 (2009) (citation omitted).
The first instances about which Ragland complains occurred during the testimony of a police officer. On direct examination, the officer described driving around, looking for Ragland's vehicle, when he saw the victim's grandmother. He testified that the grandmother, The prosecutor responded, “Sorry, I don't want you to get into what somebody else said.” Defense counsel did not object.
Then on cross-examination, defense counsel asked the officer whether he was able to determine where Ragland lived. The officer responded, Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion, and defense counsel declined the offer of a curative instruction. The trial court asked, “You've reconsidered whether or not that might be advantageous or disadvantageous to your client?” Defense counsel responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”
Another instance about which Ragland complains concerns trial counsel's failure to call as a defense witness a doctor who examined the victim two weeks after the incident and, according to Ragland, would have cast doubt on the testimony of the emergency room doctor who examined the victim on the night of the incident.
Jones v. State, 296 Ga. 561, 567(4), 769 S.E.2d 307 (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Ragland argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a similar transaction, which, he claims, was not admissible for any proper purpose, was not sufficiently similar to the crime on trial, and thus served only as improper evidence of his character and propensity to commit the crimes.1 We disagree.
The similar transaction victim testified at trial that ten months before the incident for which Ragland was on trial, she was walking to the gym one evening when Ragland grabbed her, pulled her across the street to the grounds of a church, and raped her. She was 13 years old at the time. At the time of the commission of the instant crime, Ragland had not been arrested for the similar...
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Wilkerson v. State
...(2001) (proof of penetration is not required establish sodomy, all that is required is some contact). See also Ragland v. State , 332 Ga. App. 510, 513 (3), 773 S.E.2d 772 (2015) (decided under the former Evidence Code; similar transaction victim's testimony is alone sufficient to prove def......